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Introduction
A prominent aspect of the discussion in regards to whether Japan can be labeled fascist 
during  the  1930's  until  its  defeat  in  1945  is  the  lack  of  a  fascist  mass  movement 
concentrated in a fascist political party. Maruyama Masao (丸山眞男) notes that Japan, 
until 1936, lacked a fascist mass movement and that the fascist terrorists did not wish to 
create such a movement.1 He divides Japanese fascism into 'fascism from below' and 
'fascism from above'  and  explains  that  the  military  itself,  as  a  result  of  the  fascist 
terrorism  actually  gained  more  political  power,  and  became  an  important  force  in 
advancing  'fascism  from  above.'2 Was  it  just  the  military's  position  of  power  that 
enabled it to spread militarism and fascism? Was it not the mass base of militarized and 
willing followers within the populace, who had been indoctrinated for decades, who 
came to cheer the fascist terrorism and eventually helped carry the fascization 'from 
above' that was promoted by the military? 
The Imperial Japanese Army (大日本帝国陸軍 dainippon teikoku rikugun) was an 
important  actor  in  the  political  scene  from  Meiji  to  Shōwa  partly  because  the 
restorationists – the Meiji Oligarchs – came from the samurai class, which had been the 
military  force in  Japan  for  centuries.  The  army's  unique  position  in  the  Meiji 
Constitution (明治憲法 meiji kenpō3) and the emperor's position as de jure head of state 
and supreme commander of the armed forces, but de facto not being in control, greatly 
contributed to the army's independence and its being a powerful political player. This, 
however, as this thesis will demonstrate, was only one significant aspect for the army in 
being an important factor in spreading militarism and fascism in prewar Japan. The 
army would have hardly been able to stimulate the support it – for the most part – had 
within the population merely through military propaganda, aided by the fascist terrorism 
of  the  first  half  of  the  1930's,  if  the  massive  indoctrination  of  virtually  the  entire 
populace had not taken place.
 Compulsory education and universal conscription, but most of all, the Imperial 
Military Reserve Association (帝国在郷軍人会  teikoku zaigō gunjinkai, hereafter: zaigō 
gunjinkai) and its subsidiary organizations accomplished comprehensive indoctrination. 
1 Masao Maruyama, “The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism,” in Thought and Behaviour in  
Modern Japanese Politics, ed. Ivan Morris, trans. Andrew Fraser (London: Oxford University Press, 
1963), 52.
2 Ibid., 26-27, 33, 66-67.
3 The Meiji  Constitution is  officially called Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan ( 大日本帝国憲法 
dainippon teikoku kenpō).
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The  zaigō gunjinkai and its subsidiary organizations not only reached the soldiers on 
active  duty  and  the  reserves,  but  almost  all  of  the  Japanese  males,  and  through 
permeating  the  educational  system,  also  a  large  part  of  the  female  population  was 
reached. Fascist and militarist ideology, for example, that of Uesugi Shinkichi (上杉慎吉) 
and Kakehi Katsuhiko (筧克彦), was thus spread throughout the population.
The main argument of this thesis is that the army became a decisive factor in 
spreading militarism and fascism in prewar Japan because it  created a mass base of 
willing followers. A party-centered mass movement which Japanese fascism lacked, was 
thus not necessary to promote militarism and fascism.
The focus of this thesis will be on the army in prewar Japan and not on the  
military including the Imperial Japanese Navy ( 大日本帝国海軍  dai nippon teikoku  
kaigun) as a whole because the navy, as Krebs notes, never became as influential of a 
political actor as the army did.4 The time at which Japan entered the state of being at 
war is determined by multiple factors. When speaking, for example, of the 15 Year War 
(十五年戦争 jūgonen sensō), the Manchurian Incident (満州事変 manshū jihen) is seen as 
the  beginning of  the  war.  For  this  thesis,  however,  roughly 1937 marks  the  end of 
prewar Japan. This is based on several facts: after the February 26 Incident (二・二六事
件  ni-niroku  jiken)  in  1936,  the  army  gained  power  and  measures  were  taken  to 
eliminate remaining liberal tendencies, the kokutai no hongi (国体の本義 Fundamentals 
of our National Polity) was published in 1937, and military budgets reached the levels 
they had during previous wars. Finally, with Konoe Fumimaro (近衛文麿 )  as Prime 
Minister, the army found a willing ally in promoting their aims, and as a result of the 
China Incident ( 支那事変  shina jihen),  also in 1937, which within one month was 
escalated to a full-blown war, the National Mobilization Law (国家総動員法 kokka sōdō 
inhō) was enacted in 1938.
The first chapter examines the Japanese context from the late Meiji period until 
the early Shōwa period focusing on important developments in regards to the Imperial 
Japanese Army. The three wars that Japan was involved in during that time, the first 
Sino-Japanese  War,  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  and  World  War  I,  as  well  as  liberal 
tendencies during the Taishō era, all of which influenced the army's relationship to and 
4 Gerhard  Krebs,  Japan  im  Pazifischen  Krieg:  Herrschaftssystem,  Politische  Willensbildung  und  
Friedenssuche (München, Iudicium-Verlag, 2010), 41. Due to the scope of this paper, the navy will 
not be further discussed. Some aspects of this thesis, for example, the law that enabled only active 
duty officers of the rank of general/admiral to serve as Army/Navy Ministers, however, also apply to 
the navy.
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backing in the populace, will be discussed in order to establish a historic perspective, on 
which the following chapters will build.
The second chapter provides an overview of the specifics of Japanese fascism. 
The focus then proceeds on to the period of fascist terrorism, which can be seen as the 
result  of  the  deteriorating  socioeconomic  situation  discussed  in  Chapter  1.  Two 
significant incidents, the Manchurian Incident and the February 26 Incident that greatly 
promoted the spreading of fascism in Japan will be analyzed. This advancement, as will 
be shown, benefited from the differing levels of support of most army officers and the 
populace. Another result of the fascist terrorism, the continuing inner army factionalism, 
will be addressed.
Yamagata Aritomo (山県有朋), the architect of the Imperial Japanese Army and 
the  conscription  system,  will  be  introduced  in  Chapter  3.  Yamagata,  as  will  be 
demonstrated, did not only form the army but also was involved in major aspects of the 
creation of the Meiji political system. Chapter 3 will conclude with the assessment that 
Yamagata's death in 1922, made faults in the system he was decisive in shaping evident. 
His death created a power vacuum that led to instability, in which radical forces could 
advance their aims more freely than they could have while Yamagata as an eminent 
authority in the background was alive.
Chapter  4  examines  the  various  aspects  of  the Imperial  Japanese  Army.  The 
introduction  of  universal  conscription,  which  was  one  of  the  main  pillars  of  the 
indoctrination effort, will be evaluated before turning to the role of the emperor and the 
armed forces in the Meiji system as shaped by the Meiji Constitution. The role of the 
emperor as de jure supreme commander and the institutions that made up the foundation 
of the army's independence will be analyzed as they were decisive for the emergence of 
the Imperial Japanese Army as a dominant political actor. The focus then shifts to the 
army's educational institutions and the indoctrination within these and the army. This 
indoctrination is significant because it was the nucleus from which the militarist and 
fascist ideology of, for example, Uesugi and Kakehi, was spread among the populace – 
not directly, since universal conscription did not reach the majority of the population, 
but by means of the zaigō gunjinkai and its subsidiary organizations.
Another important person in the military as well as the civilian sphere, Tanaka 
Giichi (田中義一), will be introduced in Chapter 5. Tanaka, like his mentor Yamagata, 
created  an  important  military  institution:  The  zaigō  gunjinkai.  He  also,  as  will  be 
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discussed, had a major role in shaping military policies that had significant effects on 
the Japanese government's policies.
Chapter 6 will focus on the zaigō gunjinkai. Before going into detail, however, it 
is  necessary  to  evaluate  the  indoctrination  that  the  entire  populace  underwent 
independent  of  the  the  zaigō  gunjinkai and  its  subsidiary  organizations:  the 
indoctrination in compulsory education, which was based on the  Imperial Rescript on 
Education (教育ニ関スル勅語 kyōiku ni kansuru chokugo, hereafter: kyōiku chokugo) and 
forms a minor pillar of the indoctrination effort. Attention will then turn to analyzing the 
reasons that convinced Tanaka of the necessity of what became another main pillar of 
the army's indoctrination effort: the  zaigō gunjinkai and its subsidiary organizations. 
The structure of the  zaigō gunjinkai will be discussed subsequently, before shifting to 
the Greater Japan Youth Association  (大日本青年団  dainippon seinendan,  hereafter: 
seinendan),  the  Youth  Training  Centers  ( 青 年 訓 練 所  seinen  kunrenjo,  hereafter: 
kunrenjo), and the Greater Japan National Defense Women’s Association (大日本国防婦
人会  dainippon kokubō fujinkai, hereafter:  fujinkai), that gave the army access to the 
juvenile as well as the female population. The chapter will conclude by analyzing the 
activities that were carried out by these organizations,  evaluating the success of the 
indoctrination effort, and by inspecting the source of funding, will assess the integration 
of the organizations into the local hamlet structure.
Chapter 7 will take up aspects discussed in Chapter 1, mainly the backing of the 
army within the population, and proceeds to discuss the army as a force outside of the 
military sphere. Aspects of the army's ties to the bureaucracy will be depicted before 
focusing on the army's cooperation with the zaibatsu (財閥 business conglomerate). The 
final part of Chapter 7 will evaluate the army's increasing role as a political player.
Chapter 8, as an epilogue, will depict Japan's path towards complete 'national 
mobilization' and 'total war'. The Peace Preservation Law (治安維持法  chian ijihō)  of 
1925, which included the provision that harming the kokutai (国体 national polity) was 
an illegal act, will be analyzed before turning to the kokutai no hongi. Subsequently, the 
China Incident, and the National Mobilization Law, as an example of legislation that 
followed the China Incident and increased the state's authority, will be discussed before 
finally turning the focus to the 'total war' effort which was borne by the willing populace 
as a result of the indoctrination efforts.
Unless otherwise indicated, the English translations are my own. Citations are 
according  to  the  standards  of  the  Chicago  Manual  of  Style  with  the  exception  of 
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Japanese names, which throughout the thesis, and also in the Japanese sources, will be 
given in the Japanese format. Japanese terms are in italics but not capitalized, while 
names are capitalized but not in italics. A list of significant Japanese terms used in this 
paper is located in Appendix I.
1. The Japanese Context & the Army: Late Meiji until prewar 
Shōwa
1.1 The First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War
The Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War are important events regarding the 
Imperial Japanese Army. The Sino-Japanese War marked a temporary end of the anti-
militaristic sentiment within the population. Both wars created a sense of a nation for 
the first time in modern Japan and in the long run gained admiration for and backing of 
the Imperial Japanese Army within the Japanese population as will be shown in this 
chapter.
1.1.1 The First Sino-Japanese War (1894 – 1895)
In 1894 the Japanese ruling elite finally saw their chance to wage war on China. A plan 
had been developed by the General Staff Office (参謀本部  sanbō honbu) as early as 
1887. A decisive factor for this external aggression was public unrest within Japan that 
stemmed from the fact that the Japanese government seemed incapable of revising the 
unequal treaties which in turn spurred radical nationalism.5 It should not be overlooked, 
however,  that  “Japan's  slide  into  imperialism  was  a  logical  response  to  Japanese 
perceptions of world trends.”6 The Sino-Japanese War was popular among the Japanese 
population from the beginning on7 and contributed to the growing nationalism8 with the 
5 Rudolf Hartmann, Geschichte des Modernen Japan: Von Meiji bis Heisei (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
1996), 80-81.
6 Marius  B.  Jansen,  “Japanese  Imperialism:  Late  Meiji  Perspectives,”  in  The  Japanese  Colonial  
Empire: 1895 – 1945, ed. Ramon Hawley Myers et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 
70.
7 Akira  Iriye,  “Japan's  Drive  to  Great-Power  Status,”  in  The  Nineteenth  Century,  Vol.  5  of The 
Cambridge History of Japan, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
765;  Gerhard  Krebs,  “Das  Kaiserliche  Militär  –  Aufstieg  und  Ende,”  in  Militärmacht  Japan?:  
Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte, ed. Heinz Eberhard Maul (München: Iudicium-Verlag, 1991), 33.
8 Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 33.
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public rejoicing over the triumphant victory.9 It also marked the point of making the 
anti-militaristic sentiment within the population a notion of the past. The  “[m]ilitary 
victory  […]  roused  for  the  first  time  a  sense  of  nation.  The  war,  contemporaries 
observed,  had  changed  the  spirit  of  loyalty  and  patriotism from empty  theory  into 
concrete 'national consciousness.'”10 The Sino-Japanese War benefited the military as it 
emerged  from the  conflict  more  powerful,  and  the  Japanese  population  viewed  its 
policies with increasing favor. This gain in power can be recognized by the fact that 
during the 20 years from 1898 to 1918, military officers served as Prime Ministers for  
an amount of time totaling 15 years. This continuing militarization brought with it a 
suppression of democratic movements. The socialist and labor movements, which were 
emerging in Japan around the turn of the century when the postwar economic boom 
turned into a crisis in 1900, are an example of this.11
With the fact that political parties were emerging as noticeable political actors 
for  the  first  time  after  the  Sino-Japanese  War, and  the  bourgeoisie  slowly  gaining 
political  influence toward the end of the 19th century, the  hanbatsu seiji ( 藩閥政治 
politics of oligarchy) which built on the base of the ruling elite made up of nobles, the 
military, and bureaucrats, was marginally threatened for the first time. The bourgeoisie, 
however, at that time was not powerful and independent enough to pose a serious threat 
to the ruling elites.12 From 1900 on the basic framework of Japanese foreign affairs was 
dominated by imperialism; however, peaceful economic expansion and Pan Asianism 
were also publicly discussed and had an influence on official policy.13
1.1.2 The Russo-Japanese War (1904 – 1905)
Preparations for a military conflict with Russia were intensified with the establishment 
of the first Katsura Tarō (桂太郎 ) government (1901-05).14 The cabinet's decision to 
wage  war  on  Russia  can  only  be  grasped  if  the  following  two  aspects  of  Japan's 
domestic context are taken into consideration. (1) The press played a crucial part in 
sensationalizing the Russian presence in Manchuria and portraying Russia as unwilling 
to  agree to  compromise as long as  Japan did not prove itself  determined to use its 
9 Frederick  R.  Dickinson,  War  and  National  Reinvention:  Japan  in  the  Great  War,  1914-1919 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 25; Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 33.
10 Dickinson, War, 25.
11 Hartmann, Geschichte, 83-86.
12 Ibid., 87-88.
13 Iriye, “Great-Power Status,” 773.
14 Hartmann, Geschichte, 88.
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military to demonstrate power. (2) A pro-war movement was organized by intellectuals, 
publicists and political parties which besieged the government using the reasoning that 
since Japan could not be the one to step down, and one party had to back down in order 
to end the power struggle in Korea, the focus had to lie on forcing Russia to do so by 
threatening  them  with  military  aggression.15 While  “[p]atriotism,  militarism,  and 
imperialism were accepted as necessary conditions for the existence of the nation,”16 
with the greater portion of the Japanese population seemingly pressing for war, the only 
organized anti-war movement was small and consisted of a few socialists.17
The war  against  Russia  again  had  a  nationalizing  and unifying  effect.18 The 
Army's reputation, however, temporarily declined somewhat because of the immense 
number of casualties on the Japanese side. Almost 90,000 Japanese soldiers were killed 
in the war.19 The meager gains resulting from the war also led to public unrest.20 In the 
long run, however, the army gained prestige during the Russo-Japanese War (According 
to  Humphreys  the  “prestige  was  never  higher.”21)  that  led  some  army  leaders  to 
overestimate  the  army's  capabilities  and  convinced  them  that  Japan  had  become 
invincible.22 The army leadership also considered that Russia might seek revenge and, 
therefore, strongly pushed for military expansion.23 These views brought Japan a large 
step closer to World War II (WWII).24 As a result of the widespread feeling that Japan 
had been cheated out of its rightful gains after having been victorious in the Russo-
Japanese War,  it  also became a common demand that  the Japanese spirit  had to be 
steeled in order to be prepared for an “inevitable decisive conflict.”25
Due to the newly acquired market and the access to raw materials in Manchuria, 
the Japanese economy along with the defense industry grew further. Japan, however, in 
spite of the economic growth, entered a state of financial crisis in 1907, partly due to the 
15 Iriye, “Great-Power Status,” 775.
16 Ibid., 776.
17 Ibid., 776.
18 Dickinson, War, 26.
19 Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 35. According to Saaler up to 120,000 in comparison 10,000 in the first 
Sino-Japanese war. Sven Saaler, Zwischen Demokratie und Militarismus: Die Kaiserlich-Japanische  
Armee in der Politik der Taishō-Zeit: (1912 – 1926) (Bonn: Bier, 2000), 58.
20 Ikuhiko  Hata, “Continental  Expansion:  1905–1941,“  in  The  Twentieth  Century,  Vol.  6  of  The 
Cambridge History of Japan, ed. Peter Duus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 274; 
Iriye, “Great-Power Status,” 777; Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 36.
21 Leonard A. Humphreys, The Way of the Heavenly Sword: The Japanese Army in the 1920's  (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), 12.
22 Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 36-37.
23 Ibid., 36-37; Saaler, Demokratie, 63-65.
24 Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 36-37.
25 Peter B. High,  The Imperial  Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years'  War, 1931-1945 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 8.
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fact that it did not receive reparation payments from Russia but had to repay its creditors 
nonetheless.26 Japan's  resources,  including  the  newly  accessible  raw  materials  in 
Manchuria, still did not suffice for Japan to be independent from the imports of raw 
materials. Therefore, until the end of the Meiji era, light industry remained the major 
industry in Japan. Japan with its  main sources of national income being agriculture, 
forestry and fishery still hadn't become a modern, industrialized nation.27
The years after the Russo-Japanese War were characterized by an imperialistic 
foreign policy, securing Korea as a Japanese protectorate and the Japanese domination 
of southern Manchuria. This led to a conflict of interests with the USA, which for the 
time  being  could  be  balanced,  for  example,  through  treaties  with  England,  but 
eventually would have a part in leading towards WWII.28
1.2  World War I,  Temporary Economic Prosperity,  Depression,  and 
Military Buildup
World  War  I  (WWI)  created  economic  prosperity  in  Japan  and  generated  high  tax 
revenues which were used to substantially increase military funding. However, with the 
economy  stagnating  and  workers  being  laid  off,  the  years  following  WWI  were 
characterized by public opinion, which had turned against excessive military spending, 
expansion, and the military itself.29 This public opinion was cemented by the utilization 
of  soldiers  to  suppress  labor  uprisings.30 However,  after  the  Kantō  Earthquake  (1 
September 1923), which destroyed large parts of Tokyo and Yokohama, the army was 
able  to  regain part  of its  favor  within the populace by being the major provider  of 
relief.31
The economic boom that Japan experienced during WWI was made possible in 
part  by Europe's and the U.S.'s preoccupation with the war.  This left  the Asian and 
African  markets  open  to  Japan,  which  dramatically  increased  Japan's  exports.  For 
example, machinery and steel as well as chemicals that were formerly imported began 
26 Hartmann, Geschichte, 104-06.
27 Ibid., 106.  Even  in  1926,  Japan's  industrialization  was  significantly  inferior  to  that  of  capitalist  
European nations. Maruyama, “Ideology,” 78.
28 Hartmann, Geschichte, 114. Korea was officially annexed into the Japanese Empire in 1910. William 
Fitch Morton, Tanaka Giichi and Japan's China Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 17-18.
29 Edward J. Drea, Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853 – 1945 (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 2009), 140-41, 161; Humphreys, Heavenly Sword, 45-49.
30 Fujiwara Akira [藤原彰], Gunjishi [軍事史] (Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shinpōsha, 1961), 140; Humphreys, 
Heavenly Sword, 50.
31 Humphreys, Heavenly Sword, 52-53.
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to be produced in Japan. At the same time, Japan experienced massive inflation, and as a 
concomitant  encountered  social  unrest  in  the  form of  the  rice  riots  (1918)  and  the 
peasant and labor movements.32
Once WWI ended and competition began to rise in the export markets, the boom 
vanished and Japan entered a prolonged state of deflation and depression which, due to 
various factors – for example, a decline of exports due to the Kantō Earthquake in 1923, 
and the Great Depression –  lasted until 1931.33 At the same time, Japan experienced 
growth in key industries, for example in mechanical engineering and ship building.34 
This  expansion of  key industries  in  the  decade following WWI can be seen as  the 
“material basis for the policies of military expansionism that led to the Pacific War.”35 
As the industries continued increasing their production and securing foreign technology, 
Japan for the first time became self-sufficient in those areas36 while still relying on the 
import of raw materials.
Farmers suffered greatly due to the cheap rice imports from Korea and Taiwan. 
Their  situation  worsened  starting  in 1925,  because  of  a  “worldwide  surplus  of 
agricultural  commodities  and  the  fall  in  prices.”  This  led  to  an  increase  in  silk 
production,  and  consequently  decreased  the  value  of  silk,  which  led  to  further 
desperation in the agricultural sector. At the same time, larger factories (mainly within 
the secondary sector that had boomed during WWI) laid off workers in order to avoid 
bankruptcy; small  factories opened and people from the countryside migrated to the 
cities and accepted jobs with very low pay and harsh working conditions in order to 
survive, thus stimulating urbanization.37
The situation of the farmers who had suffered throughout the 1920's  became 
worse in the early 1930's,38 with the price of raw silk never recovering, the farmers 
indefinitely lost  their  important second source of income,39 which had a  devastating 
32 Takafusa Nakamura, “Depression, Recovery and War, 1920-1945,” in The Twentieth Century, Vol. 6 of 
The Cambridge History of Japan, ed. Peter Duus (Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
451. Another important cause for the peasant movement was the trend toward absentee landlords. 
Landlords  migrated to  the cities,  damaging the traditional  connection between the tenant  and the 
landlord in his role as a paternalistic leader by becoming increasingly capitalistic and disconnected 
from the tenants' situation. Richard J. Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The  
Army and the Rural Community (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 182.
33 Nakamura, “Depression,” 451.
34 Andrew Gordon,  A Modern History of  Japan: From Tokugawa Times to  the Present  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 140.
35 Nakamura, “Depression,” 453.
36 Ibid., 462.
37 Ibid., 454-58.
38 William M.  Fletcher,  The  Search  for  a  New  Order:  Intellectuals  and  Fascism in  Prewar  Japan 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 41-42.
39 Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey 3rd Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 289.
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influence on the manufacturing industry because the agricultural sector comprised of 47 
percent of Japan's  total  work force.40 Two factors,  however,  led to  Japan's  economy 
recovering faster from the Great Depression than most other countries' economies did. 
Japan finally devalued the yen enabling exports to eventually exceed imports again, and 
arms  production  was  increased  substantially,41 with  the  metal  manufacturing  sector 
expanding from 8.5 percent in 1930 to 18.9 percent in 1936.42 This new intrusion of 
Japanese  goods  into  foreign  markets  led  Western  powers  to  establish  quotas  and 
increase tariffs which spurred resentment in Japan and bolstered the militarists' demands 
for establishing a completely self-sufficient Japanese empire.43
1.3 Democracy During the Taishō Years
As  previously  noted,  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  aside  from  its  unifying  effect,  also 
spurred  resentment  within  the  Japanese  population  because  of  the  high  Japanese 
casualties and meager gains (few territorial and none monetarily) which led to violent 
uprisings. This movement in 1905, was the first  popular movement that,  on the one 
hand, criticized the government's weakness in foreign policies while, on the other hand, 
demanded more constitutionalism and democracy at  home.44 In doing so,  the public 
during the Taishō Democracy ( 大正デモクラシー  taishō demokurashii45) adopted a 
position of external expansionism, which during the Meiji era had been voiced by the 
opposition within the political establishment. To this call for external expansionism, the 
public added a democratic dimension, thus calling for “'constitutionalism at home and 
imperialism externally' (uchi wa rikken-shugi, soto wa teikoku-shugi [内は立憲主義、外
は帝国主義 ]).”46 These indications of liberalism, also in the form of the decline of the 
genrō (元老  elder statesmen), in terms of influence as well as in actual numbers, and 
steps toward universal male suffrage during and after Hara Takashi's (原敬, also referred 
to as Hara Kei) tenure as Prime Minister, which “coincided with a policy of cooperation 
with the Anglo-American sea powers” were,  however,  accompanied by authoritarian 
40 Fletcher, New Order, 41-42.
41 Hane, Modern Japan, 289.
42 Fletcher, New Order, 44.
43 Hane, Modern Japan, 289.
44 Saaler, Demokratie, 59-61.
45 One must note the difference between the Taishō era (1912-1926) and what historians termed the 
Taishō Democracy. In general it is assumed that the Taishō Democracy began with the popular riots in 
1905. The end is either set at 1925, or after the last pre-WWII party cabinet in 1932. Gordon, Modern 
History, 161; Saaler, Demokratie, 57.
46 Saaler, Demokratie, 61.
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policies.  Legal  dissent  was  limited  and  collectivist  values  advocated  within  the 
educational  system by editing  textbooks  towards  more  emphasis  on  values  such as 
loyalty to the emperor and patriotism.47 Apart from the vote, political parties had no 
connection to the Japanese population. There was no substantial grass roots movement 
that  connected  the  people  with  the  parties.  Trade  unions  that  possibly  could  have 
worked as a link between the population and the political parties, although growing in 
quantity between 1911 and 1936, never had more than 500,000 members. This lack of 
connection  to  the  people,  in  addition  to  the  inner-party  factionalism and  the  weak 
institutional setting within the system of the Meiji Constitution, left the political parties 
extremely weak.48 Political parties thus were essentially without the power to provide 
any opposition to the military establishment in times of crisis.
While the Manchurian Incident and the 1929 financial crisis were often seen as 
two  main  factors  for  the  national  opinion  that  was  hostile  to  cooperation  with  the 
Western powers, capitalism – mainly the zaibatsu – and party politics, the seeds of this 
sentiment  were  in  place  “before  economic  disaster  and  military  expansionism 
dominated  the newspaper  headlines.“49 The  zaigō gunjinkai was  founded and began 
indoctrinating its growing membership in 1910. Legislation limiting the spreading of 
political opposition was also established prior to the Manchurian Incident.50 A broad and 
powerful political grass roots movement did not emerge during the 1920's. Instead, the 
1920's prepared the Japanese population to accept what the army had envisioned and 
had been preparing to create: a completely militarized state.51
1.3.1 Pluralization of Japan
During  the  Meiji  period  there  was  no  significant  opposition  to  Japan's  imperialist 
policies within society, and therefore Meiji-Imperialism was not challenged. However, 
“[a]fter World War I and the advent of Taishō democracy […] the international jisei [時
勢 (current of the) times] changed, and with it Japanese liberal consciousness as well.“52
47 Fletcher, New Order, 10.
48 Shūichi  Kato,  “Taishō Democracy as  the Pre-Stage for  Japanese Militarism,” in  Japan in Crisis:  
Essays on Taishō Democracy, ed. Bernard S. Silberman et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1974), 229-30.
49 Fletcher, New Order, 28.
50 Ibid., 28.
51 Kato, “Taishō Democracy,” 232.
52 Jansen, “Japanese Imperialism,” 75.
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Two important aspects of the urban mass society developed during the Taishō 
years:  (1)  the  populace became  significantly  more  exposed  to  politics  and  foreign 
influences through the media. Males were also able to participate in politics for the first 
time although only through the right to  vote,  as membership of the political  parties 
remained extremely low. (2) As a result of the accessible media, the populace was more 
easily  influenced  and  manipulated  by  the  ruling  (eventually  military)  elite.53 For 
example, the Mainichi Newspaper (毎日新聞 mainichi shinbun) expanded its circulation 
from 260.000 in 1912 to 1.500.000 in 1930, and the Asahi Newspaper (朝日新聞 asahi 
shinbun) had an estimated readership of 3 million readers in the 1930's.54
2. Militarism and Fascism in Japan
The question as to whether Japan was fascist before and during WWII remains to this 
day  controversial  in  scholarship.  It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  establish  a  common 
ground of what is being referred to as fascism throughout this thesis. Maruyama Masao 
established a concept for Japanese fascism in 1947 that is still generally accepted among 
Japanese scholars and will provide the basis for the definition of fascism in this paper.
A common criticism that is addressed when arguing the question of fascism, is 
that Japan was not fascist because it lacked some of the significant characteristics that 
were featured in German or Italian fascism: for example, a fascist mass movement that 
was concentrated in a fascist political party.55 This criticism should be reconsidered as it 
53 Kato, “Taishō Democracy,” 229. The press roughly from the Manchurian Incident onwards lessened 
its critical tones and increasingly became conformed with Japan's leadership's aims until it became 
merely a propaganda outlet of the ruling elite and controlled by the military authorities. After the 
China Incident, the newspapers' independence was further restricted as they had to adhere to stringent  
instructions of what they were allowed to publish. Olavi K. Fält,  Fascism, Militarism or Japanism?  
The  Interpretation  of  the  Crisis  Years  of  1930  -  1941  in  the  Japanese  English-Language  Press  
(Rovaniemi: Pohjois-Suomen Historiallinen Yhdistys, 1985), 13-14. Another reason for the press to 
become increasingly favorable of  the military's  expansionism is that  territorial  expansion meant a 
possible increase in readership.  Louise Young,  Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of  
Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 56.
54 Fletcher, New Order, 71; Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2000), 570. Definite numbers are difficult to obtain. Therefore, they vary. 
Young, for example, states that both leading newspapers had a circulation of 1 million each in 1927.  
Young, Total Empire, 59-60.
55 This criticism can be found for example in Peter Duus and Daniel  I.  Okimoto, “Fascism and the 
History of Pre-War Japan: The Failure of a Concept,”  The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 39, No. 1 
(Nov., 1979): 66-67. Martin also criticizes the application of the term of fascism on Japan because of  
grave  dissimilarities  with Germany and Italy.  He further  states  that  the Italian  and  German state  
structures  were also too different  from each other  to  both be labeled fascist.  Bernd Martin,  “Zur 
Tauglichkeit eines Übergreifenden Faschismus-Begriffs: Ein Vergleich Zwischen Japan, Italien und 
Deutschland,” in  Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 29. Jahrgang, 1. (Jan.,  1981):  72-73.  Another 
example that is mentioned in many discussions of Japanese fascism is the question of whether Japan 
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stems from a Eurocentric view and does not acknowledge that the ideology of fascism 
was promoted because of varying reasons and in differing ways.56 Accordingly, fascist 
ideology  differs  from  state  to  state,  based  on  their  varying  cultural  and  historical 
backgrounds.57 While Western historians in general don't consider Japan as being fascist 
in the 1930's and during WWII,58 Japanese historians in general declare the opposite.59
According to Skya, a broad variety of terms are used when referring to “the 
ideology of extreme nationalism that […] inspired the elite and mobilized the masses to 
wage war in East Asia and the Pacific.” Amongst them is Japanese fascism, which will 
be used in in this thesis.60
2.1 An Overview of Japanese Fascism
The ideological background of Japanese fascism, as Skya notes, centers on the “Shintô 
creation story of the Japanese islands by Izanami and Izanagi, the divine origins of the 
imperial  line,  the divinity of the emperor,  the ethnic divinity and superiority of the 
Japanese people, the belief in a divine world mission for the Japanese state, [and] global 
imperial rule under the emperor.”61 It can be seen as a radicalization of the pre-existing 
was  ruled  by  a  dictatorial  regime  or  not.  See  for  example  Alexander  Bürkner,  “Probleme  der 
Japanischen  Wehrverfassung  von  der  Meiji-Zeit  bis  in  die  Gegenwart”  (PhD  diss.,  Rheinische 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, 1975), 133;  Maruyama, “Ideology,” 74; Seizaburō Shinobu, 
“From Party Politics to Military Dictatorship,” The Developing Economies Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 
1967): 680-82. For a brief summary of Western research that argues against applying the concept of 
fascism to Japan, see Hans Martin Krämer, “Faschismus in Japan: Anmerkungen zu einem für den 
Internationalen Vergleich Tauglichem Faschismusbegriff,” Sozial-Geschichte Heft 2 (June, 2005), 13-
16.
56 Dirk Böttcher, “Faschismus: Begriffe und Historische Entwicklung,” in Staat und Gesellschaft, Vol. 2 
of Japan im Schatten des Siegers, ed. Ullrich Menzel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), 77.
57 Kwang-Duk  Kong,  “Tennō-Faschismus:  Zur  Entstehung,  Struktur,  Ideologie  und  Funktion  des 
Herrschaftssystems in Japan,  1868 – 1945” (Phd diss.,  Philipps-Universität  Marburg,  1982), 122. 
Gordon, for example, notes that while there are differences in the fascist states, the similarities Japan  
shared with Germany and Italy are more important. Gordon, Modern History, 202.
58 Böttcher, “Faschismus,” 77.
59 Krämer, “Faschismus,” 7, 18. Kato, for example, refers to Germany and Japan as “two different types 
of fascism.” Kato, “Taishō Democracy,” 225.
60 Skya mentions  and  uses  the  following  terms:  “State  Shintô,”  “Japanese  fascism,”  “Shintô 
ultranationalism,”  “emperor  ideology,”   “emperor  system  fascism,”  “Japanism,”  “Shintôism,” 
“militarism,” in the introductory chapter of his work, but throughout the study mainly uses “radical 
Shintô ultranationalism” to refer to this ideology.  It  is noteworthy that  the terms “nationalism” in 
“ultranationalism” and “extreme nationalism” do not refer to “nationalism” as in the building of a 
nation-state or in liberal nationalism. Walter Skya, Japan's Holy War: The Ideology of Radical Shintô  
Ultranationalism, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 18-19.  Bix for example uses “Emperor-
system-fascism.” Herbert P. Bix, “Rethinking 'Emperor-System Fascism': Ruptures and Continuities in 
Modern Japanese History,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars Vol. 14, No. 2 (April–June, 1982): 
2.
61 Skya, Holy War, 18-19.
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Emperor-system.62 Japanese fascism, like its European counterparts, was characterized 
by (1) notably offensive foreign policies rooted in anti-communist and racist elements, 
(2) aggression as a means of creating domestic unity and political suppression, and (3) a 
magnification of given militarist,  imperialist  and racist  tendencies.63 In  other  words, 
European  and  Japanese  fascism,  have,  for  example,  the  rejection  of  individualistic 
liberalism, the pursuit of expansionist foreign politics, the glorification of military and 
war, and the notion of racial superiority in common.64 The concept of kokutai played an 
important role in the ideological aspect of Japanese fascism as it, “captured in a single 
verbal compound the entire range of ideological virtues that defined what it meant to be 
Japanese, as opposed to the 'other.'”65 A peculiarity of Japanese fascism is the military's 
leading role in advancing it.66
Maruyama  sees  three  aspects  as  distinctive  for  Japanese  fascism. The  first 
distinctive point is the tendency toward a family system.67 The second is the prominent 
position of the idea of agrarianism (農本主義 nōhonshugi).68 The 1929 world depression 
and the hardship it created in Japanese agriculture are to Maruyama the primary social 
cause that accelerated the fascist movement in 1930–1. It had an immediate effect on 
the army and mostly on the young officers (青年将校 seinen shōkō) of whom a large part 
came  from  rural  areas  and  were  sons  of  “lesser  landowners  or  small  independent 
cultivators.”69 The third distinctive aspect is the Greater Asia Principle.70
62 Kong, “Tennō-Faschismus,” 136.
63 Bix, “Rethinking,” 4.
64 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 35.
65 Tetsuo  Najita  and  H.  D.  Harootunian,  “Japanese  Revolt  Against  the  West:  Political  and  Cultural  
Criticism in the Twentieth Century,” in The Twentieth Century, Vol. 6 of  The Cambridge History of  
Japan,  ed.  Peter  Duus (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press,  1988), 714.  The  kokutai and its 
emperor cult, according to Krebs, had been the aim of as well as the premise for the modernization  
during and after the Meiji Restoration. He also states that the term  kokutai,  that demonstrated the 
emperor's family's unbroken line of decent from the gods, was intentionally romanticized and served 
as a means to control the populace and encourage it to serve the emperor and the Japanese nation with 
utmost loyalty and obedience. Krebs, Japan im Pazifischen Krieg, 17.
66 Abe Hirozumi [博純安部], Nihon fashizumu kenkyū josetsu [日本ファシズム研究序説] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 
1975), 173.
67 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 36-37.
68 Agrarianism, in contrast to the “tendency immanent in fascism towards the strengthening of State  
authority and the exercise of a powerful control over all aspects of industry, culture, and thought by  
means of a centralized State authority […] demanded autonomy for all villages in an attempt to put a  
stop to the expansion of the industrial productive power in the cities.” Maruyama, “Ideology,” 37-38. 
For a brief discussion of agrarianism, see Ann Waswo, “The Transformation of Rural Society: 1900–
1950,”  in  The  Twentieth  Century,  Vol.  6  of  The  Cambridge  History  of  Japan,  ed.  Peter  Duus 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 589-605.
69 Maruyama,  “Ideology,” 44-45.  Agrarianism,  according  to  Skya's  analysis,  had  lost  most  of  its 
importance by the mid 1930's and its concept of autonomous agrarian communities loosely linked to 
the emperor within a decentralized state was to a large part replaced by the consensus that favored 
“the emperor on top of a highly centralized and industrialized state.” Skya, Holy War, 249-50.
70 This Greater Asia Principle had its origin during the Meiji era and originally meant emancipating Asia 
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Maruyama further  categorized  Japanese  fascism in  'fascism from below'  and 
'fascism from above,' and divides the era of Japanese fascism into three periods.71 He 
refuses,  however,  to  clearly determine the  beginning of  the  fascist  period  as  “[t]he 
totalitarian system gradually came to completion  within the  framework of  the State 
structure determined by the Meiji Constitution.”72 Maruyama labels the first period that 
was defined by “right-wing movements among civilians” which lasted roughly from 
1919 until  the Manchurian Incident  in  1931 as the 'preparatory period.'  The second 
period,  the  'period  of  maturity,'  in  which  civilian  right-wing  groups  merged  with 
military extremists and parts of the military became the driving factor of fascism, is 
defined by right wing terrorism and lasted until the February 26 Incident. The February 
26 Incident also marked the end of 'fascism from below.' During the third period, the 
'consummation period,' which  begins  with the military's  advance to  dominate Japan 
after  the  February 26  Incident  and  ended  with  Japan's  defeat  in  1945,  the  military 
openly advocated 'fascism from above' and teamed up “with the semi-feudal power of 
the bureaucracy and the Senior Retainers on the one hand, and with monopoly capital 
and the political parties on the other.”73
2.1.1 The Background of Japanese Fascism
One of the driving forces of fascism in Japan was the military. It was backed by what 
Maruyama  calls  the  “pseudo-  or  sub-intellectuals”  within  the  middle  class:  “small 
factory  owners,  building  contractors,  proprietors  of  retail  shops,  master  carpenters, 
small landowners, independent farmers, school teachers (especially in primary schools), 
employees  of  village  offices,  low-grade  officials,  Buddhist  and  Shinto  priests.”74 
Members of this group, through the predominance of the patriarchal structure in Japan, 
had significant influence on their subordinates. In accordance to their position in the 
Japanese social hierarchy, they “also served as executives of town and village councils, 
from European colonialism. Over time, however, the emphasis shifted to Japan establishing hegemony 
over  Asia  instead  of  European  powers  and  finally this  notion was  used  as  a  legitimation  for  an  
imperialist war. Maruyama, “Ideology,” 51.
71 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 26-27, 33.
72 Ibid., 80. Militarist tendencies became visible in Japan when the kyōiku chokugo was promulgated in 
1890 and militarist ideology permeated the educational system. Kazuko Tsurumi, Social Change and 
the Individual: Japan Before and After Defeat in World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1970), 102.
73 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 26-27, 30.
74 Another driving force that Maruyama notes is the bureaucracy. Ibid., 57-58. The bureaucracy will be 
briefly discussed in Chapter 7.
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agricultural, religious, educational, youth and reservist associations,”75 and transmitted 
the  ideological  indoctrination  from  the  ruling  class  to  the  broad  populace.  “It  is 
precisely  these  pseudo-intellectuals  who  directly  controlled  the  thought  and  the 
sentiment of the 'masses'.”76 “The participants in radical fascist uprisings and the leading 
members of right-wing groups”77 also largely came from this “pseudo-intellectual” part 
of the middle class. The “pseudo-intellectuals” due to their social position – pressure 
from above, for example, the zaibatsu and influence on their subordinates – could best 
identify with Japan's situation in world politics, being somewhat backward in relation to 
the West, but being the most advanced in East Asia. They perceived Asian resistance to 
Japanese domination in the same way as the insubordination of rebellious employees 
and “became the most ardent supporters of the China Incident and the Pacific War.”78
The authoritarian and elitist customs in Japanese society were another reason 
why it was possible to instill the populace with fascist ideology without encountering 
massive opposition. Confucianism, the core ideology during the Tokugawa era, as well 
as  authoritarianism and elitism,  featured  anti-individualistic  tendencies,  and were  in 
general socially conservative and illiberal. They cannot be equated with fascism, but 
they formed a base on which it could develop.79 During the Meiji period and until the 
defeat in WWII, Japan was characterized by elitism. The Japanese ruling class consisted 
of several groups of elite, for example, the military, the bureaucracy, and the genrō, that 
were  not  controlled  by  the  cabinet.80 The  political  parties,  as  demonstrated  above, 
generally  lacked  backing  in  the  populace81 and  furthermore,  seemed  unwilling  to 
decisively oppose fascism.82
The Japanese fascist ideology was never absolutely uniform and was altered as 
times made it necessary. The emperor-centered militarist and fascist ideology, taught by 
Uesugi  Shinkichi  and  Kakehi  Katsuhiko  at  the  military's  schools,  permeated  the 
thinking of the Japanese populace, and replaced Hozumi Yatsuka's traditional absolutist 
75 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 60.
76 Ibid., 60.
77 Ibid., 64.
78 Ibid., 64-65.
79 Christopher  W. A.  Szpilman,  “Fascist  and  Quasi-Fascist  Ideas  in  Interwar  Japan,  1918-1941,”  in 
Japan in the Fascist Era, ed. E. Bruce Reynolds (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 99-100.
80 Edwin O.  Reischauer and Albert  M. Craig,  Japan: Tradition & Transformation (Boston:  Mifflin, 
1989), 224-25.
81 Kato, “Taishō Democracy,” 229-30.
82 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 80-81.
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form of emperor ideology with a mass-based emperor ideology within an egalitarian 
state  structure.83 All  totalitarian  movements  have  in  common  the  aim  of  forming 
individuals into a collective body. Japanese fascism was very successful in doing so.84 
The manifestation of fascism as the official Japanese state ideology was secured and 
demonstrated by the  kokutai no hongi.85 Indoctrination was not successful in terms of 
turning the entire Japanese populace into fascists, but this form of Japanese fascism, as 
defined above, did become the dominating ideology. The framework of fascist rhetoric 
was used by staunch fascists  as  well  as non-fascists  of  the ruling elites  in  order  to 
mobilize the Japanese nation and to justify their actions.  It would also be a massive 
exaggeration to contend that all fascists were terrorists. The majority of terrorist actors 
in the 1930's can, nonetheless, be labeled as fascist.86
2.2 Fascist Terrorism
As this thesis focuses on the army's role in spreading and advancing militarism and 
fascism in prewar Japan, the direction of this analysis of Japanese fascism is mainly 
limited to the 'period of maturity' that was characterized by fascist terrorist incidents.87
The radicalization of young officers during the first decade of the Shōwa period 
was  a  result  of  the  deteriorating  socioeconomic  situation  as  depicted  in  Chapter  1. 
Additionally, they were subjected to a 10 percent pay cut. The muting of their protest 
and their financial difficulties in turn evolved into empathy for the masses, who were 
also affected by the perceived greed of the ones in power. It also led to hatred toward 
those  whom the  young  officers  deemed  responsible  for  the  unequal distribution  of 
wealth: the politicians and financial elite.88 These young officers had been indoctrinated 
in military ideology from early childhood on in the rikugun yōnen gakkō (陸軍幼年学校 
83 Skya,  Holy  War, 324-26.  For  details  to  the emphasized  position of  the  armed forces  in  Kakehi's  
ideology, see ibid., 204-05.
84 Ibid., 292-93.
85 Ibid., 261.
86 Ibid., 247-48.
87 Domestic  terrorism  had  already  influenced  Japanese  policies  during  the  Meiji  era.  Right-wing 
extremist groups like the genyōsha (玄洋社) founded in 1881 and the kokuryūkai (黒龍会) founded in 
1901 had, through their activities, for example, the assassination of Empress Myongsong of Korea by 
members of the genyōsha in 1895, guided Japan towards military expansionism with focus on Korea 
and Manchuria.  Their ultranationalist ideology provided a basis for fascist terrorism from roughly 
1931 to 1936. Ibid., 233-34. A brief overview of terrorist plots between 1931 and 1935 can be found 
in  Marion  Laurinat,  Kita  Ikki  (1883  -  1937)  und  der  Februarputsch  1936:  Eine  Historische  
Untersuchung Japanischer Quellen des Militärgerichtsverfahrens (Münster:  Lit Verlag, 2006), 123-
31.
88 Humphreys, Heavenly Sword, 37, 125.
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army preparatory schools), then proceeded into the military's  advancing schools and 
actually  came  into  contact  with  the  'real  world'  for  the  first  time  after  graduating. 
Military reduction went hand in hand with the emergence of the newly rich in the post  
WWI setting, and stood in direct contradiction to the world view that had been instilled 
in them. The young officers' focus was primarily on altering the domestic situation, but 
they also supported overseas expansionist goals.89 Their ideology was based on “the 
highly irrational  premises  of  Japanese  nationalism and  the  emperor-centered  Shinto 
faith,” and they responded, if necessary, to the perceived threat by advocating social 
revolution by means of rebellion and terrorism.90
The terrorist attacks in the 1930's all had in common a lack of realism. Their 
plans, if there were any, generally ended with the plotters dying in battle. No concrete 
plans  were  made  as  to  what  had  to  be  done  once  the  state  was  overthrown,  and 
absolutely  none  materialized.91 The  conspirators  that  took  part  in  the  terrorist  plots 
between 1930 and 1936, never numbered more than 250, and many of them participated 
in many of the plots. Although they were few in number, they were able to influence 
Japan's history greatly because they enjoyed the backing not only of most army officers, 
if not because of their goals at least for their patriotic motive,92 but also of the general 
populace. This was partly due to the fact that their killings were selective and usually 
did not harm innocent bystanders. Furthermore, parts of the populace shared the opinion 
that  the  politicians  who  were  assassinated  deserved  to  have  been.  In  addition,  the 
terrorist acts were successfully portrayed as selfless acts committed for the better of the 
emperor  and the  Japanese  nation.93 While  the  10-year  sentence  of  a  military police 
89 Humphreys, Heavenly Sword, 117.
90 Ibid., 37.
91 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 53-56. The sakurakai (桜会) is one example of a domestic terrorist group that 
stood for national reform, that is, abolition of political-party government, military expansion in Asia 
and bringing about  a  Shōwa Restoration ( 昭和維新  shōwa ishin).  It  was founded by Hashimoto 
Kingoro (橋本欣五郎) in 1930 and consisted of about 100 members of whom most were mid-ranking 
army officers either in the Army Ministry or the sanbō honbu. The  sakurakai together with civilian 
ultranationalists were responsible for the planning of the March Incident (1931), a coup d'état aimed at 
replacing  the  existing  government  with  one  under  military  leadership  headed  by  General  Ugaki 
Kazushige who, however,  backed out and the plan failed. The  sakurakai was also responsible for 
planning of the October Incident (十月事件 jūgatsu jiken) in 1931, which was to take place only shortly 
after the Manchurian Incident but also failed. Richard L. Sims, Japanese Political History since the  
Meiji Renovation: 1868 – 2000 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 155-57; Skya,  Holy War, 235-36. The 
basic aim of the Shōwa Restoration was to establish imperial rule in Asia under the Japanese emperor,  
and to enable the replacement of the constitutional government through direct reign of the emperor.  
Skya,  Holy War,  235-36.  Some of the plotters involved in the 1931 uprising that sought to install 
Ugaki Kazushige as Prime Minister were relocated to Manchuria as part of the Kwantung Army, and 
would take part in the Manchurian incident a few months later. Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 45-46.
92 Humphreys, Heavenly Sword, 124-25.
93 Skya, Holy War, 251.
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officer for murdering an anarchist and a feminist in 1923 “caused considerable critical 
press and public comment,”94 the May 15 Incident (五・一五事件  go-ichigo jiken) in 
1932 and the following trial  proved that a  radicalization in the populace had taken 
place. The murder of the Prime Minister was excused because of its political, patriotic 
motive and was thus deemed better for the nation.95 Fascist terrorism, and the May 15 
Incident in particular, greatly contributed to the end of party cabinets in 1932.96
Japanese  fascism  lacked  a  mass  grass  roots  based  movement.  The  fascist 
terrorism executed by a few radicals, however, had significant influence on Japanese 
history as it stimulated the advance of 'fascism from above.' A fascist restructuring of 
the  state  within  the  existing  state  structure  was  expedited  by  the  military,  the 
bureaucracy, and the political parties.97 Two incidents, the Manchurian Incident and the 
February 26 Incident, which were of decisive importance for spreading fascism in Japan 
– each in their own way – will now be discussed in greater detail.
2.2.1 The Manchurian Incident
Sustaining  Japan's  position  in  Manchuria  had  been  an  essential  part  of  the  army's 
strategic  planning since the  Russo-Japanese War. As the  doctrine  of  'total  warfare'98 
spread  and  became  widely  accepted  among  army officers,  unlimited  access  to  raw 
materials  became necessary in  order  to  build the  basis  for  a  wartime economy and 
further 'national mobilization' (国家総動員 kokka sōdōin99). Manchuria seemed to be the 
perfect place, only loosely connected to China, with the Japanese army firmly in place 
since  1905,  and  rich  in  the  desired  raw materials,  such  as  coal  and  iron  ore.  The 
94 Humphreys,  Heavenly Sword,  58. The police officer,  Amakasu Masahiko ( 甘粕正彦 ), a convicted 
criminal, later served as a police official in Manchuria. Ibid., 59.
95 Ibid., 58; Maruyama, “Ideology,” 67.
96 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 65.
97 Ibid., 65.
98 The phrase 'total war' is usually associated with Erich Ludendorff's  Der Totale Krieg, published in 
1935, which widely spread the concept. Ludendorff characterized a 'total war' by its not only affecting 
the combatants, that is, the military but the entire nation. It required military strength, the support and 
sacrifice of the entire populace, as well as economic strength: a total mobilization of the entire state's  
resources. Erich Ludendorff cited in Abe [博純], Nihon fashizumu, 177-78. Ludendorff, however, did 
not invent the concept, as will be shown in Chapter 6. Tanaka Giichi, who did not live to see the 
publication of Der Totale Krieg, also advocated for the preparation for 'total war.'
99 Nagata Tetsuzan in 1927 stated that “'national mobilization is the task of marshaling the entire society 
of the state in times of need, moving from a peacetime to a wartime footing. The state must then 
organize,  unify,  and  utilize  all  available  resources,  material  and  human,  producing  a  maximum 
national  strength  as  military power.'“  Nagata  Tetsuzan  cited  in  Gordon  M.  Berger,  “Politics  and 
Mobilization in Japan, 1931-1945,“ in  The Twentieth Century, Vol. 6 of The Cambridge History of  
Japan, ed. Peter Duus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 112 [trans. by Berger].
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domination of Manchuria, as army officers perceived, evolved to being a matter of life 
and death to the Japanese nation. During ongoing inner-army power struggles, middle-
rank officers around Ishiwara Kanji (石原莞爾) were able to realize their own vision of 
the Japanese future, and in 1931, launched what came to be known as the Manchurian 
Incident.100 This marked the starting point of the army's takeover of Manchuria.101
On September 18, 1931, disguised Japanese soldiers of the Kwantung Army (関
東軍 kantōgun) detonated a bomb on the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway (南満
州鉄道  minami manshū tetsudō,  in short and hereafter: mantetsu) near Mukden and 
assigned blame to Chinese warlords. Under this pretext, the Kwantung Army occupied 
Mukden and other areas within close proximity.102 With the support of military forces, 
sent by the commander of the Japanese Army in Korea, Hayashi Senjūrō (林銑十郎), the 
Kwantung Army was able to seize Manchuria almost entirely by February 1932, leaving 
the Japanese government no option but to approve of the operation as a fait accompli.103 
The puppet state of  Manchukuo (満州国  manshūkoku) was established on March 1, 
1932, with the former Chinese emperor Pu Yi as de jure head of state, although de facto 
he was only a figurehead.104
The  Kwantung  Army under  the  influence  of  Ishiwara  became  a  hotbed  for 
Japanese militarism and the army's expansionist policies on the Asian mainland.105 Apart 
100 Humphreys, Heavenly Sword, 128; Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 47-48; James L. McClain, Japan: A 
Modern  History (New  York:  W.W.  Norton  &  Co.,  2002), 408-09.  Japan's  army  was  present  in 
Manchuria since the Russo-Japanese War as a result of which Japan, in addition to meager territorial  
gains, had gained a concession for the  South Manchurian Railway.  Hata, “Continental Expansion,” 
274;  Humphreys,  Heavenly Sword, 12. Ishiwara is sometimes mentioned in one breath with the so-
called young officers. This, however, is a faulty interpretation. Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara, during 
the Manchurian Incident, was already relatively high in rank and on the direct route to more important  
postings and cannot be equated with the young officers.  Saaler,  Demokratie, 494. For example, the 
young officers who were directly involved in the February 26 Incident did not exceed the rank of  
captain. Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 52.
101 Skya, Holy War, 236. 
102 Reinhard Zöllner, Geschichte Japans: Von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 
2006), 355. The plans for the Manchurian Incident had been known to the army's leadership in Tokyo. 
Although Ishiwara and his associates' plans seemed too daring to most members of the Army Ministry 
and the sanbō honbu, they were able to secure unofficial support from many important persons. When 
news of the planned seizure of Manchuria reached the emperor, however, the army leadership was 
forced to act. The attempt to stop the plotters from carrying out their plan, however, was in vain as the 
special emissary sent to prevent them,  Tatekawa Yoshitsugu ( 建川美次 ), was a secret supporter of 
Ishiwara. Itō Takashi [伊藤隆], Jūgonen sensō [十五年戦争], Vol. 30 of Nihon no rekishi [日本の歴史] 
(Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 1983), 22-23; Sims, Political History, 156.
103 Hartmann, Geschichte, 176-77. Ishiwara had been able to persuade the commander of the Kwantung 
Army, Honjō Shigeru (本庄繁), who had not been involved in the plans, of their necessity. As a result 
Honjō requested three additional divisions to be sent from Japan. Itō [伊藤 ],  Jūgonen sensō, 23-24. 
The Japanese government did not approve of the army's actions and did not recognize Manchukuo as 
a  state  until  September  1932 –  after  the  May 15  Incident,  the  murder  of  Prime Minister  Inukai 
Tsuyoshi (犬養毅). Hartmann, Geschichte, 177.
104 McClain, Japan, 412; Zöllner, Geschichte, 356.
105 Saaler, Demokratie, 494-95.
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from being a source of raw materials, Manchukuo, basically ruled by the Kwantung 
Army,  was  also  used  to  gain  experience  for  a  wartime  economy,  free  of  civilian 
instruments of control.106
The success of the Manchurian Incident made a substantial impression on the 
Japanese population. The plotters, who had acted without the consent of the government 
and most of their superiors, were seen as national heroes. This euphoria that had been 
ignited in Japan gave the Kwantung Army the necessary civilian backing to operate 
independently in Manchuria.107 In the aftermath, societies that advocated, for example, 
the Shōwa Restoration,  experienced growing popularity.108 To quote Maruyama,  “the 
Manchurian Incident acted as a definite stimulus to Japanese fascism.”109
The continuing power struggles within the army after the Manchurian incident 
led to the creation of two opposing groups: the Imperial Way Faction (皇道派  kōdōha) 
and  the  Control  Faction  ( 統 制 派  tōseiha).  The  Imperial  Way  Faction temporarily 
dominated army policy. It formed around Army Minister General Araki Sadao (荒木貞
夫 )  and was determined to end the domination of the Chōshū clique (including Ugaki 
Kazushige ( 宇垣一成 ),  who was not from Chōshū but affiliated with them) and its 
policies,  for  example,  a  planned  economy.  The  Imperial  Way Faction  also  showed 
sympathy for the struggling rural population, which earned it the support of many anti-
capitalist young officers coming from rural Japan. They believed in the imperial way (皇
道 kōdō; a form of emperor cult). Part of their conviction was that Japan could win wars 
based  on  its  fighting  spirit,  which  had  been  part  of  what  were  considered  to  be 
traditional Japanese characteristics for hundreds of years, and which would make up for 
the lack of technology. Their counterparts around Ugaki and Nagata Tetsuzan (永田鉄
山), who were convinced that fighting spirit could not replace technology, became to be 
known as the Control Faction. Both factions, however, had little differences concerning 
the policy in Manchuria.110 Araki,  as Army Minister,  was able to place many of his 
followers in the most influential positions within the army.111 This rigorous placement of 
106 Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 49. The seizure of Manchuria also had the affect of stimulating Japan's 
economy as exports to Manchukuo expanded by almost 12 percent between 1931 and 1936.  Bix, 
“Rethinking,” 12.
107 Krebs,  “Kaiserliche  Militär,” 48;  Krebs,  Japan  im  Pazifischen  Krieg, 30; McClain,  Japan, 410; 
Young,  Total Empire, 4.  The populace's backing was furthered by the military exploiting the anti-
zaibatsu sentiment within the populace by declaring it would keep the old zaibatsu out of Manchuria. 
Bix, “Rethinking,” 12.
108 Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 48.
109 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 30.
110 Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 49.
111 Ibid., 50; Saaler, Demokratie, 495.
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followers in important posts earned him many opponents. Araki was replaced as Army 
Minister in 1934, and the Imperial Way Faction lost influence.112 After the February 26 
Incident, which was planned and executed by officers connected to the Imperial Way 
Faction, many of the responsible and influential officers were forced to retire or were 
transferred  from  posts  at  the  army's  headquarters  to  regional  offices  where  their 
influence would be limited. As a result,  the Imperial  Way Faction continued to lose 
influence while  the Control  Faction gained power within the army.113 This  does  not 
connote that Kakehi's ideology, which had greatly influenced the thought of the Imperial 
Way  Faction, lost  importance  within  the  army.  Instead,  Kakehi's  ideology  was 
incorporated into the Control Faction.114
2.2.2 The February 26 Incident
In 1935, Aizawa Saburō (相沢三郎 ), an Imperial Way Faction associate, assassinated 
Nagata Tetsuzan. In order to prevent the Imperial Way Faction from using the trial to 
attack the army leadership as well  as the government and create public turmoil,  the 
Control Faction that dominated the  sanbō honbu planned to relocate the army's first 
division, the mainstay of young officers who were linked to the Imperial Way Faction, 
to Manchuria before the Aizawa trial ended. This was perceived as a serious threat by 
the young officers,  who decided to act  before it  was too late.115 Not  only were the 
plotters  able  to  secure  support,  approval,  and  financial  backing  from high  ranking 
military  officers  and  influential  civilians,  but  members  of  the  imperial  family 
contributed as well.116
On February 26, the plotters took action and mobilized roughly 1,600 of their 
subordinate soldiers. They assassinated leading military personnel and politicians and 
were  able  to  gain  control  of  important  strategic  locations  in  Tokyo.  Their  plan  of 
overthrowing the government and replacing it with one under the leadership of either 
Mazaki Jinzaburō (真崎甚三郎 ) or Araki did not end successfully. Neither Araki nor 
112 Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 50-52.
113 Janis Mimura,  Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State (Ithaca: 
Cornell  University  Press,  2011), 44.  Araki,  however,  did  not  lose  his  political  influence.  This  is 
exemplified by the  fact  that  he was appointed Education Minister  in  1938 as  part  of  the  Konoe  
cabinet. Saaler, Demokratie, 496.
114 Skya, Holy War, 191.
115 Ben-Ami Shillony, “The February 26 Affair: Politics of a Military Insurrection,” in Crisis politics in  
Prewar Japan: Institutional and Ideological Problems of  the 1930s,  ed.  George M. Wilson et  al. 
(Tokyo: Sophia University, 1970), 26-29.
116 Shillony, “February 26 Affair,” 29-32, 33-37.
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Mazaki acted and the plotters were eventually forced to surrender on February 29, as the 
emperor, in whose name the plotters had claimed to be acting, advised the army's high 
command to suppress the uprising.117 Kita Ikki (北一輝) and Nishida Mitsugi (西田税), 
who were seen as having provided the ideological background for the uprising, along 
with the plotters, were sentenced to death in a hurried and secret trial. The high ranking 
Imperial Way Faction officers who supported the uprising, were temporarily relieved of 
their duties, until the majority of them would move to important positions again under 
the first Konoe cabinet.118
The February 26 Incident was the largest and the last  fascist  terrorist  plot to 
overturn the existing state structure. It also proved to be a turning point for the inner- 
army  power  struggle  between,  loosely  defined,  the  Imperial  Way  Faction  and  the 
Control Faction. The Control Faction was able to use the February 26 Incident to oust 
the Imperial Way Faction from power and enhance its and the army's political influence 
by “using the menace of radical fascism as a decoy for outsiders.”119 The military was 
able to portray itself as the only capable force of restoring normality.120 'Fascism from 
below' was suppressed while 'fascism from above'  was promoted.  General Terauchi, 
inaugurated Army Minister after the February 26 Incident, saw to eliminating liberalist 
tendencies and proposed weakening the Diet's power by ending the legislature's control 
over  the executive.121 Fascism was “'rationalized'”  in  the political  progress  after  the 
February 26 Incident, and was advanced “by legal means from within the governmental 
apparatus.”122 This  led  to  the  strengthening  of  bonds  between  the  military,  the 
bureaucracy and the zaibatsu, and the increase of military spending, thus completing the 
Japanese fascist structure.123
The  February  26  Incident  also  overshadowed  the  smashing  victory  of  the 
Constitutional Democratic Party (立憲民政党  rikken minseitō) and the success of the 
emerging  Social  Mass  Party  ( 社 会 大 衆 党  shakai  taishūtō),  in  the  1936  election, 
117 William G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 180; Krebs, 
“Kaiserliche Militär,” 52-53.
118 Beasley, Modern Japan, 180-81; Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 52-53. Shillony, “February 26 Affair,” 
49. The custom that only soldiers of the rank of general on active duty could become Army Minister 
was reenacted after the February 26 Incident to keep the generals, who due to their support of the 
plotters were removed from active duty, from direct influence. Beasley, Modern Japan, 180-81.
119 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 66.
120 Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 53.
121 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 66-67. Japan's Imperial Diet (帝國議会 teikoku gikai) consisted of a House of 
Representatives (衆議院 shūgiin, also lower house) and a House of Peers (貴族院 kizokuin, also upper 
house).
122 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 70.
123 Ibid., 71.
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delivering a severe blow to the remaining public support of the political parties.124 The 
military's increased self-confidence led to a clash between the military and the Diet as 
the  military  demanded  a  large  increase  in  expenditures,  less  portfolios  for  party 
members  and “radical  reforms of  the  central  bureaucracy to  increase  administrative 
efficiency  for  the  sake  of  national  defense.”125 The  army,  albeit,  had  not  reached 
absolute power yet, which can be seen in the fact that the cabinet headed by General 
Hayashi Senjūrō (林銑十郎, Prime Minister in 1937) collapsed because it was not able to 
overcome the parliament's opposition to certain policies.126
Japanese fascism until the February 26 Incident is characterized by the lack of a 
mass organization. It consisted of a small number of activists. It then evolved and was 
expanded within the existing state apparatus. The civilian right-wing extremists were 
only  able  to  significantly  influence  Japanese  politics  when  they  merged  with  the 
military  extremists  in  the  period  of  fascist  terrorism.127 Nonetheless,  the  fascist 
movement, promoted 'from below,' never became more than a few right-wing extremists 
with no concrete plans that were to be followed once they had successfully overthrown 
the existing state structure.128 This lack of realistic plans is best demonstrated by the 
outcome of the February 26 Incident: approximately 1600 soldiers were only able to kill 
“a few elderly men.”129
Although coup d' états such as the February 26 Incident were failures, a fascist 
alteration of the state took place. The reason for this lies in the fact that it wasn't only 
the young officers  who advocated the “military-fascist-motion” that  centered on the 
remodeling of the state. This notion was also present in the military's core.130 Although a 
Shōwa Restoration,  that  Skya determined as  one of  the  “fundamental  purpose[s]  of 
life”131 for  a  Japanese  fascist  terrorist,  never  materialized,  the  fascist  terrorism had 
significant  influence.  The  Manchurian  Incident  gave  the  army a  boost  in  terms  of 
support within the populace.  The party cabinets ended after the  May 15 Incident in 
1932, and the military gained new heights in terms of influence over Japanese politics 
124 Fletcher,  New  Order, 79.  The  success  of  the  Social  Mass  Party,  however,  cannot  be  seen  as  a 
demonstration  of  anti-militaristic  sentiment  within  the  populace.  The  Social  Mass  Party  was 
dominated by pro-government and pro-military forces that were somewhat in favor of  the fascist  
current – at least more so than the major conservative parties were. Bix, “Rethinking,” 18.
125 Fletcher, New Order, 79.
126 Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 53.
127 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 51-52.
128 Ibid., 57.
129 Ibid., 56.
130 Abe [博純], Nihon fashizumu, 175.
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after  the  February  26  Incident  and  began  spreading  'fascism from above.'  Fascism 
gained widespread support, arguably, even amongst members of the imperial family.
We  will  now  turn  to  Yamagata  Aritomo,  who  played  an  important  role  in 
creating  the  Imperial  Japanese  Army  and  the  Meiji  institutions,  which  became  an 
important base for militarism and fascism to form in Japan.
3. Yamagata Aritomo (山県有朋, 1838 – 1923)
Yamagata Aritomo came from lowly samurai heritage. He would become one of the 
most,  arguably  the most,  influential  Japanese  oligarchs  who dominated  Japan in  its 
period of modernization and imperialism. In 1907 he was awarded the honor of being 
raised to the rank of prince.132 Yamagata is considered to be “a key figure in the creation 
of Japan's modern army and civil governmental system,”133 and became “by far the most 
politically powerful man in the army.”134 He died merely a decade before Japan would 
turn towards fascism. A part of his legacy, as we will see, are institutions that, without 
his leading authority in the background, facilitated the militarist and fascist takeover in 
the 1930's.
3.1 Military and Political Career
Yamagata Aritomo was born in  the Domain of Chōshū ( 長州藩  chōshū han,  today 
Yamaguchi Prefecture 山口県 yamaguchi ken) on June 16, 1838.135 He received most of 
his education at home on a somewhat irregular basis, as was common in lowly samurai 
families. Concurrently with his schooling, from the age of thirteen onwards, Yamagata 
worked small jobs, in which he showed reliability and talent and was able to slowly 
advance to more prestigious, however, still minor positions in the local han (藩 feudal 
domain) administration.136 The first record of Yamagata coming into contact with anti-
Tokugawa forces, which sought to reestablish imperial rule, was during an intelligence 
gathering mission. In 1858, he and five other young samurai, among them Itō Hirobumi 
132 Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan: 1838-1922 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), 1-2, 232.
133 Richard J. Smethurst,  “The Creation of the Imperial  Military Reserve Association in Japan,”  The 
Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 30, No. 4 (Aug., 1971): 815.
134 Humphreys, Heavenly Sword, 2.
135 Fujimura Michio [藤村道生], Yamagata Aritomo [山県有朋] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1961), 1.
136 Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo, 5-6.
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( 伊藤博文 ) were sent to Kyoto by the  han's  authorities to investigate the changing 
situation in the Tokugawa bakufu (徳川幕府). Upon his return to Chōshū, Yamagata was 
accepted as a student and influenced by Yoshida Shōin (吉田松陰), a prominent advocate 
of the  sonnō jōi (尊王攘夷  “ 'honor the emperor, expel the barbarians'”) movement.137 
Yoshida's teachings included the idea that “'[t]he lord-vassal relationship is man's first 
principle, and preserving independence from the barbarians is the nation's main task,'“ 
and  focused  on  the  importance  of  the  value  of  loyalty  “to  family,  the  han,  to  the 
emperor, and to the divine nation.“138 These ideas were of significant importance for 
Yamagata's  intention  to  create  a  conscript  army,  and  later  Tanaka  Giichi's  aim  of 
creating 'national villagers'139 after the Russo-Japanese War.
As a result of the han's army being defeated by foreign troops that the sonnō jōi  
advocates sought to expel, the han's army was restructured in 1863 to include peasants 
as  well  as  samurai.  Yamagata  became an  officer  in  the  so-called  kiheitai ( 奇兵隊 , 
irregular militia). The  kiheitai and other mixed militia units (諸隊  shotai) trained in 
Western  style  fighting  and tactics,  and combined Japanese and Western  weapons.140 
Yamagata was able to gain more experience as a military leader of the kiheitai during 
battles with foreigners,  during an inner-Chōshū power struggle which the  sonnō jōi  
advocates won, and the ensuing war between the Tokugawa bakufu and Chōshū, from 
which Chōshū emerged victorious.141 On his second intelligence gathering mission in 
Kyoto nine years after the first one, Yamagata met like-minded, anti-bakufu samurai 
from Satsuma, such as Saigō Takamori (西郷隆盛) and Ōkubo Toshimichi (大久保利通) 
for  the  first  time.142 During  the  Meiji  Restoration,  Yamagata,  as  commander  of  the 
kiheitai, gained further experience with peasants as soldiers and his skills as a military 
leader came to be more widely known.143
Yamagata's  conviction  that  universal  military  service  would  considerably 
enhance the security of a nation was deepened during his first trip to Europe and the 
U.S. from August 1869 to September 1870. This trip also became an important step in 
137 Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo, 11-13. Europeans and Americans were referred to as 'barbarians.'
138 Ibid., 15.
139 Smethurst defines a 'national villager' as follows:  “A national villager was a person who supported 
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the  symbols  of  Japan's  unity.”  Richard  J.  Smethurst,  introduction  to  A Social  Basis  for  Prewar  
Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community, by Richard J. Smethurst (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1974), xvi.
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his career as he, upon returning to Japan, was the first person without rank and title to 
be permitted an audience with the emperor, during which he reported his observations 
from overseas.144 Shortly after returning from this inspection tour of Europe and the 
U.S.,  Yamagata  was appointed Assistant  Vice  Minister  of  the Military Ministry and 
immediately  began  planning  a  national  conscript  army.145 He was  convinced  that  a 
strong  army  was  of  utmost  importance  in  order  for  Japan  to  prosper.146 Universal 
conscription, to Yamagata, was a means to strengthen and unify the nation, as well as an 
important educational factor. Additionally, it would lead to all men becoming soldiers 
and loyal subjects to the emperor.147
After separate Army and Navy Ministries were established on 27 February 1872, 
Yamagata was appointed Vice Army Minister, and from 18 April 1873 to 24 December 
1878, Army Minister.148 In addition,  he was appointed Councilor of State in  August 
1874.  When  Saigō  resigned  from his  post  within  the  army,  Yamagata  became  the 
“leading military figure in the government.”149 In order to become the first chief of the 
newly established sanbō honbu, he stepped down as Army Minister. His new position 
made him more powerful than ever before.150 “[A]s state councilor and supreme military 
adviser to the emperor, Yamagata enjoyed the highest position of military authority in 
the  nation.”151 The  gunjin  chokuyu ( 軍 人 勅 諭  Rescript  to  Soldiers  and  Sailors152), 
arguably one of the most important documents in the Meiji period, was promulgated in 
1882 as a result of Yamagata's influence on the emperor.153
In 1882,  Yamagata  also assumed his  first  civilian  post  in  the  Meiji  political 
system, while maintaining his position of leadership within the army. He became acting 
president of the Legislative Board, a preparatory body that advised the government on 
issues concerning the writing of the constitution.154 Yamagata was inaugurated Home 
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Minister  in  1883.  In  this  position  he  greatly  contributed  to  the  restructuring  of  the 
system of local government.155 Local self-government, similar to universal conscription 
in Yamagata's view, was an important pillar that would provide a solid foundation on 
which the state would prosper. Both universal conscription and local self-government, 
in Yamagata's opinion, connected the populace to the central government and would 
encourage unity and contribute to stability.156 Yamagata was convinced “that in return 
for a modicum of local responsibility loyal support of the government's goals would be 
given.”157
The  next  major  step  in  Yamagata's  career  was  becoming  Prime  Minister  in 
December 1889, a post he held concurrently with that of Home Minister.158 During his 
term in office, he strongly supported the promulgation of the kyōiku chokugo.159 In his 
inaugural speech in front of the first Diet on December 6, 1890, Yamagata laid out an 
important  aspect  of  Japanese policy that  would  influence  the  nation's  policy,  in  the 
external as well as in the domestic sphere for decades to come. Yamagata spoke of 'lines 
of  sovereignty'  and  'lines  of  interest.'  He  defined  the  'lines  of  sovereignty'  as  the 
territories under Japanese control and the 'lines of interest' as those in the immediate 
proximity of Japan. Securing both lines, he claimed, was necessary to maintain Japanese 
independence. From this he concluded the necessity of significant military expansion.160 
The 'lines of interest,' which Yamagata did not define in his speech, referred to Korea. 
He had previously clarified this in a written statement, which he circulated amongst the 
cabinet ministers.161
Yamagata ascended the next step in his civilian career in 1893 when he became 
President of the Privy Council (枢密院 sūmitsuin), which brought him even closer to the 
emperor.162 During  the  second  cabinet  that  Yamagata  headed  (1898–1900),163 he 
instigated legislation that limited active duty generals and admirals to becoming Army 
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and  Navy  Minister  in  order  to  keep  party  politicians  from  interfering  in  military 
bureaucracy.164
After and in between the official posts which Yamagata was to assume until his 
death, he, as genrō, maintained a strong influence within the military as well as in the 
political  sphere.  He  had  insured  his  influence  through  a  clique  of  loyal  followers, 
clansmen from Chōshū, some of whom eventually moved from important posts in the 
army to high offices within the civil bureaucracy, in the same way he had. Others who 
had been his subordinates during his post as Home Minister, continued to ascend in the 
civilian bureaucracy,165 thus securing Chōshū influence in many areas of the Japanese 
state. After Itō Hirobumi's death in 1909, Yamagata became by far the most influential 
genrō.166
3.2 Yamagata's Death and the Ensuing Power Vacuum
The  dominance  that  Yamagata  had established in  the  army and within  the  political 
sphere, as well as the army's independence from government control, proved to be a 
significant problem after his death in 1922.
As long as  Yamagata  was alive,  he controlled the army,  and it  followed his 
orders.167 After Yamagata's death, the Chōshū clique's influence in the army and political 
arena slowly declined.168 Yamagata as “principal military adviser to the emperor” had 
ensured that the Army Minister and the chief of the sanbō honbu cooperated. After his 
death, threatening rivalries between the Army Ministry  (陸軍省  rikugunshō)  and the 
sanbō honbu ensued. Serious flaws in the system of the dual command structure became 
visible.169 Once his presence as an authority in the background vanished, it became clear 
that  the  structure  of  the  military  was  not  optimal  and  that  the  system  had  only 
functioned properly as long as Yamagata had held the strings. In this way, the military 
system resembles the civilian governmental system. Once its founders were gone,  it 
lacked stability and was easily influenced by extremists.
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Yamagata had established and mainly used the unique  status  of  the  army to 
maintain its independence from civilian control, while the officers in control during the 
1930's  used  the  army's  unique  status  to  actively influence  the  nation's  policies  and 
future.170 Neither the Meiji Constitution, nor the greater part of the institutional structure 
of  the state  and the bureaucracy dominated by the oligarchs,  was altered in  prewar 
years.  The difference from the 1920's,  which were to a certain extent dominated by 
liberal  trends,  and the  1930's,  was the  change of  “the influential  groups within  the 
regime,”  and  as  a  concomitant,  the  change  of  policies.171 Pluralism in  thought  and 
politics coupled with the succession of the Meiji-Leaders by a group that was not united 
by the Meiji-Struggle and, therefore, less collegial, in addition to economic difficulties, 
made  way  for  instability  to  take  hold  of  Japan.172 As  Ramseyer  and  Rosenbluth 
conclude, “[o]nce the oligarchs had died […] most of the substantive checks on military 
power disappeared.”173 In opposition to some scholars who see the 1930's and 1940's as 
a dark valley, an aberration in Japan's proper path, this paper argues that instead, the 
Taishō Democracy was somewhat of an irregularity in Japan's path. From the fact that 
party politics were not included in the Meiji Constitution, one can conclude that the 
Meiji oligarchs, at least initially, did not desire them. The situation in the 1930's and 
1940's is in part a result of the expansion policies since the Meiji Restoration, and from 
a  democratic  viewpoint,  flaws  in  the  Meiji  constitutional  system,  for  example,  as 
demonstrated  above,  the  need of  authorities  in  the background in order  to  preserve 
stability in this unstable environment. An environment in which, as Böttcher notes “the 
only nominally absolute powers of the emperor led to the competition for influence of 
the institutions of state and the powerful groups. Under the pretense of loyalty to the 
emperor,  every sufficiently  powerful  actor  was able  to  pursue his  own interests.”174 
Following Kato's analysis, the state structure did not change in the late Taishō to early 
Shōwa period. It was still in accordance with the Meiji Constitution; it was the function 
that changed.175 The independence of the army, one of the actors with sufficient power 
whose striving for influence benefited from the change of function, is one aspect that 
will be discussed in the next chapter.
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4. The Dainippon Teikoku Rikugun
This chapter will examine the creation of the Imperial Japanese Army. It was an army 
that was meant to establish unity within Japan, secure Japan's independence, and guard 
Japan on its ascendance to big power status. On the basis of its special place in the Meiji 
Constitution and the skillful  conduct of Yamagata Aritomo, the army,  however,  also 
became an independent political actor in prewar Japan, an actor that eventually became 
the primary carrier of the fascist restructuring of the Japanese state.
4.1 Creating and Structuring the Dainippon Teikoku Rikugun
The Imperial Guard (御親兵  goshinpei, or  親兵  shinpei), established as suggested by 
Yamagata, was the first army in Japan that was not an army comprised of soldiers from 
just one  han, but was rather made up of soldiers from three different han (Satsuma, 
Chōshū and Tosa),  united  and organized  as  the  emperor's  army.176 It  “mark[ed]  the 
beginning of  modern  Japan's  military institution,”177 replacing  an  army made up of 
troops  from  independent  domains  that  were  rooted  on  a  quota-based  conscription 
system.178 The  Imperial  Guard  provided  an  important  backbone  for  the  successful 
restructuring of Japan, the abolishment of the  han and the creation of prefectures in 
1871 (廃藩置県  haihan chiken).179 In addition to its  shizoku (士族  former samurai) 
volunteers under the  sōhei (壯兵 ) system,180 by the summer of 1871, the army with a 
“quota-based […] garrison system” had drafted its  first  1500 conscripts  of  whom a 
quarter proved to be physically unfit.181 This new conscript army, however, lacked all 
basic  requirements  to  function:  “weapons,  money,  authority,  and  personnel 
recruiting.”182 In addition, the sōhei system was very costly and was seen as a hindrance 
to securing the Meiji-Reforms. It thus posed a threat to the new government, because 
the  sōhei in general had stronger bonds of loyalty to their former leaders within the 
abolished clans than to the new government.183
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In 1873, finally, through the Conscription Ordinance (徴兵令 chōheirei) the basic 
groundwork of the modern Imperial Japanese Army was laid. By the end of 1873 it 
consisted of about 17,900 men and would expand to about 33,000 in 1875.184 From 1878 
on, with the the successive transition from the French to the German army system, an 
important change took place within the army command structure. The army chain of 
command  was  divided  into  two  separate  institutions:  the  administrative  and  the 
operational command.185
A mutiny among the Imperial Guard, known as the “Takebashi disturbance” (竹
橋事件 takebashi jiken) in 1878, and the advent of political thought advocating popular 
rights within the military became a matter of strong concern to the military leadership, 
spurred  reforms  to  the  military  system,  and  underlined  the  importance  of  a  strict 
prohibition  of  soldiers  being  involved  in  politics.186 Among  the  reforms  were  the 
Admonitions to the Armed Forces (軍人訓戒 gunjin kunkai) issued in 1878, the gunjin  
chokuyu promulgated in 1882, a military police system created in 1881,187 and prior to 
the Meiji Constitution, by means of a memorandum presented to the emperor in 1881 by 
his councilors (参議 sangi), the emperor was termed commander-in-chief and the duties 
of a soldier were outlined to be patriotic and apolitical.188
In the years after the Meiji Restoration, the army's primary objective was that of 
functioning  as  a  police  force  keeping  the  peasants  and  the  shizoku clans  that  had 
opposed  the  Meiji  Restoration  under  control,  and  therefore  enabling  the  new 
government to introduce reforms.189 During the late 1870's to early 1880's, the role of 
the military changed from primarily being responsible for safeguarding the domestic 
status  quo  to  forwarding  external  objectives,  that  is,  expansionist  policies.190 The 
primary objective of official army policy – defense of the homeland within Japanese 
borders – however, was in place until at least the end of the fiscal year 1904 and was not 
officially changed until  the Imperial  National  Defense Plan ( 帝国国防方針 teikoku 
kokubō kōshin) was enacted in 1907. National defense from then on was to be officially 
secured through a doctrine of offensive advance (攻勢主義 kōsei shugi).191
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4.2 Conscript Army
Apart from the fact that an army based primarily on  shizoku,  like the  sōhei system, 
would have posed a threat to the new government,192 a conscript army, as Drea states, 
seemed promising for many reasons: 
“Conscription  would  […]  break  down  the  old  order's  feudal  customs,
promote  the  restoration's  goals,  and  create  a  future  pool  of  trained  soldiers
available in times of foreign crisis and able to protect their homes in times of
internal  disorder.  Furthermore,  army  indoctrination  could  translate  the
conscripts'  regional  loyalties  into national  allegiance and send them home as
veterans  to  proselytize army virtues,  modernization,  and proto-nationalism to
their communities.”193
Conscripts through this indoctrination would eventually live the slogan and become the 
embodiment  of  'good soldier  =  good citizen'  ( 良兵即良民  ryōhei  soku ryōmin) the 
'national villagers' Tanaka Giichi envisioned the entire populace of becoming.
Yamagata  had  been  impressed  by  the  conscripts'  ability  during  the  Meiji 
Restoration.194 This, as well as Yamagata's aim to use conscription as a means of civilian 
education,195 and  the  reasons  mentioned  above,  led  Yamagata  to  strongly  favor 
conscription over any other army model. He based the Japanese conscription system on 
the French one. Common soldiers would serve three years on active duty and four years 
in the reserves.196
Conscription was presented to the Japanese population as having been part of 
ancient  Japanese  customs and as  an egalitarian measure because it  would eliminate 
inequality by opening the military profession to commoners as well  as for example 
nobles  and former samurai.197 However,  during  the  first  years  after  its  introduction, 
conscription was rejected by the population.198 This was partly due to the term 'blood 
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tax'  ( 血税  ketsuzei)  that was used in the conscription law, which caused the mostly 
illiterate  peasants  to  understand  its  literal  meaning.199 The  implementation  of 
conscription spurred uprisings,  and eligibles sought to  circumvent  being conscripted 
using all means possible.200 More riots, during which registration centers were attacked, 
followed in 1874.201 Desertions were frequent in the first years of conscription.202 These 
circumstances show, that the extreme loyalty that the Japanese soldiers demonstrated 
until  the  end  of  WWII  was  not  a  traditional  value  belonging  to  Japan's  “national 
character.” It took decades of indoctrinating and training to consolidate this patriotic 
spirit, an essential part of modern nationalism – and militarism, and fascism – that led to 
the creation of a populace that willingly partook in military service.203
The  conscription  system,  that  would  be included  in  Article  20  of  the  Meiji 
Constitution,204 in its form as introduced in 1872 and enacted in 1873, had serious flaws. 
In theory every male of the age of 20 was to serve in the military. However, many ways 
to evade conscription existed. Apart from exemptions common to conscription, such as 
being a convicted criminal or physically unfit, less obvious exemptions also existed. It 
was possible to evade being drafted by paying a fee of 270 Yen (an enormous sum at 
that time), and students as well as the first born (the household heir) were also exempt 
from the  draft,  which  led  to  adoptions  of  second and third  born sons  into  families 
without a male heir. About 4% of eligibles were drafted in 1876 and as late as 1889 it  
was  not  more  than  about  5%.205 Until  the  conscription  reform in  1889,  the  rate  of 
conscripted eligibles never exceeded 6%.206
According to Katsura Tarō (桂太郎), a Yamagata protégé, the army was missing 
out on the most promising recruits because the rich, influential, and educated were able 
to evade conscription. This gave the army a negative image, and peasants also tried to 
dodge being drafted. This, in addition to the fact that comprehensive civilian education 
could  not  be  secured  since  only  a  small  percentage  of  young  men  were  being 
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conscripted,  led  Yamagata  and  Katsura  to  conclude  that  reforms  were  necessary to 
achieve their goals.207
The  conscription  system underwent  reforms  of  varying  significance  between 
1878 and 1889.208 Many loopholes were closed, and one-year long officers' training for 
middle and high school graduates was introduced. The aim of this voluntary officers' 
training for the elite was to associate  the army elite  (officers)  with the village elite 
(landowning class) with the goal to enhance the military's  status and backing in the 
populace while simultaneously securing order at the military and village levels.209 These 
reforms and indoctrination bore its fruits, and from the mid 1890's onward, serving as a 
conscript in the Imperial Japanese Army was seen as a patriotic duty by the majority of 
the Japanese populace.210
The number of conscripts rose from about 20,689 (5.7% of eligibles) in 1891 to 
151,141 (18.2% of eligibles) in 1936 with the actual number of eligibles continuously 
rising.  The  percentage  of  eligibles  drafted  in  that  period  of  time  (1891  to  1936), 
however, reached its peak during the military expansion after the Russo-Japanese War, 
only falling one step short of the WWII levels, while the amount of draftees per year 
declined due to the budget cuts of the Taishō era only to be increased again after the 
Manchurian Incident until Japan's defeat in 1945.211 In 1873, Yamagata had envisioned 
building an army of 400,000 soldiers.212 However, in 1883, according to Yamagata, even 
after a restructuring of the army now 200,000 soldiers strong, it still fell far short of his 
original goal because of budget restraints. In 1896, after the Sino-Japanese War, the 
army finally reached the strength that Yamagata had aimed for in 1873.213 While the 
quantity of recruits rose, the quality, at least from the viewpoint of the army leadership, 
differed. Conscripts before the 1910's were likely to come from a rural setting and were 
more influenced by the  traditional values present in the countryside and preferred by 
the military.  Due to  demographic changes  and urbanization from the 1910's  on,  the 
likelihood of a conscript coming form an urban background and therefore having been 
subjected to extended education and being politically more knowledgeable and critical 
was  substantially  higher.  The  post  Russo-Japanese  War  recruits  were  more 
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individualistic and required stronger guidance.214 The increase of conscripts during the 
years after the Russo-Japanese War, which put a higher burden on the populace, again 
spurred  a  notion  of  trying  to  evade  being  drafted  on  the  grass  roots  level.215 Mass 
desertions, due to abuse by officers as well  as non-commissioned officers that were 
made public in the media, were a common phenomena in the years after the Russo-
Japanese War.216 At the same time, the increased number of conscripts brought the army 
and the populace closer together. Military thought spread more extensively among the 
populace.217 The conscription system not only proved to be successful in bringing the 
army and populace closer together, it also led to an effective Imperial Japanese Army 
and proved it skeptics wrong, as its first  big test, the  Satsuma Rebellion  ( 西南戦争 
seinan sensō) of 1877 showed.218 Yamagata, who had believed in the capabilities of a 
conscript  army  from  the  outset,  was  impressed  by  the  conscripts'  ability  of  being 
victorious over an army of professionally trained shizoku.219
Dickinson argues that  the Imperial  Japanese Army based on the conscription 
system was established primarily to create and preserve national unity and to achieve 
great power status and not because of a probable menace to Japanese independence,220 
while Harries and Harries see the main objective of its creation in defending Japan's 
independence  of  threats  by  imperialist  powers.221 Regardless  of  where  the  primary 
objective is seen to be, the Imperial Japanese Army did both. As depicted above, the 
Imperial Japanese Army secured Japan's inner peace from early on. From the 1880's on 
with the transformation of Japan into a modern constitutional monarchy until the turn of 
the century and the Russo-Japanese War with Japan's attempt to become an Empire, it 
enabled Japan to  count  itself  among the  great  powers.222 The universal  conscription 
system affected Japan as a nation-state as well as the Japanese people. The surpassing 
influence it had on the lives of the people is comparable in magnitude to the influence of 
the  replacement  of  the  Tokugawa  class-based  educational  system by the  system of 
universal education.223
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4.3  The  Emperor  and  the  Independence  of  the  Dainippon  Teikoku 
Rikugun
Five  institutions were of vast importance in enabling the Imperial Japanese Army to 
become as powerful, influential and independent as it did: (1) The emperor's prerogative 
of supreme command; (2)  direct access to the throne by the Army Minister; (3) the 
Army Minister had to be a general on active duty; (4) the dual command structure; and 
(5) the introduction of the gunrei (軍令 military decree224).
Initially through the gunjin chokuyu, and further secured legally through Article 
11 of the Meiji Constitution, the emperor was promulgated supreme commander of the 
Japanese  armed  forces.225 This  proved  to  be  an  important  obstacle  to  Japanese 
constitutionalism226 since the emperor in reality was not in a position to wield control 
over the military, and the government did not have the legal means to do so.227
The Army Minister's direct access to the emperor ( 帷幄上奏  iaku jōsō) was 
established legally by Article 7 of the Cabinet-Government Regulations (内閣官制第七条 
naikaku kansei daishijijō) in 1889.228 From then on the Army Minister could access the 
throne directly under the pretext that the matter in concern was a military secret. The 
Prime  Minister  would  be  informed  after  the  throne  had been consulted.  The  vague 
definition  of  what  was to  be considered a  military secret  led  to  the Army Minister 
generally  excluding  the  Prime  Minister  from  the  decision-making  process  and 
informing him only of the results.229 With the Army Minister having direct access to the 
emperor, the military was out of the reach of cabinet controls.230 The Army Ministry 
became a military lobby group within the civilian government instead of being a control 
mechanism of  the  government.231 The  military,  albeit,  did  not  immediately come to 
dominate Japanese policies.232
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In 1900, through a revision of a law, the Army Minister had to be an officer on 
active duty (軍部大臣現役武官制 gunbu daijin geneki bukansei).233 This measure enhanced 
the military's already existing political power (resulting from, for example, its role in the 
Meiji Restoration)234 and clearly sought to limit the influence of the political parties on 
the  military.235 It  enabled  the  army to  directly  influence  policies  by  threatening  to 
withdraw its minister, bringing the government to a collapse or not naming an Army 
Minister  in  the  first  place,  preventing  a  cabinet  from  forming.236 This  law  was 
temporarily repealed from  1913 to 1936; however,  de facto,  nothing changed. Army 
Ministers continued to be generals on active duty.237
The dual command structure was created with the establishment of the sanbō 
honbu in 1878, which was independent of the government.  With the  sanbō honbu in 
charge of the army's command (軍令 gunrei), the Army Ministry was left only in charge 
of administration (軍政 gunsei). The sanbō honbu reported directly to the emperor, and 
so its chief of staff enjoyed direct access to the emperor.238 The cabinet could not legally 
control the sanbō honbu and de facto, neither could the emperor.239
In  addition  to  the  institutions  mentioned  above,  one  last  decisive  factor 
guaranteed  the  possibility  of  the  military  making  decisions  independently  from the 
cabinet. This was the establishment of the so-called gunrei in 1907. These gunrei  that 
concerned the command of the army240 were exempt from the legal proceedings that 
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involved all chokurei (勅令 imperial command) having to be countersigned by the Prime 
Minister. This system had significant influence on the independence of the sanbō honbu 
and the Army Ministry. This, notwithstanding, did not mean that the Army Ministry was 
excluded from Japanese politics. In fact, the Army Ministry now had a better position to 
influence policies because through the gunrei it could, for example, exclude the Finance 
Ministry from financial decisions concerning the military.241 
With these institutions firmly in place, securing the army's independence and the 
army's connections to, for example, the bureaucracy, the army was in the best position 
to dominate the state in the late 1930's.242 The civilian government instead of controlling 
the military was forced to defend itself against military domination,243 and the military's 
goals almost always were definite.244
4.4 Indoctrination within the Dainippon Teikoku Rikugun
4.4.1 The Gunjin Chokuyu
The  gunjin chokuyu, promulgated in 1882 by Yamagata, defined the core values of a 
Japanese soldier and was the basis of military education and indoctrination. As Jansen 
analyzes, it was “[d]esigned to serve as moral guidance for the modern armed forces, 
[and] it reminded soldiers and sailors that it was not impetuous bravery that counted, but 
prudence,  self-control,  and disciplined  loyalty.“245 The  rescript  rephrased  values,  for 
example simplicity, valor, loyalty to and respect for superiors, which had been part of 
the samurai bushidō (武士道), for the commoner conscript.246 Within the Japanese armed 
forces it “became […] the core for the ideology of unity, the gunjin (nippon) seishin [軍
人(日本)精神 (Japanese) soldiers' spirit]“247 and “explicitly told the military to stay out of 
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politics.”248 It was studied everyday by the conscripts, who were expected to be able to 
recite an abbreviated version,249 until 1934, when they were expected to know the entire 
rescript.250
4.4.2 Education, Indoctrination and Ideology
The necessity of spiritual mobilization became apparent during the Satsuma rebellion in 
1878.251 Consequently,  one  part  of  the  education  within  the  army  focused  on 
indoctrinating the soldiers with values of patriotism, spiritual superiority, and loyalty to 
the superiors, but most importantly to the emperor. The intensity of this indoctrination 
deepened over time and reached its climax in the period from 1941 until Japan's defeat 
in  1945. In  addition  to  and  before  the  zaigō  gunjinkai's  establishment,  the  army 
indoctrinated its officers through various schools, who were then to spread their mindset 
amongst the conscripts.
The Army Academy (陸軍士官学校  rikugun shikan gakkō), compulsory for all 
officer  cadets,  was established in  1874.252 The Army College ( 陸軍大学校  rikugun 
daigakkō) was established in 1882.253 It was the entrance to important positions within 
the  army  and  only  the  most  promising  officers,  roughly  10  percent  of  the  Army 
Academy  graduates,  attended.254 Additionally,  in  1896  rikugun  yōnen  gakkō were 
established. Sons of military personnel could enroll for three years as early as at the age 
of 12 to 13 years old in order to prepare to follow in their father's footsteps.255
It is noteworthy that two leading theorists of what Skya terms “radical Shinto 
ultranationalism” were lecturers at military schools. Kakehi Katsuhiko256 taught in the 
Law  Department  of  the  Naval  Academy.  He  had  “a  direct  link  with  the  Japanese 
military,”257 since his  teachings were also part of the Imperial Japanese Army schools' 
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curriculum.258 His “ideas […] served as the pillar of the ideology of a clique of army 
officers identified with the Imperial Way Faction.”259 The influence of Uesugi's ideology 
is “particularly noteworthy”260 as he had direct influence on the Imperial Japanese Army 
officers.261 His teachings were part of the military schools' curriculum.262 At Yamagata's 
request, Uesugi began teaching at the  Army College as head of the constitutional law 
department in 1913, and from 1918 on also taught ideology at the  Army Academy.263 
Although few officers were ever members of radical groups such as, for example, the 
Imperial Way Faction, most were fundamentally influenced by the ideology,264 and “it 
was  with  Uesugi  […]  that  the  senior  military  barons  made  common  cause  in  the 
ultranationalist movement of the 1920s”.265
Leading positions in the Army Ministry and the sanbō honbu, as well as the post 
of Army Minister in the period after the Russo-Japanese War,  were usually held by 
graduates  of  the  military  academies  and  colleges,  that  is,  highly  trained  military 
bureaucrats.266 Since officers who had served in the army for an extended period of time 
before entering the Army College, and having been influenced by Kakehi's and Uesugi's 
ideologies, were, after graduating, very likely to move to important offices quickly, they 
were  in  excellent  positions  to  spread  those  radical  ideas  directly  among  their 
subordinates and through them indirectly among the Japanese populace.
The Russo-Japanese War served to reestablish the importance of  seishin (精神 
spirit as in soldiers' spirit) within the Imperial Japanese Army – morale and spirit in 
combat were seen as the decisive factor in Japan's victory.267 In 1908, a completely 
revised guntai naimusho (軍隊内務書, Army Handbook of Interior Administration) was 
issued placing “heavy emphasis on spiritual training and the inculcation of the military 
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virtues.”268 The direct link to the emperor, the “ultimate source of authority,” was used 
to  indoctrinate  the conscripts  with notions of  racial  superiority over  the enemy and 
moral superiority over their fellow civilian countrymen.269 The revised guntai naimusho 
also  introduced  the  system  of  the  army  as  a  family270 which  originated  from  the 
intention of furthering the army's popularity (which had temporarily declined after the 
Russo-Japanese War), while focusing in particular on conscripts from rural areas. The 
slogan “the company commander is the father, the squad leader is the mother” (中隊長は
お父さん、班長はお母さん chūtaichō ha otōsan, hanchō ha okāsan) originated during that 
time. Although some resemblances to prison life survived the transformation, noticeable 
changes took place in the army barracks. To very poor farmers, life in the military could 
seem to be an improvement over the strenuous manual farm labor and meager diet on 
which the poorest of farmers had to survive. This strengthened the army's role in the 
rural areas, but also weakened its base in urban areas. To further the control on the rural 
population,  a  system of  observation  was established.  The company commander,  for 
example, would be provided with a detailed report on the conscript's rank in society and 
in return would send a report on the recruit's performance within the army back to the 
town hall.271 The revised guntai naimusho, however, unintentionally to a certain degree, 
isolated the army “from the people by restricting soldiers'  time off base and strictly 
censoring their reading materials.”272 With the establishment of the zaigō gunjinkai two 
years later, the army gained better access to the lives of the populace and was able to 
communicate its values273 and further army-mobilization. As Fuji notes, the final step 
towards completing the observation system had begun.274
From 1909 on, as Drea analyzed, spreading and deepening “élan and morale 
[among conscripts] became an [army] obsession. According to the conventional army 
wisdom, iron discipline exemplified by unquestioning obedience to orders was the sole 
means to enhance spiritual power and inculcate confidence in victory.“275 The Infantry 
Field Manual (歩兵操典  hohei sōten276) was revised accordingly in 1909, stressing the 
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importance of seishin and insisting on the infantry's decisive role in winning battles by 
attacking with small weapons and bayonets277 and therefore negating the importance of 
modern technology and weaponry. “The manual also intimated that proper attention to 
military discipline would develop an irresistible attack spirit that would inevitably result 
in victory.”278
With many army manuals edited and rewritten in  the years  between 1908 to 
1913,  genuine  Japanese  ideas  found  their  way  into  the  manuals  for  the  first  time 
replacing many of the existing ideas that had been copied from French and German 
military manuals. These ideas that would later characterize the Japanese army, consisted 
of an absolute lack of scientific rationality, extreme spiritual idealism, and the belief in 
sole infantry advance – an almighty infantry attacking with unsheathed swords. The 
revised manuals established the emperor ideology as a part of army thought and began 
spreading  it  within  the  army through  various  measures. Since  the  Army Codes  of 
Conduct (陸軍礼式 rikugun reishiki) were revised in 1910, even more emphasis was put 
on the deification of the emperor, who from then on was saluted in a special manner 
otherwise reserved for gods.279
As a response to the spreading of what political leaders considered  dangerous  
thought, for example communism within the Imperial Japanese Army in the aftermath 
of WWI, the army undertook various countermeasures.280 One of them was the revision 
of the guntai naimusho in 1921.
“The manual first used the term kokutai (national polity) to accentuate the army's 
unique relationship with the throne along with a grassroots appeal to nationalism 
wrapped in contempt for other Asians. Stressing that  kokutai  and the unbroken
imperial line conferred a sacred uniqueness on the army, authorities reaffirmed
the  army's  intangible  attitudes  of  self-sacrifice,  loyal  service  to  the  emperor,
unselfishness, and courage to cultivate a distinctive ethos that distinguished the
institution from the civilian culture.”281
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The  emphasis  on  extreme  spiritual  idealism and  the  belief  in  an  almighty  infantry 
attacking  with  unsheathed  swords  came  under  reconsideration  due  to  experience 
gathered in WWI. Finally in the Battle-Outline Draft (戦闘綱要草案 sentō kōyō sōan) in 
1926, the necessity of science was to a certain degree acknowledged.282 This, however, 
did not signify a turn towards realism. The Infantry Manual of 1928 still included many 
of the  crazed notions of infantry advance instead of combined arms warfare.  It also 
featured the first appearance in any manual of the concept of “'belief in certain victory'” 
that  commanders  had  to  instill  in  the  soldiers.283 In  1934,  furthermore,  the  Army 
Ministry published a pamphlet entitled The True Meaning of National Defense and the  
Proposal to Strengthen it (国防の本義と其強化の提唱 kokubō no hongi to sono kyōka no  
teishō) which underlined the “importance of a total national defense state” and stated 
that war was “'the father of creation and the mother of culture.'”284 Ideological education 
(精神教育  seishin kyōiku) was an important part of the military training during the 
military  service  from  the  outset  of  conscription  on,  and  it  gained  more  and  more 
importance during the Taishō years.285 Through the education and indoctrination of the 
conscripts, the military's  values were spread among the population as the conscripts 
upon returning home shared their experience with their families.286
In the next chapter we turn to Tanaka Giichi, who was next to Yamagata, the 
important  person  in  terms  of  spreading  military  values  among  the  populace,  as  he 
played a decisive role in enlarging the indoctrination apparatus beyond the limits of 
conscription with his work in establishing the zaigō gunjinkai.
5. Tanaka Giichi (田中義一, 1864 – 1929)
Tanaka Giichi,  the father of the  zaigō gunjinkai and the last  of Yamagata Aritomo's 
protégés, is  considered  to  have  been  an  “outstanding  staff  officer  and  imaginative 
military planner,”287 and “a man of towering ambition,”288 as well as being “personable.” 
He had access to the Chōshū clique's most inner circles and was an influential officer 
throughout his career. He regularly ignored the limitations of his rank and position, and 
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took to influencing military policies and changing military institutions.289 The drafting 
of a memorandum on the necessity of military expansion, which impressed the military 
leadership and led to Tanaka being assigned to draft a national defense plan,290 and the 
establishment  of  the  zaigō  gunjinkai and  the  seinendan,  are  good examples  for  his 
successful attempts to go beyond the boundaries of his rank and position.
5.1 Early Life
Tanaka Giichi, like his mentor Yamagata Aritomo, came from a lowly samurai family in 
Chōshū. Born in 1863, his youth was defined by poverty and anti-government rebellion. 
At  the age of  thirteen,  in  1876,  Tanaka partook in an unsuccessful anti-government 
uprising, but because of his young age, he was pardoned. After this experience Tanaka 
became an avid student, and before enrolling in the Army Academy, for a short period 
of time worked as a school teacher. In 1886, he graduated as an infantry lieutenant. 
Because of his aptitude, he was accepted at the Army College from which he graduated 
in 1898. Because of his Chōshū background, his graduating from the Army College, and 
his political and military views, which had much in common with Yamagata Aritomo's, 
Tanaka was on the most direct path of acquiring important posts within the army. He 
would become one of Yamagata's few protégés.291
5.2 Military Career
Shortly after graduating from the Army College, Tanaka, as part of his assignment to the 
intelligence section of the sanbō honbu, was sent to Russia to study the language and 
investigate the strength and capabilities of Russia's armed forces. In 1902, upon his 
return to Japan, Tanaka became head of the sanbō honbu Russian section. His view that 
the Russian army's major weakness was the nonexistence of communication between 
the officers of noble blood and common soldiers from a peasant background, had an 
influence on the Japanese plans for war with Russia. His determination to wage war on 
Russia was exemplified by his joining the kogetsukai (湖月会) in 1903, an organization 
whose members were all government officials,  who advocated war with Russia within 
legal means. After the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Tanaka was transferred to a 
289 Ibid., 19-20.
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post in the Manchurian Army's staff where he rose to the rank of infantry lieutenant-
colonel.  He returned to  Japan before the war was won in order  to aid Yamagata in 
ending the war before Japanese resources were exhausted.292 This shows that Tanaka, in 
contrast to officers who would later be affiliated with the Imperial Way Faction, had a 
realistic estimate of how capable Japan was in terms of its military capacity. A capacity 
he sought to heighten throughout his career, as will be demonstrated when discussing 
his involvement in establishing the zaigō gunjinkai and the seinendan.
Between 1905 and 1910, Tanaka rose to the rank of major general and played a 
key role in developing Japanese army strategy and creating the aforementioned  zaigō  
gunjinkai.293 In 1906, Tanaka drafted the national defense plan, which Yamagata altered 
slightly.  The plan,  which became official  policy in  1907, was a  commitment  to  the 
maintenance and expansion of Japanese rights, in particular, in Manchuria, and on the 
Asian mainland in general.  The plan also sought to  improve army-navy relations  in 
order to become the dominating force in the Sea of Japan and the Tsushima Straits.294 
The national defense plan, of which revisions were enacted in 1918, 1923, and 1936, 
not  only defined national  defense through a doctrine of offensive advance,  but  also 
became a key instrument in the army's striving towards political influence. It further 
secured  the  high  command's  ( 統 帥 部  tōsuibu)  independence  while  limiting  the 
governments influence on decision making in regards to military matters. At the same 
time, it heightened the military's influence on foreign policy. Additionally, it also served 
to  legitimize  the  military's  intervention  in  the  spheres  of  finance  and  the  national 
economy, and therefore put the system used to degenerate  civilian control firmly in 
place.295 By establishing the “'protection of the nation's existence' (kokka sonritsu [国家
存立 ])” as the basis of foreign policy, which was interpreted as a means to justifiably 
undertake  “preventive  expansion  policy,”296 the  National  Defense  Plan  indirectly 
reinforced Yamagata's idea that the maintenance and defense of 'lines of sovereignty' 
and 'lines of interest' were necessary for the well-being of Japan. 
Tanaka  became Section  Chief  of  the  Military  Affairs  Bureau  in  the  Army 
Ministry (陸軍省軍務局軍事課長 rikugunshō gunmukyoku gunji kachō) in 1909. This post, 
again, was a 'gateway to success' (登竜門  tōryūmon) to achieve higher positions, for 
292 Morton, Tanaka Giichi, 11-15; Smethurst, Social Basis, 13.
293 Morton, Tanaka Giichi, 16; Smethurst, Social Basis, 13.
294 Jansen, “Japanese Imperialism,” 68; Morton, Tanaka Giichi, 16; Smethurst, Social Basis, 13.
295 Saaler, Demokratie, 65; Yoshida [吉田], “Nihon no guntai,” 154-55.
296 Saaler, Demokratie, 67.
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example,  (Vice)  Army  Minister,297 and  “gave  him  direct  (and  frequent)  access  to 
Yamagata.”298 He was  promoted to  major  general  in  1911 and  became head  of  the 
Military Affairs Bureau in the same year. This was a post he held for roughly 15 months 
before being issued the command of the army first division's second brigade, which he 
held until 1914.299
During his time as section chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, Tanaka worked 
on many administrative reforms to stop the abuse of office, for example, regulations for 
promotions to the rank of general. The planning and creation of the  zaigō gunjinkai, 
however,  was  Tanaka's  most  important  accomplishment.300 Although,  in  terms  of 
jurisdiction,  the Military Affairs  Bureau was not  responsible  for  the creation  of  the 
zaigō gunjinkai (the Infantry Bureau would have been), it cannot be denied that Tanaka 
played the key role in its creation and after its creation as well.301 Tanaka, as an advocate 
of the 'good soldier = good citizen' doctrine,302 was convinced that military training led 
by reservists would instill obedience, loyalty, and patriotism in the populace, and as a 
concomitant, would enhance the military's prestige.303 
Upon returning from a trip to Europe and the U.S. in August 1914, Tanaka was 
transferred to the  sanbō honbu.  He was not assigned a particular post until  October 
1915,  when  he  was  inaugurated  as  Vice  Chief  of  the  sanbō  honbu.  He  used  the 
meantime to tackle the organization of the seinendan based on the impressions he had 
collected while overseas.304
While Tanaka was Vice Chief of Staff, he favored of an intervention in Siberia. 
He also supervised the extensive planning for this mission that sought to counter the 
Bolshevik Revolution.305 After becoming Army Minister in 1918, Tanaka changed his 
view concerning the Siberian intervention whose goal he came to deem as unachievable. 
Against the opposition of the sanbō honbu, he worked on reducing troops in Siberia.306
297 Kōketsu Atsushi [纐纈厚], Kindai nihon no seigun kankei: Gunjin seijika Tanaka Giichi no kiseki  [近代
日本の政軍関係―軍人政治家田中義一の軌跡] (Tokyo: Daigaku kyōikusho, 1987), 43.
298 Humphreys, Heavenly Sword, 11.
299 Kōketsu [纐纈], Seigun kankei, 44-45, 48.
300 Tazaki Suematsu [田崎末松], Hyōden Tanaka Giichi: Jūgōnen sensō no genten [評伝田中義一―十五年戦
争の原点], Vol 1 (Tokyo: Heiwa senryaku kenkyūkai, 1981), 261-62.
301 Tazaki [田崎], Tanaka Giichi, 262, 264.
302 Kisaka Junichirō [木坂順一郎], “Gunbu to demokurashii: Nihon ni okeru kokka sōryoku sensō junbi to 
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Yamakawa shuppansha, 1969), 6.
303 Totman, Japan, 369.
304 Kisaka [木坂], “Gunbu,” 6; Tazaki [田崎], Tanaka Giichi, 439.
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Tanaka was again involved in forming national defense policy as the National 
Defense Plan was being revised in 1917. It had become apparent to Tanaka that future 
wars would not be short-lived,  but  rather  drawn out  and required a nation that  was 
prepared to all  extents.  Tanaka's aim was to create a self-sufficient and independent 
nation capable of defending itself.  This,  on the one hand, meant  that the peacetime 
economy had to be structured for a rapid conversion to industrial mobilization during 
wartime,  and that  the populace had to  be prepared  accordingly.  On the  other  hand, 
resource-poor Japan needed to gain unlimited access to resources elsewhere, namely in 
China.  China  was  therefore  deemed  vital  to  Japan's  national  interest,  and  the 
simultaneous north and southward expansion of Japanese borders was anticipated. The 
army's focus on China went hand in hand with the threat of a Russian war of revenge 
diminishing, as Russia was occupied domestically with its revolution.307
In 1921, Tanaka, as a result of a heart attack, resigned from his post as Army 
Minister.  Before his  retirement,  however,  in accordance with the Hara government's 
foreign policy,  he continued to  work towards a  withdrawal of Japanese troops from 
Siberia and the Shandong Peninsula.308 After having recovered his health, Tanaka was 
persuaded to serve as Army Minister again in the Yamamoto cabinet (September 1923 – 
January 1924).309
5.3 Party Politician
During his time as Army Minister in the Hara cabinet, Tanaka came to accept the fact 
that cooperating with political parties had become necessary in order to advance further 
in the nation's political sphere, and therefore made his first close ties with politicians 
from the Friends of Constitutional Government Party (立憲政友会 rikken seiyūkai).310 He 
maintained these ties  to  the  rikken seiyūkai, and in  1925,  during a leadership crisis 
within  the  rikken  seiyūkai,  retired  from active  duty  in  the  army,  joined  the  rikken 
seiyūkai, and was elected its president.311 Tanaka became the only Prime Minister (1927 
307 Drea, Japan's Imperial Army, 138-40.
308 Humphreys, Heavenly Sword, 28-29.
309 Morton, Tanaka Giichi, 47-49.
310 As early as 1910, Tanaka had first advocated to Yamagata the view that the oligarchy had to make use 
of the political parties in order to stay in power. Yamagata did not share this view and condemned the 
involvement of military personnel in party politics but quietly accepted Tanaka's endeavors as Tanaka 
became an important mediator between Yamagata and the political parties. Saaler,  Demokratie, 483-
84.
311 Morton, Tanaka Giichi, 26; Saaler, Demokratie, 484.
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– 1929) with a military background to head a party cabinet.312 The course of action of 
the  rikken  seiyūkai cabinet  headed  by  Tanaka,  according  to  Maruyama,  “almost 
appear[ed]  to  be  that  of  a  fascist  government.”  Freedom  of  speech  and  left-wing 
movements were further suppressed through the revision of the Peace Preservation Law 
by an emergency decree.313 The main theme of the Tanaka cabinet's policy, however, 
was the settling of the “China problem.”314
Tanaka's China policy as Prime Minister was based on the impressions he had 
gathered while meeting important warlords and political leaders during a tour of China 
in 1917. His 'positive China policy' was characterized by a close cooperation between 
the Tanaka government and the army's leadership, as Tanaka had formulated the army's 
China policy for years prior to his inauguration as Prime Minister. It treated China and 
Manchuria as two separate states and sought to avoid war with China over Manchuria. 
Tanaka,  nonetheless,  was  determined  to  secure  Japan's  position  in  Manchuria  –  if 
diplomacy failed,  then by military force.315 When Tanaka's policy of diplomacy was 
seen as failing, demands to secure Manchuria by force became strong within the army, 
primarily  among  Kwantung  Army staff  officers.  Eventually,  Tanaka  lost  the  army's 
support.316
Tanaka resigned in 1929 after he had failed to prosecute the murderers of the 
Chinese warlord Chang Tso-lin: Kwantung army officers. The murder can be seen as an 
attempt to force the Tanaka government into a more aggressive policy towards China. 
Tanaka, on the one hand, had been pressured by the emperor and the political opposition 
to prosecute the responsible officers, and on the other hand, had been pressured by the 
army not to do so. After being unsuccessful in covering the issue up, Tanaka resigned 
under pressure from the emperor. He died shortly afterwards.317
312 Humphreys, Heavenly Sword, 179. Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 44-45.
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314 Saaler, Demokratie, 486.
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Mongolia in order to conquer China. No significant proof has been brought forward, however,  to 
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6. The Teikoku Zaigō Gunjinkai
While this chapter focuses on the Tanaka-designed  zaigō gunjinkai and its subsidiary 
organizations, it is necessary to briefly discuss the compulsory educational system and 
the  kyōiku  chokugo to  establish  an  overview  of  the  indoctrination  that  the  entire 
populace underwent.
6.1 Indoctrination in the Field of Education
Compulsory  elementary  education  was  introduced  by  the  Education  Order  ( 学 制 
gakusei) in 1872.318 It was not until 1900, however, that more than 80% of eligibles 
attended.319 A notable change took place in elementary school education when the ethics 
textbook was edited in 1910. The contents of the edition published in 1903, which had 
been  influenced  by  Western  ideas,  were  replaced  by  increasingly  conservative 
nationalistic ideas.320 This change was made necessary by the sacrifices the Japanese 
population  had  to  endure  during  the  Russo-Japanese  War  which  required  the 
reactivation of a lived patriotism. Emphasis was now put on “[i]mperial and national 
themes, on conservative morality, and on what some scholars call the 'family state' or 
'family nation' (kazoku kokka [家族国家]) ideology.”321 The kokutai was also featured in 
the revised textbook.322 Filial piety at home, but also in terms of including the emperor, 
the head of the “national family,” was stressed as well. Loyalty to the emperor and filial 
piety were brought together to form the sole principle of  chūkō no taigi (忠孝の大義 
“ great loyalty-filial piety principle”). The same was true for patriotism and emperor-
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65; Krebs, Moderne Japan, 17.
319 In 1875 only 35.2%, in 1895 61.3%, in 1905 95.6%, in 1910 98.1%, from 1920 until 1945 more than  
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loyalty.  It  became  the  principle  of  chūkun  aikoku ( 忠君愛 国  “ patriotic  emperor-
loyalty”).323
Since the conscription system had been revised in the 1880's, elementary school 
teachers,  after  completing their  educational  training,  had to  serve in  the army for  a 
period  of  six  months  thus  ensuring  the  army's  influence  in  the  elementary  school 
system.324 In  1917,  Tanaka  dispatched  active  duty  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers  to  middle  schools  and  teachers'  colleges  and  stressed  the  importance  of 
enforcing military education (軍事教育 gunji kyōiku) and military drill (軍事教練  gunji  
kyōren).325 Military  ideology  and  influence  would  further  permeate  the  educational 
system when Ugaki (Army Minister 1924-27, 1929-31), due to budget restraints, had to 
pare costs and reduced the strength of the standing army as well  as the duration of 
conscription in order to modernize the army's equipment in spite of the aforementioned 
budget  restraints.326 The  excess  officers  were  allocated  to  public  schools  to  further 
military drill and education and strengthen patriotism in order to prepare the populace 
for 'total war.'327 To compensate for the shortened duration of the conscript's active duty, 
military training became mandatory at Japanese elementary schools in 1926.328 Tanaka 
had demanded that schools should increasingly be used to indoctrinate and educate the 
323 Karasawa [唐沢] cited in Fridell, “Ethics Textbooks,” 830 [trans. by Fridell]. The history textbook as 
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populace in  military values  as  early as 1911 stating “national  education must  inject 
military ideology [into the populace].”329
6.1.1 The Kyōiku Chokugo
Before Tanaka had risen in rank and become an influential staff officer in the army, 
eventually  Army  Minister,  and  finally  Prime  Minister,  the  kyōiku  chokugo330 was 
published  in  October  1890,  and  laid  the  basis  for  extensive  indoctrination  of  the 
Japanese populace.
The kyōiku chokugo, at least temporarily, put an end to the discussion concerning 
the contents of compulsory education and established the basis for its “Japanization.” It 
defined  the  ethical  maxim  of  education  to  incorporate  values  like  loyalty  to  and 
obedience of superiors and the emperor, an extended form of the Confucian concept of 
filial piety.331 It “made working for the good of the state in the name of the emperor the 
cornerstone of the compulsory educational system.”332 Shortly after its promulgation, 
the kyōiku chokugo was idolized as a “national scripture” and its reading, for example, 
on national holidays, took place “with all the solemnity of a sacred ritual.“333 Students 
were expected to memorize the kyōiku chokugo, which was written in language that was 
not part of everyday conversation. The process of learning and reciting it in this sacred 
manner  led  the  students  and populace  that  had  undergone  this  indoctrination  to  be 
programmed to accept statements that were voiced in the same manner, containing its 
uncommon catchwords, as valid beyond doubt.334 Saaler sees the proclamation of the 
kyōiku chokugo in 1890, as the beginning of the gleichschaltung of military and civilian 
education.335 Indeed,  the  indoctrination  that  was  spread  henceforth  through  the 
educational system would form one of the main pillars that the extreme nationalism and 
expansionism of the following decades would stand on.336
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The  kyōiku  chokugo can  be  seen as  a  means of  extending the  values  of  the 
gunjin chokuyu to the entire population,337 as it gave the education in Japanese schools a 
very nationalistic touch.338 The nationalistic touch that the  kyōiku chokugo provided, 
however, was not sufficient for  the army. The army demanded that more militaristic 
ideology be taught in the schools. Japanese, history, sports, and music lessons were to 
focus on militaristic topics (such as military history, military songs, military drill). This 
was also intended to partially compensate for the reduction of the duration of service for 
the  conscripts.  The  zaigō  gunjinkai was  the  leading  institution  in  securing  the 
militaristic intrusion into the educational sector.339
6.2 The Idea of and Reason for the Teikoku Zaigō Gunjinkai
At the latest in 1903, Tanaka had voiced the opinion that it was necessary for Japan to 
maintain a military reserve that could quickly be reactivated in times of necessity, for 
example, when the standing army alone was unable to fight victoriously against a more 
powerful opponent. His conviction was confirmed during the Russo-Japanese War when 
Japan's army fought to its absolute maximum of capacity.340 Additionally,  Tanaka was 
convinced that future wars would be “nation total wars [my italics]” (国家総力戦 kokka 
sōryokusen) in which not only the military's ability decided over victory or defeat, but in 
which the nation itself needed to be properly prepared to be capable of contributing to 
the cause, making the zaigō gunjinkai and seinendan necessary.341 The reservists would 
be an especially decisive factor, and their ability would have considerable influence on 
the outcome of a war.342
Tanaka wanted to control and mobilize the populace under the leadership of the 
army through  the  system  of  (1)  compulsory  education,  (2)  seinendan,  (3) military 
service and  (4)  zaigō  gunjinkai.343 He  believed  that  training  loyal  soldiers  would 
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341 Tanaka Giichi (田中義一) cited in Kisaka [木坂], “Gunbu,” 6.
342 Tanaka Giichi (田中義一) cited in Tazaki [田崎], Tanaka Giichi, 265. The pamphlet in which Tanaka 
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of it, under the title of Zaigōgunjin no yakuwari (在郷軍人の役割), can also be found in Rekishigaku 
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automatically lead to the creation of loyal citizens.344 The backing of the army within the 
population was to be achieved through the concurrent combination of education and 
military training.345 He was convinced of the necessity of creating a populace built of 
'national villagers' who because of its identification with the values present in the rural 
hamlet structure, would support the military and national goals, and would worship the 
emperor.346 This conviction was also supported by the experience gained during the 
Russo-Japanese War. Japan had, as leading Imperial Japanese Army officers perceived, 
been able to win against a country as powerful as Russia only because the Japanese 
military had been backed by the population and the Russian military had not.347 In order 
to  be  prepared  for  future  wars,  as  far  as  Imperial  Japanese  Army  officers  were 
concerned,  it  was necessary to  remodel  society into a  body as  disciplined and well 
ordered as the Imperial Japanese Army.348 The reservists, in Tanaka's opinion, would “in 
times of war control the fate of the country and in times of peace have the duty to guide 
the development of the nation.”349
6.2.1 Establishing the Teikoku Zaigō Gunjinkai
The first reservist associations were founded around 1900. They were independent, but 
their founding had been encouraged by the army. The aim of those reservist associations 
was to enhance the military's prestige within the population and to act as role models in 
terms  of  morale  and  public  decency.  They  also  participated,  for  example,  in  the 
voluntary  fire  brigades,  cooperated  with  the  police,  substituted  police  duties  and 
supported families with members on active duty.350
344 Tanaka (田中) cited in Tazaki [田崎], Tanaka Giichi, 266.
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The founding of the zaigō gunjinkai in 1910 originated from Tanaka's impulse.351 
The army's structure was transplanted into the hamlet branch chapters (分会 bunkai) of 
the  zaigō  gunjinkai through  a  “top-to-bottom”  procedure,352 absorbing  the 
aforementioned independent reservist associations.353 The zaigō gunjinkai was delegated 
to the jurisdiction of the Army Minister.354
Consistent with Tanaka's aims, the  zaigō gunjinkai was created to further the 
military  preparedness  of  the  male  population,355 to  “educate  the  general  public  in 
military values [and] to build a mass civilian base of support for [the military's] national 
goals and to create a unified Japan in which 'all citizens are soldiers' under the emperor's 
'leadership'.”356 Furthermore,  the  zaigō  gunjinkai would  provide  a  powerful  military 
reserve  to  support  Japan's  expansionist  ambitions  and  would  work  against  the 
“deterioration of popular ideas” (国民思想の悪化 kokumin shisō no akka) in the form of 
increasing tenant uprisings and a growing labor movement, and prevent this political 
awakening  from  spreading  within  the  army.357 As  within  the  independent  reservist 
associations that the  zaigō gunjinkai had incorporated,  the reservists,  as Tanaka was 
certain, would be role models in terms of morale and public decency and would support 
the community in various aspects.358 Above all, the  zaigō gunjinkai and its subsidiary 
organizations  were  used  to  consolidate  the  traditional community  awareness,  to 
encourage the populace to work hard, and, in accordance with the extended form of 
filial  piety as established in  the  kyōiku chokugo,  to  obey superiors  and worship the 
emperor.359 The  zaigō  gunjinkai and  it's  subsidiary  organizations  also  enabled  the 
351 Saaler,  Demokratie, 135.  The planning of the  zaigō gunjinkai had begun in 1906. It was originally 
intended to be a joint venture of the army and navy. Due to various circumstances the founding was 
delayed and in the end the navy backed out. A reservist organization was, in reality, not as important to 
the navy. Due to its structure only a significantly small number of sailors retired from active duty. 
Inoue [井上], “Seiji to gunbu,” 376. The navy eventually participated in the zaigō gunjinkai from 1914 
onwards. Inoue Kiyoshi [井上清], Ugaki Kazushige [宇垣一成] (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1975), 176; 
Kisaka [木坂 ], “Gunbu,” 6. Apart from Tanaka five other officers from Chōshū,  General Terauchi 
Masatake (寺内正毅 , Army Minister); Major General Nagaoka Gaishi (Chief of the Military Affairs 
Bureau of the Army Ministry from 1908 to 1910); Colonel Sugano Shōichi (菅野尚一, Military Affairs 
Bureau);  Commander  Yoshikawa  Yasuhira  ( 吉 川 安 平 ,  Navy Ministry);  Field  Marshal  Yamagata 
Aritomo; and 3 officers who were affiliated with the Chōshū clique although they were not from 
Chōshū,  Major General Oka Ichinosuke (岡市之助 ), Colonel Kawai Misao (河合操 ), and Lieutenant 
Colonel Kojima Sōjirō (児島惣次郎, all three Military Affairs Bureau); worked on the planning of the 
zaigō gunjinkai. Smethurst, “Creation,” 816.
352 Inoue [井上], “Seiji to gunbu,” 377.
353 Kōketsu [纐纈], Seigun kankei, 44; Smethurst, Social Basis, 9.
354 Kōketsu [纐纈], Seigun kankei, 44.
355 Gordon, Modern History, 136.
356 Smethurst, “Creation,” 815.
357 Inoue [井上], “Seiji to gunbu,” 376.
358 Tanaka (田中) cited in Tazaki [田崎], Tanaka Giichi, 266.
359 Sims, Political History, 111-12.
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Imperial  Japanese Army to spread its militaristic values among the large part of the 
populace that was not affected by conscription.360
Membership in the  zaigō gunjinkai was  de jure voluntary, but  de facto group 
pressure by one's peers and pressure from the hamlet coerced most eligibles into joining 
in the rural areas.361 As a result, in the 1920's, as many as 80% of the eligibles in rural  
areas were members in contrast to only 40% in the urban areas.362 In 1936, the  zaigō  
gunjinkai had 14.000 branches totaling 2.9 million members.363 In order to guarantee the 
acceptance of the  zaigō gunjinkai in the populace, leaders of the local branches were 
elected by the members themselves and not by the Imperial Japanese Army authorities. 
Generally,  those  elected  leaders  came  from  the  influential  elite  of  the  hamlet,  the 
wealthy and the educated,364 which established the zaigō gunjinkai as a perfect likeness 
of the social order of the hamlets and of the entire society as well.365
6.3 The Dainihon Seinendan and Seinen Kunrenjo
In 1914, Tanaka undertook an inspection tour of Europe and America. He focused his 
interest  on  the  education  of  juvenile  males. During  his  visit  to  Germany,  he  also 
inspected youth groups that  stood under  the authoritarian rule  of  the military.  After 
returning to Japan, Tanaka sought to create a Japanese equivalent by restructuring the 
existing  youth  groups  into  one  centrally  controlled  organization.  His  aim  was  to 
influence  Japanese  juvenile  males  from  the  time  they  graduated  from  compulsory 
elementary school until they reached the conscription age of 20 years. They were to 
360 Saaler, Demokratie, 133.
361 A record of eligibles was kept in the municipality because of the conscription system and eligibles 
were “matter of factly forced” to join the zaigō gunjinkai. Inoue [井上], Ugaki Kazushige, 176; also 
Smethurst, Social Basis, 83. Peer pressure was not as strong in the urban setting because unlike in the  
rural areas citizens had not lived together in the same hamlet for decades or centuries, social networks  
for mutual help during harvest did not exist and the urban residents did not necessarily work in the 
same place making them much more individual. Smethurst, Social Basis, 68. Membership in the zaigō 
gunjinkai became mandatory from 1937 on and almost comprehensive membership was reached in the 
rural areas. Ibid., 17, 83.
362 Since the hamlet structure did not exist in the rural areas, urban members mostly joined the  zaigō 
gunjinkai voluntarily because of political conviction and were substantially more active in the political 
movement of the  zaigō gunjinkai in the 1930's. Ibid., 17-18.  After Tanaka traveled to Germany in 
1914 and was impressed by the German reserves being organized in factories as well he sought to 
change the zaigō gunjinkai's statutes accordingly. In 1917 the zaigō gunjinkai's statutes were altered 
and first factory and mine branch chapters were established. Given the success of the factory branch 
chapters  in  suppressing  strikes  during the  1918 rice  riots,  Tanaka  ordered  branch  chapters  to  be 
established in every large factory. Inoue [井上], “Seiji to gunbu,” 376-77.
363  Smethurst, Social Basis, 20. According to Inoue membership totaled 3 million in 1928. Inoue [井上], 
Ugaki Kazushige, 176.
364 Smethurst, Social Basis, 89-91.
365 Ibid., 81.
56
undergo physical training as well as spiritual training, with the focus laying on physical 
strength.  The  seinendan were  directly  connected  to  the  zaigō  gunjinkai and  would 
ensure that the youth would be ideologically  conformed.366 The  seinendan essentially 
performed the same task as the zaigō gunjinkai already did, but focused on the juvenile 
male  population.  It  spread  military  values,  established  military  order  in  the  rural 
society,367 physically  prepared  the  youth  for  their  military  service,368 and  therefore 
provided a “basis for an ideologically stable army.”369
6.3.1 Establishing the Dainihon Seinendan
The seinendan was created in 1915 under the directive of the the Education Ministry (文
部省 monbushō) and the Home Ministry (内務省 naimushō), which had been pressured 
into effect by the army, namely by Tanaka.370 Tanaka played a decisive role in creating 
the  seinendan,371 and until the outbreak of the war with China, the China-Incident in 
1937,  he  was  the  only  active  duty  soldier  who  officially held  office  within  the 
seinendan.372 As  in  the  case  of  the  zaigō  gunjinkai, existing  youth  groups  were 
centralized, thus creating a militaristic organization to control and educate the youth.373 
Military drill, physical training, and classes focusing on patriotism and ethics, under the 
leadership of the  zaigō gunjinkai,  were added to the activities of the existing youth 
366 Inoue [井上], “Seiji to gunbu,” 377; Kōketsu [纐纈], Seigun kankei, 49. Tazaki [田崎], Tanaka Giichi, 
437, 440-42. Tanaka, in a pamphlet entitleled Shakaiteki kokumin kyōiku (社会的国民教育), explained 
his aims and what he expected from the seinendan. An excerpt of this pamphlet is featured in Tazaki 
[ 田 崎 ],  Tanaka  Giichi,  441-42.  The  pamphlet  had  153 pages  and  circulation  apparently reached 
700,000 copies. Each elementary school and reservist branch chapter featured one. Smethurst, Social  
Basis, 35; Morton, Tanaka Giichi, 21.
367 Kōketsu [纐纈], Seigun kankei, 48, 50.
368 Tazaki [田崎], Tanaka Giichi, 440-42.
369 Saaler, Demokratie, 137.
370 Kōketsu [纐纈], Seigun kankei, 49; Smethurst, Social Basis, 26-27; Tazaki [田崎], Tanaka Giichi, 442. 
The Army Ministry did not create the seinendan under its own name in order to avoid criticism for 
furthering the militarization. Inoue [井上 ], “Seiji to gunbu,” 376-77. Ultimately the directives to the 
seinendan came from Tanaka and his staff and merely were presented as the Education and Home 
Ministries'. Kōketsu [纐纈], Seigun kankei, 50.
371 Inoue [井上], “Seiji to gunbu,” 377. Tazaki [田崎], Tanaka Giichi, 440.
372 Smethurst,  Social Basis, 34. Tanaka became a member of the executive board of directors from the 
formation of the seinendan on and therefore had significant influence on the organization. Kōketsu [纐
纈], Seigun kankei, 50.
373 Inoue [井上], “Seiji to gunbu,” 376-77; Smethurst, Social Basis, 27-28; Tazaki [田崎], Tanaka Giichi, 
443. The existing youth groups had, through a directive of the Home and Education ministries been  
formed into an  organization called  seinenkai ( 青年 会 ),  supervised  by local  authorities,  and  used 
increasingly during the military expansion after  the Russo-Japanese War to counter  draft-evasion. 
Kōketsu [纐纈], Seigun kankei, 49. For the history and restructuring of the independent youth groups 
see also Waswo, “Transformation,” 573-74.
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groups.374 The  seinendan closed the gap in the indoctrination system. Up to that time, 
young males were out of the reach of indoctrination during the period after graduating 
from compulsory elementary school, until they entered the army as a conscript or joined 
the  zaigō gunjinkai.375 From its  formation,  male juveniles would be indoctrinated in 
elementary schools, after graduation would enter the  seinendan, and at the age of 20 
would enter the  zaigō gunjinkai or join the Imperial Japanese Army as a conscript.376 
Although neither the  zaigō gunjinkai nor the Imperial  Japanese Army itself  was the 
official authority over the seinendan, they both had significant influence over it because 
the zaigō gunjinkai and seinendan cooperated in many activities.377
6.3.2 The Seinen Kunrenjo
An important  part  of the Ugaki  disarmament was the military's  penetration of other 
ministries' jurisdictions (that is, education) and the establishment of institutions whose 
funding did not appear in the Army Ministry's budget. One of these were the kunrenjo 
that were established in 1926. They, in addition to the seinendan, were intended to fill 
the indoctrination gap of juvenile men, from age 16 to 20, who after graduating from 
elementary school, did not continue their formal education.378 The curriculum during the 
four years of participation in the  kunrenjo comprised of 100 hours on the subject of 
ethics and civics (修身公民科 shūshin kōminka), 400 hours of military drill, 200 hours of 
general education (普通学科  futsū gakka), and 100 hours of business lectures (職業科 
shokugyōka).379 
374 Smethurst, Social Basis, 28.
375 Ibid., 26.
376 Inoue [井上], “Seiji to gunbu,” 377; Kōketsu [纐纈], Seigun kankei, 49.
377 Smethurst, Social Basis, 32-33.
378 Inoue [井上 ], Ugaki  Kazushige,  175;  Yoshida [ 吉田 ],  Nihon no guntai,  142-43. The majority of 
participants were artisans, shopkeepers and farmers with only elementary education.  Lory,  Military 
Masters, 209. The kunrenjo, like the seinendan stood under the jurisdiction of the Education Ministry. 
The zaigō gunjinkai and through it the Imperial Japanese Army, nonetheless, had significant influence 
on the  kunrenjo since the 400 hours of military drill  were supervised by reservists who made up 
40,000 of the 110,000  kunrenjo teachers. Additionally the army's regimental commanders annually 
inspected the  kunrenjo. Tanaka played a decisive role in creating the kunrenjo. By 1925 he was the 
leader of the opposition party  rikken seiyūkai and pressured the cabinet to endorse Army Minister 
Ugaki's proposal. Smethurst, Social Basis, 38-39.
379 Inoue [井上 ], Ugaki Kazushige, 175-76;  Lory,  Military Masters, 209.  Graduates from the  kunrenjo 
program served one year on active duty as conscripts, the same length that university and technical  
school graduates  did.  Inoue [井上 ], Ugaki  Kazushige,  175-76. A reserve officer  system was also 
established  following  the  Ugaki  reforms.  Graduates  from  middle  school,  who  had  successfully 
completed their schools' military training program could apply for a reserve officer's training. During 
peacetime  about  4,000  reserve  officers  graduated  from  the  officer  cadet  schools  per  year.  Drea, 
Japan's Imperial Army, 159-60.
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The same law that  established the  kunrenjo in  1926 ( 青年訓練所法  seinen 
kunrenjo hō) made military drill after finishing compulsory education obligatory by law. 
Upon completing compulsory education, juvenile males became members of the local 
seinendan and underwent military training instructed by  zaigō gunjinkai members.380 
The  army now used  both  organizations  to  indoctrinate  the  young  male  population. 
While  the  kunrenjo focused  on  military  drill  and  patriotic  training,  the  seinendan 
focused on securing ties between the army and the communities by delivering a broader 
range of training in patriotic and military subjects, as well  as physical training,  and 
therefore acted as a recruiting mechanism for the kunrenjo.381
By  1934,  roughly 40% of  the  eligibles  had enrolled  in  the  15,000  kunrenjo, 
totaling about 915,000  students. Similar to the  zaigō gunjinkai,  participation in rural 
areas was significantly higher than in urban areas. This is due to the same reason: peer 
pressure was more likely to be felt in rural Japan's hamlet structure. In 1935, in order to 
reach more eligibles, the kunrenjo and the supplementary technical schools (実業補習学
校 jitsugyō hoshū gakkō) merged. This merger increased the enrollment to a total of 
almost two million students; well over half of the eligibles participated. For the first 
time, young females were also allowed to join, constituting roughly 25 percent of the 
participants.  They,  however,  did not  participate  in  military drill. Attendance became 
compulsory for both male and female youths by law in 1939. By 1943 almost 80% – 3 
million  juvenile  males  and females  –  partook in  the  kunrenjo.  The  majority  of  the 
remaining 20% were on active military duty.382
6.4 The Dainippon Kokubō Fujinkai
Women had not been directly targeted by the military's indoctrination apparatus until 
juvenile females were admitted to the kunrenjo. As Japan proceeded on its path toward 
complete 'national mobilization,' women, to a certain extent, also moved into the focus 
of the military authorities.
Women had participated in some of the reservists' activities, for example, seeing 
off and welcoming soldiers home. Their scope of involvement, however, was intensified 
when the fujinkai was founded by mostly military wives in Osaka in 1932.383
380 Tazaki [田崎], Tanaka Giichi, 443.
381 Smethurst, Social Basis, 39-40.
382 Ibid., 41-43.
383 Ibid., 44. A women's association called Patriotic Women's Society (愛国婦人会  aikoku fujinkai) had 
existed prior to the founding of the dainippon kokubō fujinkai. It had consisted of roughly 3 million 
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At its  prime, the  fujinkai consisted of up to 8 million working class women. 
Apart from the supportive activities, the  fujinkai women participated in military drill, 
instruction in the handling of firearms under reservist instructors, partook in nationwide 
military exercises, and collected money for national defense projects. The fujinkai, from 
1937 onwards, to a significantly higher degree than the seinendan and kunrenjo, stood 
under  direct  military  control.  The  membership,  as  in  the  previously  discussed 
organizations,  was  due  to  peer  pressure.384 The  fujinkai,  however,  differed  from the 
zaigō gunjinkai, seinendan and kunrenjo in that it was an organization directly linked to 
the war.385
6.5  Duties  and  Activities  of  the  Teikoku  Zaigō  Gunjinkai  and  its 
Subsidiary Organizations
As stated  earlier,  Tanaka  envisioned  the  reservists  supporting  their  communities  in 
various ways. They were to help the elderly, support families with war dead, discourage 
the youth from doing wrong, demonstrate simplicity and fortitude, promote hygiene, 
boast  trade,  strive  to  further  rural  wealth,  encourage  community awareness,  and  to 
support  public  projects.  Additionally,  they  were  to  guide  the  youth,  Japan's  future 
soldiers, in physical training and developing their  seishin. They were also intended to 
encourage  the  populace  to  show  respect  for  the  army.386 Accordingly,  all  of  these 
activities and duties were incorporated into the zaigō gunjinkai bylaws.387
The activities and duties of the zaigō gunjinkai and its subsidiary organizations 
can be roughly divided into 3 groups: community service duties, military activities, and 
patriotic activities.
Hamlet 'age groups' that had provided services for the community had existed in 
Japan long before the independent reservist associations, and later, the zaigō gunjinkai 
was established. These services comprised of supporting the elderly and the poor, police 
duties to provide safety within the hamlet, construction work, and emergency relief.388 
According  to  the  bylaws  of  the  zaigō  gunjinkai,  the  reservists  appropriated  these 
women from the aristocracy and upper class. Due to the membership of the dainippon kokubō fujinkai  
soon exceeding it, the aikoku fujinkai, however, lost its importance. Ibid., 46-48.
384 Lory, Military Masters, 205-06; Smethurst, Social Basis, 45-47.
385 Smethurst, Social Basis, 79.
386 Tanaka (田中) cited in Tazaki [田崎], Tanaka Giichi, 266.
387 An excerpt of the bylaws can be found in Tazaki [田崎], Tanaka Giichi, 262-3. An English translation 
is featured in Smethurst, “Creation,” 818-19.
388 Smethurst, Social Basis, 145.
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activities.  This  benefited  the  zaigō  gunjinkai in  two  ways.  First  of  all,  through 
supporting the hamlet, for example, through construction work or providing relief after 
the Kantō Earthquake (1923),  the  zaigō gunjinkai,  and in the long run the Imperial 
Japanese Army, gained the respect and benevolence of the populace.389 Secondly, since 
these  activities  were  part  of  everyday life  long  before  the  zaigō  gunjinkai existed, 
participants, that is, reservists, did not necessarily see themselves as soldiers obeying 
orders, but as civilians contributing to the welfare of the hamlet.390
Military activities, like community service duties, had also been part of hamlet 
life  before  the  zaigō  gunjinkai had  been  established.  Among  these  activities  were 
supporting men on active duty, bidding farewell to conscripts, welcoming back soldiers 
returning from the barracks, and burying the war dead. Women also participated in these 
activities. Activities that only women participated in were the stitching of the  sennin 
bari (千人針 391), and preparing and sending comfort bags (慰問袋  imon bukuro) filled 
with small gifts, for example, cigarettes, to soldiers on active duty. Activities that had 
not existed before the establishment of the  zaigō gunjinkai, that were now introduced 
into hamlet life, were military drill, martial arts training, and the medical and physical 
examination of the Japanese juvenile males prior to being conscripted.392
The  third  group,  the  patriotic  activities,  were,  at  least  in  part,  strongly 
intertwined  with  the  military activities.  Their  goal,  in  particular,  was  to  further  the 
populace's willingness to serve the hamlet and the emperor, and in general, to enhance 
patriotism among the rural  populace.  The  zaigō gunjinkai,  as well  as the  seinendan, 
published journals. These journals were used by the branch chapter leadership on the 
local level as guidebooks for patriotic and civilian as well as military education and 
indoctrination. Movies and plays with patriotic motives were shown at gatherings.393 
Hosting patriotic festivities on national holidays, for example, for the coronation of the 
emperor394 and lectures on loyalty, courage and sacrifice for students, were also among 
389 Smethurst,  Social Basis, 151. The zaigō gunjinkai in cooperation with police and army was used to 
suppress strikes during the 1918 rice riots and depending on the region played an important role in  
their suppression. Inoue [井上 ], “Seiji to gunbu,”  377. The violence the Imperial  Japanese Army 
demonstrated  in  the  suppression  of  the  riots,  temporarily  undermined  the  army's  support  in  the 
populace. Humphreys, Heavenly Sword, 43.
390 Smethurst, Social Basis, 145.
391 Sennin bari  literally translates to 1,000 stitches.  1,000 women each stitched one stitch to create a 
charm that soldiers wore in battle, the sennin bari.
392 Smethurst, Social Basis, 152-54.
393 Ibid., 163-67. The journal of the  zaigō gunjinkai  was entitled Comrades in Arms  (戦友  senyū). The 
journal of the seinendan was called Imperial Youth (帝国青年 teikoku seinen) and in 1923 renamed to 
Youth (青年 seinen).
394 Smethurst, Social Basis, 174.
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these activities.395 The fujinkai women, in particular, had the duty to promote frugality. 
They supported the military in campaigns to save money encouraging others to share 
the life of a soldier and refrain from eating luxuriously, smoking expensive tobacco, and 
enjoying other unnecessary leisure activities.396
The activities of the latter two groups, for example, military drill lessons at the 
kunrenjo under instruction of local reservists, the physical examination of young males 
for conscription, roll calls (点呼  tenko), and preparatory training for conscripts,  were 
according to the motto of 'good soldier = good citizen,' and were in particular aimed at 
promoting the soldiers'  spirit (軍人精神 gunjin seishin).397 The activities of the  zaigō  
gunjinkai took  a  decisive  turn  when  the  bylaws  were  changed  in  1925.  Under  the 
direction of Tanaka,  the  zaigō gunjinkai from then on also incorporated the duty to 
prevent  so-called  dangerous  thought  from  spreading,  and  in  doing  so,  the  zaigō  
gunjinkai irretrievably became a counter-revolutionary military institution of the state.398
6.6 Indoctrination by  Means of the Teikoku Zaigō Gunjinkai and its 
Subsidiary Organizations
The indoctrination within the zaigō gunjinkai focused on an emperor-centered loyalty, 
stressing the spiritual superiority of the Japanese nation, for example, because of the 
consecutive reign of emperors from the same blood for 2500 years over a homogenous 
Japanese nation. Unlike members of the Imperial Way Faction who believed that this 
spiritual superiority would compensate for lacking technologically advanced weaponry, 
the important figures in the  zaigō gunjinkai,  Tanaka and later Ugaki, both important 
promoters of the indoctrination effort, among others, did not believe this. Tanaka and 
Ugaki instead saw this emperor-centered ideology as a focus of loyalty to be used to 
motivate and create a coherent and obedient populace.399
The zaigō gunjinkai, because of its setup, involved not only reservists but also 
school children, civil servants, teachers and school principals in its activities.400 It had a 
crucial part in spreading military values among the populace401 and was also used to 
395 Lory, Military Masters, 204.
396 Ibid., 205-06; Smethurst, Social Basis, 47.
397 Inoue [井上], Ugaki Kazushige, 176.
398 Ōe Shinobu [大江志乃夫], Tennō no guntai [天皇の軍隊] (Tokyo, Shōgakkan, 1982), 76-77.
399 Smethurst, “Creation,” 820.
400 Ibid., 818.
401 Saaler, Demokratie, 135.
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mobilize  the  population  to  oppose  party-politics.402 The  zaigō  gunjinkai became 
increasingly important to the military establishment and was used as a bulwark against 
the  strengthening  of  socialism  and  the  labor  movement  during  the  1920's  Taishō 
Democracy, to maintain order within society.403
The zaigō gunjinkai and its subsidiary organizations were successful in creating 
a populace consisting of 'national villagers.'404 The male population, and partially the 
female  population,  underwent  a  thorough  indoctrination  in  values  the  military 
determined, from elementary school until old age. This militarization of the populace 
was secured through the various organizations. They and the army's intrusions into, for 
example, the educational system, enabled the army to at least ideologically control the 
Japanese males for the better part of their lives. In terms of socialization, the army was 
the sole entity that had significant influence on Japanese males.405 The zaigō gunjinkai, 
as Tanaka had anticipated, played an important role in spreading militarism among the 
populace and establishing military order in rural society.406 This indoctrination, however, 
was not conclusive as the example of wearing military attire while not on active duty 
demonstrates.407 Furthermore, the seinendan, as well as the zaigō gunjinkai, temporarily 
escaped from the direct control of the  army.408 Nonetheless, through securing that all 
members of society were reached, regardless of their level of education, the basis for 
402 Berger, “Politics,” 116.
403 Kōketsu [纐纈], Seigun kankei, 47-48.
404 Smethurst, Social Basis, 49.
405 Saaler,  Demokratie, 138;  Tsurumi,  Social Change, 88-89.  According to Saaler, the indoctrination of 
women with militaristic values was hardly successful. Saaler, Demokratie, 138.
406 Kōketsu [纐纈], Seigun kankei, 47-48.
407 Although the  zaigō gunjinkai encouraged the veterans to wear their formal military attire, and the 
percentage of veterans that  followed this order rose during the Taishō period, even in 1931 most 
veterans still preferred other clothing styles and wore mostly the Japanese style  kimono. However, 
with the beginning of the Shōwa era the wearing of Western style clothes also spread. Most veterans  
merely did not want to wear clothes  that  reminded them of the harsh times and strictly enforced 
obedience during their active duty. Fuji [藤井], Zaigō gunjinkai, 3-4.
408 Through reforms the Education and Home Ministries lost influence over the seinendan which to the 
vexation and dismay of the army became increasingly independent. From the mid 1920's on, however, 
the army was able to regain its temporary lost influence over the  seinendan and become the single 
authority over it.  Kōketsu  [纐纈 ], Seigun kankei,  52.  The  zaigō gunjinkai had  become the  most 
influential patriotic pressure group in the 1930's and at times exceeded the Imperial Japanese Army's 
intentions. Two radical groups, for example, emerged in the zaigō gunjinkai, the meirinkai (明倫会 ) 
and the  san-roku kurabu (三六クラブ ) that, from the viewpoint of the  zaigō gunjinkai leadership, 
advocated  rebellious  thought. Smethurst,  Social  Basis, 176;  Richard  J.  Smethurst,  “The Imperial 
Military Reserve Association and the Minobe Crisis in 1935,” in  Crisis politics in Prewar Japan:  
Institutional and Ideological Problems of  the 1930s,  ed.  George M. Wilson et  al.  (Tokyo:  Sophia 
University,  1970), 2-4.  According  to  Maruyama,  the  reservists  were  the  main  factor  in  turning 
Minobe's state theory into a crisis within the Japanese society. The theory, as Maruyama states, had  
been accepted as common sense by civil and judicial officials and the intelligentsia, as well as parts of  
the military authorities  for  many years.  The populace,  however,  perceived  it  as  utterly improper.  
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successful indoctrination was secured.409 The army was able to use the zaigō gunjinkai 
and  seinendan as  a  public  relations  organ  for  national  defense  and  succeeded  in 
encouraging militarization and ultimately significantly influenced public opinion. In this 
perspective,  Tanaka's  aims  can  be  seen  as  the  beginning  of  the  foundation  of  the 
“national mobilization system” (国家総動員体制  kokka sōdōin taisei).410 Tazaki goes as 
far as stating that Tanaka's institution of 'good soldier = good citizen' was the “highest 
and  strongest  fortress  in  defending  and  advancing  the  emperor  system.”411 The 
militarization of the populace was secured during the Taishō  Democracy as the army 
was able to enhance its ideological influence over the population. The dissemination of 
Western ideologies was undermined while militarist ideology was spread.412 The zaigō 
gunjinkai and the seinendan proved to be the implementation of Tanaka's theory 'good 
citizen = good soldier' (良民即良兵 ryōmin soku ryōhei) in real life.413
6.7 The Funding of the Indoctrination Apparatus
The  zaigō gunjinkai and its subsidiary organizations had been successfully integrated, 
not only into the everyday lives of the populace, but also into the hamlet structure as 
their funding demonstrated. The local governments had no legal obligation to contribute 
to  the  funding  of  the  zaigō  gunjinkai,  the  seinendan or  the  fujinkai.  The  scope  of 
funding they received, therefore, illustrates that the organizations were accepted as part 
of  the  hamlet  structure  since  the  majority  of  the  funds  came  from  the  local 
governments.414 Revenue from land that local branch chapters owned, and interest from 
investments, made up the second largest part of the funding. Donations and membership 
dues  were  the  third  largest  source  of  income.415 Only  the  kunrenjo were  officially 
financed  by  the  Japanese  government.  This,  however,  did  not  affect  the  military 
financially because the centers were part of the educational system and were therefore 
funded  by  the  Education  Ministry.416 In  this  aspect,  the  zaigō  gunjinkai and  its 
subsidiary organizations  were a  financial  coup for  the  military.  It  was  able  to  save 
money because public relations were not necessary and at the same time was able to 
409 Humphreys, Heavenly Sword, 178-79.
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indoctrinate the populace much more thoroughly than public  relations  efforts  would 
have ever made possible.417
7.  The  Army's  Various  Connections  in  pre-World  War  II 
Japan
Generally  speaking,  the  years  after  WWI  were  not  favorable  for  the  army. 
Internationally,  imperialism was becoming obsolete  and democracy was taking over. 
Imperialistic Japan became more and more isolated.418 The victorious nations had little 
interest in allowing the Japanese military partake in their research and developments. 
Japan once again turned to Germany for the exchange of military innovations. Within 
Japan, the first party politician Hara Takashi, a liberal reformer, became Prime Minister 
(1918  –  1921).  Military budgets  were  reduced.419 Through  the  aforementioned 
institutions that secured the army to act relatively independently of the government, and 
the indoctrination effort by means of the utilization of the zaigō gunjinkai, however, the 
army  was  able  to  influence  the  state  and  the  populace  nonetheless  –  even  if  its 
popularity temporarily suffered and the army itself was seemingly in retreat.
As Inoue concluded, the military, while seemingly taking one step backward was 
merely  preparing  to  take  two  steps  forwards.420 The  percentual  decline  of  military 
budgets421 relating to Japan's overall  budgets from 1919 to 1929 reflects the general 
anti-military  sentiment.  Accepting  those  budget  cuts  and  reductions  in  terms  of 
manpower, advanced by moderate forces within the army, can be interpreted as a means 
of  working  against  openly  anti-military  sentiment. The  decline  of  budgets  and 
manpower, however, was countered with a growing intrusion of the army in the field of 
education (see 6.1). Ugaki, like his mentor Tanaka had, cooperated with the political 
parties.  Giving  in  to  budget  cuts  on  the  one  hand,  but  with  Tanaka's  aid  as  party 
politician, furthered the army's influence in the educational system, on the other hand. 
In concordance to renewed pro-military sentiment after the Manchurian Incident, the 
military's  budgets also rose again in  terms of percentage and in  actual  value as the 
417 Smethurst, Social Basis, 138-40.
418 Kisaka [木坂], “Gunbu,” 1; Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 42-43.
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national budgets rose as well until 1936. In 1937, the military's budget again reached 
war level.
The  anti-military  sentiment  lasted  until  the  party  politicians  in  whom  the 
populace had vested their trust and hopes came to disappoint them in the early Shōwa 
years. The popular sentiment slowly but surely turned against the political parties and 
parliamentarianism.422 The  populace  viewed  the  Manchurian  Incident  favorably  and 
supported the army with a nationalistic euphoria,423 which was stimulated by the mass 
media and army propaganda.424 As noted above, the ensuing right wing terrorism, was 
generally viewed positively by the populace. It also posed an opportunity for the army 
to position itself as the only source capable of reestablishing and maintaining national 
order.  Finally,  the  army had successfully permeated  the  educational  system and the 
private  sphere  of  Japan's  citizens  through  the  zaigō  gunjinkai and  its  subsidiary 
organizations.
The army was also able to hide the internal power struggles and disharmony,425 
which could – if publicized – have led to the perception within the populace that the 
army's leadership, like the politicians and big business, was merely acting for its own 
benefit and not for the well-being of the nation.
7.1 The Army's Relationship with the Bureaucracy
As demonstrated above, Yamagata Aritomo was able to place his followers in important 
positions within the army and within the civilian bureaucracy and to keep these ties 
alive. He was thus able to influence policies through his followers until his death in 
1922. Without a doubt, his last  protégé, Tanaka Giichi, was able to use these channels 
for  bureaucracy-army relations  after  Yamagata's  death,  as  he  had  before  during  the 
establishment of the  zaigō gunjinkai and the  seinendan. With the slow demise of the 
Chōshū clique after Yamagata's death and Tanaka's shift to becoming a party politician, 
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in addition to the national anti-military current, these channels, however, temporarily 
suffered as well.
The relationship between the bureaucracy – represented by the 'new bureaucrats' 
(新官僚  shinkanryō), the military, and business elite, was revived and improved in the 
early 1930's when right wing groups, made up of members of the bureaucracy, military, 
and business elite, were formed.426 Although 'army technocrats,' officers associated with 
the  Control  Faction  were  not  always  seen  as  favorable  by  the  bureaucracy,  the 
politicians,  and  big  business,  the  technocrats'  advocation  of  the  necessity  of  self-
sufficiency and their vision of 'total war' were supported.427
The military-bureaucracy ties also expanded with the emergence of “military-
bureaucratic cabinets” in the wake of the party cabinet era as close  intra-ministry ties 
became necessary to handle the financial crisis as well as domestic terrorism.  These 
'new bureaucrats' or 'reform bureaucrats' (革新官僚 kakushin kanryō) who emerged and 
became  important  during  that  time, similar  to  their  military  counterparts,  the  army 
technocrats, formed a relatively cohesive group. Most of them had studied law at Tokyo 
Imperial  University,  had  undergone  similar  professional  training,  and  shared 
experiences in research groups. They easily cooperated with the military planners in 
Japan  and  Manchuria  because  of  their  technocratic  orientation. The  successful 
cooperation  of  army  technocrats  and  'reform  bureaucrats'  in  forming  policies  in 
Manchuria, from 1932 onwards, led to the demand for a more active state to further the 
cause of 'total war' planning.428 By the late 1930's, 'reform bureaucrats' tended to favor a 
fascist form of state over liberalism and Marxism.429
Not only 'reform bureaucrats'  partook in the aforementioned research groups. 
The National Policy Research Association, founded in 1933 by Yatsugi Kazuo (矢次一
夫), brought together scholars, civil servants, politicians, and military officers to discuss 
a broad range of policy issues. This group, because of Yatsugi's close ties to the Military 
Affairs Bureau, for example, also contributed to the drafting of the aforementioned 1934 
army pamphlet entitled  The True Meaning of National Defense and the Proposal to  
Strengthen it.430
Another  area  in  which  the  bureaucracy  and  military  cooperated  were 
superagencies that were established in the mid 1930's. The Cabinet Research Bureau (内
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閣調査局 naikaku chōsakyoku), established in 1935, is a prime example of one of these 
superagencies  that  crossed ministerial  jurisdictions,  promoted the cooperation of  the 
specialist elites, and enhanced the military's intrusion into civilian administration. These 
superagencies also for the most part absorbed the political parties' last raison d'être: the 
mediation of the various elites' goals into a coherent national policy.431
Military-bureaucracy ties grew during the early 1930's and matured once fascism 
was actively promoted 'from above' by the state in the third period of Japanese fascism 
from 1936 onwards.
7.2 The Army's Cooperation with the Zaibatsu
According to Hane, the cooperation between the military and the zaibatsu began around 
March 1936 (from the Hirota Kōki  廣田弘毅  cabinet onwards). She argues that this 
originated from the fact  that the “army radicals” were against  big business and, for 
example, sought to keep the zaibatsu out of Manchuria. Building an economic base in 
Manchukuo, however, was not possible without capital from Japan. The mantetsu was 
one channel for injecting Japanese capital in Manchuria.432 Another source of capital 
were  business  conglomerates that  had  been  founded  by  “technologically  minded 
entrepreneurs,”  and  had  expanded  during  WWI  focusing  on  heavy  industry  and 
chemical goods, and emerged as the 'new zaibatsu' (新興財閥  shinkō zaibatsu).433 Kato 
also  endorses  the  view  that  the  established  zaibatsu did  not  participate  in  the 
Manchurian adventure from the beginning on. He bases his argument on the premise 
that the established zaibatsu, in contrast to the 'new zaibatsu,' initially did not support 
the army's expansionist policies and concludes that the established zaibatsu eventually 
partook in the undertaking because of the immense profits that were being made.434 Bix 
is of an opposing view and states that the established zaibatsu were aware that the army 
sought to exclude them from Manchukuo primarily for domestic reasons – that is, the 
anti-big  business  current.  The  established  zaibatsu willingly  waited  until  the 
431 Berger, “Politics,” 113-14.
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government and the mantetsu had completed infrastructure in Manchuria, while at the 
same time (1931 – 1936) pursuing the advancement of coal and iron development in 
Manchukuo and profiting from industrial activities that the mantetsu undertook, which 
had a quasi monopoly on the heavy industrialization of Manchuria.435
It  remains certain,  however,  that big business, either in the form of the 'new 
zaibatsu' or in form of the established zaibatsu, possibly both, cooperated with the army 
in Manchukuo from the early 1930's onwards. This successful cooperation was extended 
to the Japanese mainland in the 'consummation period' of Japanese fascism.
7.3 The Army in the Political Arena
An  anti-political  party  sentiment  had  existed  within  the  military  leadership  since 
political parties began to emerge in the late 1880's. As soon as party politics became an 
issue, high ranking military personnel, in spite of the policy that soldiers were not to be 
involved in politics on any level, interfered in the political arena in order to counter the 
perceived threat.436 The  army,  according to  Nish,  began actively trying  to  influence 
politics from 1905 onwards.437 Before 1905, however, the army had already extended its 
influence  into  the  political  arena  by making sure that  active  duty officers  were not 
restricted to heading the Army Ministry but also on a relatively frequent basis headed 
other ministries.
Approximately half of the Japanese Prime Ministers until 1945 had either the 
rank of admiral or general, and a large number of members of the cabinets were also 
military personnel.438 Ramseyer and Rosenbluth conclude from analyzing the percentage 
of military officials that were replaced due to the forming of new cabinets from 1924 to 
1931, which was minimal, that politicians did not maintain control over the military.439 
This conclusion seems rather bold. It is nonetheless demonstrated that the military, also 
during  the  era  of  party  cabinets,  acted  independently  at  least  in  terms  of  human 
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resources.  The  military's  intrusion  into  civilian  ministries,  during  this  era  of  party 
cabinets was significantly lower than during the Meiji era. With the loss of the political 
parties'  political  influence  in  the  1930's,  the  military's  placement  of  its  officers  in 
civilian ministries again reached Meiji levels. Although the military was less successful 
in placing its personnel in civilian ministries in the Taishō era it has been, nonetheless, 
clearly proven, that the military between 1885 and 1945 infiltrated large parts of the 
cabinets.
Through the special powers of the Army and Navy Ministers, the military was 
usually able to force the cabinet to approve its budget demands. Within the Imperial 
Diet this proved to be more difficult because hardly any military personnel was ever 
part  of it.440 This theoretically posed a problem to the military because according to 
Article 64 of the Meiji Constitution, the Imperial Diet had to approve of Japan's yearly 
budget.  The  Diet's  authority  in  this  matter,  however,  was  significantly  weakened 
through Articles 67 and 71. According to Article 67, the government had to approve of a 
budget reduction, and according to Article 71, if a budget was not decided upon – that 
is, an agreement was not established – the budget would resemble the previous year's. 
Since the Army Minister had the power to bring down the government, or use this as a 
threat, the army could at least secure the previous year's budget. Additionally, the armed 
forces  could claim the support of the emperor, in whose name they maintained they 
were acting, in order to add weight to their requests.
As  Japanese  imperialism matured  during  and after  the  victory in  the  Russo-
Japanese War, so did the military as an institution. It was able to secure the governance 
of Japan's colonies for itself, creating a military rule structure (軍事支配体制 gunji jihai  
taisei), that is, a military domination, instead of a civilian structure.441 Korea became a 
Japanese protectorate during the Russo-Japanese War. This, in addition to other areas 
which Japan included into its sphere of influence, led to Southern Manchuria becoming 
a semi-colony.442 Tanaka's visit to China in 1917 not only formed the basis for his China 
policy as Prime Minister, but was also a good example for the army to see itself as a  
natural  actor  in  actively  forming  foreign  policy. During  its  presence  on  the  Asian 
mainland, the army had established an impressive information network in China. Troops 
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were  stationed  in  China,  Korea  and  Manchuria.  The  army acted  as  a  police  force 
securing the mantetsu, provided the military attachés in Beijing, and maintained military 
advisers  and  “resident  military  officers  in  major  cities.”  Army  officers  were  also 
increasingly trained  as  China  experts  who would  eventually  play an  important  role 
within the army.443 In terms of continental affairs, the army acted independently and 
sometimes  deliberately  against  government  policy,  on  considerable  occasions  with 
growing intensity and frequency in the years from 1915 to 1925.444
In  the  late  1920's,  the  army was  to  a  certain  degree  still  controlled  by  the 
government. It was not for example able to fend off the reduction of four divisions 
(most of the money saved was used for modernizing the military) and was not able to 
enforce an intervention in North China over the opposition of the government in 1928. 
The signing of the Naval Disarmament in London in 1930 was a further blow to the 
military. Shortly after that  humiliation, reactionist societies were formed by so-called 
young officers who joined with right wing civilians. Although the various coup d'états 
by secret societies all failed, these attempts did play into the hands of the army because 
they could be used by the army leadership to demonstrate that a more liberal attempt on 
the  side  of  the  government  would  not  provide  a  solution  to  Japan's  problems  and, 
therefore, put additional pressure on the government. The army, thus, gained momentum 
in the 1930's and acted relatively independently from government control in China and 
Manchuria, greatly expanding its troops in Manchuria from 10,000 in 1931 to 164,000 
in 1935. The government was relatively helpless and had to accept various actions of 
the army in China and Manchuria as faits accomplis, which in turn further strengthened 
the army's position. The army used the Meiji institutions that were not altered in the 
Taishō period to tighten its grip and became an important source of power in the 1930's. 
What greatly supported the army in gaining power was that the leaders of the zaibatsu 
and the party politicians agreed to the army's policy of protecting the Japanese Empire 
by securing access to China's resources, and neither of the two (1) objected to the policy 
that the well-being of Japan's economy in the future would rely on China and (2) could 
ignore the support of the emperor in whose name the army claimed to be acting.445 The 
declaration of Mastuoka Yōsuke (松岡洋右), a rikken seiyūkai politician, in 1931, before 
the Manchurian Incident took place, that 'Manchuria is Japan's lifeline,' a  declaration 
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that acquired “widespread popular appeal,”446 exemplifies that the political parties, in 
order to survive and retain at least part of their influence, sought the military as an ally.
Japan grew increasingly isolated after it withdrew from the League of Nations in 
1933. This increasing isolation demanded a new approach in foreign policy. The focus 
was again shifted to “'autonomous strength.'” The military's  renewed and intensified 
intrusion  into  civilian  government  administration  was  justified  by  the  theory  that 
military  supervision  was  necessary  to  gear  the  entire  nation  toward  'total  war.' 
Expansion of the heavy industry as well as the military, was justified on the grounds that 
Japanese diplomacy was to be based on a strong military backing in order to neutralize 
the perceived threats that likely enemies – the U.S., Russia, and the Chinese Nationalist 
government – posed to Japan's territorial interests.447 Yamagata Aritomo's theory of the 
necessity of defending Japan's 'lines of sovereignty' and 'lines of interests' and Tanaka's 
aim to become a self-sufficient nation, were again clearly mirrored in Japanese foreign 
policy.
Until the military became a dominating political power in the late 1930's, the 
dualism  of  military  and  political  leadership  led  to  instability  because  neither  the 
government  nor  the  army  could  dictate  its  views  completely.  The  political  party 
governments placed a challenge on the army in the years after WWI, but were never 
able to seriously threaten the army's position.
8. Epilogue: Towards Total War
One aspect that aided in preparing the nation for complete 'national mobilization' and 
eventually 'total  war' was  the  enactment  of  the  Peace  Preservation  Law.  The Peace 
Preservation Law, limiting the citizens rights, was enacted in 1925, the same year that 
general male suffrage was also enacted and gave the Taishō Democracy a whole new 
perspective: one that significantly increased the number of eligible voters.
The authors of the Peace Preservation Law supposedly did not aim at creating a 
repressive state. It was merely meant to preserve order in times of a growing threat 
posed by the radical left – as anarchism, communism, and individualism were perceived 
as threats. The inclusion of the term kokutai into Article 1 of the law, however, formed 
the basis for its being easily abused by the right wing. The right wing could justify any 
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action by stating its intention to defend the kokutai.448 The inclusion of the provision that 
endangering the kokutai was an illegal act, however, not only benefited the right wing. 
Since no official  definition existed of what the term  kokutai specifically meant,  this 
gave the authorities the means to prosecute anyone who spread “'dangerous thought.'”449 
In 1928 the Peace Preservation Law was revised by an emergency imperial edict.  It 
enhanced, for example, the judicial,  the police's,  and the state's powers, and enacted 
mechanisms to further restrict  pro democracy forces, thus furthering the progress of 
Japan's fascization.450 In the 1930's, the Peace Preservation Law was increasingly used 
by the  special  police  ( 特 別高 等警 察  tokubetsu  kōtō  keisatsu)  to  arrest  “'thought 
criminals,'” that is, objectionable radicals. They were coerced to renounce their beliefs, 
and after their successful conversion, reintegrated into their communities,451 a practice 
known as tenkō (転向).
Before  examining  the  China  Incident  and  briefly  focusing  on  the  National 
Mobilization Law of 1938 as an example for legislation that was brought forward as a 
response to the China Incident, and to further prepare the nation for 'total war,' the focus 
will now be on the kokutai no hongi.
8.1 The Kokutai no Hongi
While 'fascism from above'  was spread by the technocratic  leaders  of  the state,  the 
irrational fascist ideology entered a new level with the publication of the  kokutai no 
hongi in 1937.
The idea of the kokutai had been extended to an ideology that defined Japan as a 
nation of “absolute unity” and “unrivaled superiority” in the late 1920's to the mid-
1930's.452 This view was widely spread through the publication of the kokutai no hongi 
in March 1937. The kokutai no hongi used Japan's superiority as a means to justify the 
Japanese domination of Asia and based this justification on ancient Japanese history. 
The  continuity  that  formed  an  important  base  for  this  ideology  was  stressed  and 
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emphasized in the same way in various passages: examples taken from the kojiki (古事
記) and the nihongi (日本紀) were usually paired with examples from the Meiji era thus 
skillfully  closing  the  gap  of  several  hundred  years  and  creating  “the  illusion  of  a 
continuous  tradition.”453 The  importance  of  absolute  obedience  of  soldiers  was  also 
stressed as the “the emperor was the commander-in-chief and the sole purpose of the 
armed forces was to carry out the will of the emperor.”454 The publication of the kokutai 
no hongi can be seen as the result of the combined effort of the Education Ministry and 
the Imperial Japanese Army to include the clarification of the kokutai (国体明徴 kokutai 
meichō) in the educational curriculum,455 as well as a result of the movement to clarify 
the kokutai (国体明徴運動  kokutai meichō undō),456 in which the zaigō gunjinkai had a 
decisive role.457 The  kokutai no hongi was, on the one hand, intended to be read by 
teachers on all levels, elementary to university, and by students of higher schools and, 
on the other hand, by the general public.  Approximately 2 million copies circulated 
within  Japan  and  references  to  it  were  consistently  made  in  public  speeches  and 
ceremonies  during  national  holidays.458 Important  aspects  of  Uesugi  Shinkichi's  and 
Kakehi  Katsuhiko's  theories  were  included  in  the  kokutai  no  hongi,  thus  further 
dominating Japanese indoctrination.459 Fascism was finally  manifested as the official 
Japanese state ideology through the kokutai no hongi.460
8.2 The China Incident and the National Mobilization Law
The  so-called  China  Incident,  which  eventually  turned into  a  full-fledged war  with 
China began on 7 July 1937, with shots fired at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing. 
The China Incident was not planned by the army as the Manchurian Incident had been, 
but  was a  result  of  skirmishes  that  had taken place  for  years  on the  Sino-Japanese 
border.  The incident  could have ended on July 11,  as a cease fire had been locally 
agreed upon. The Konoe government, nonetheless, sent reinforcements, and the conflict, 
453 Ibid., 266-67.
454 Skya, Holy War, 265.
455 Krebs, Japan im Pazifischen Krieg, 22.
456 Skya,  Holy War, 264.  The result of this movement, for example, the banning of three of Minobe's 
books, and his forced retirement from his seat in the Diet, is sometimes labeled a “'bloodless coup 
d'etat ([無血クーデター ]  muketsu kudeta)'” successful in achieving some of the radical right wing's 
goals: removing those from power who opposed their radical goals. Ibid., 256.
457 Smethurst, “Minobe Crisis,” 9-14.
458 Robert  King  Hall,  introduction  to  Kokutai  no  Hongi,  ed. Robert  King  Hall,  trans. John  Owen 
Gauntlett (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 10-11.
459 Neumann, Politisches Denken, 271-72; Skya, Holy War, 265.
460 Skya, Holy War, 263-64.
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following more skirmishes,  escalated into a full-blown war by the end of July with 
Japan occupying Beijing and Tianjin. The majority of the army leadership were certain 
that  victory would  be  achieved  within  a  few months.  They were  supported  by the 
Foreign Ministry and the navy, as well as a number of politicians who demanded them 
to fight until a complete victory was reached, in order to teach China a lesson. The 
conflict  was  extended  southwards  by  the  army  and  the  navy,  the  army  occupying 
Shanghai and Nanjing by mid-December 1937. The navy grasped the opportunity and 
extended  the  battles  as  far  south  as  the  Netherlands  Indies  thus  preparing  for  a 
southward expansion of the Japanese Empire. By January 1938, Konoe announced a 
new goal  for  the  ongoing conflict:  the  eradication  of  Chiang Kai-shek's  Nationalist 
regime.461
From the  China  Incident  on,  more  measures  were  undertaken  to  silence  the 
remaining proponents  of  the  labor  and tenant  movements  and restrictive  laws were 
enacted. The state moved closer towards “outright fascism.”462 The army teamed with 
Prime  Minister  Konoe whom the  army's  leadership  saw as  a  willing  companion in 
implementing the plans for a planned economy. The 'new bureaucrats' and some party 
politicians followed suit and a broad range of new legislation was enacted in spite of the 
opposition of the industry and a large part of the Diet. Both groups did not have the 
means to stop legislation, which was being enacted as a necessity, due to the war and for 
the  sake  of  the  well-being  of  the  Japanese  nation.463 According  to  Krebs,  one  can 
summarize that the Diet from the Meiji  era until  the prewar-Shōwa years,  generally 
speaking, never combined and used all its power to interfere with the military's policies. 
In times of declared national or military emergencies (real or imagined) the Diet gave 
way to the military's demands. Politicians, rather than opposing the military, acted as 
patriots,  and  by  supporting  expansionist  policies,  sought  to  enhance  their  own 
prestige.464 The  core of  the  restrictive  laws  that  were  succeedingly  passed  was  the 
National Mobilization Law of 1938. It essentially gave the ones in power unrestricted 
authority to promote the mobilization of the nation and the populace for war in the 
461 Gordon, Modern History, 204; Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 54; Sims, Political History, 206. Böttcher 
sees the initial escalation caused by the Konoe government as an attempt to lure attention away from 
domestic problems. Böttcher, “Faschismus,” 91. The second Sino-Japanese war was not called war but 
'China Incident' because a war with China would have violated the terms of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.  
A violation of the pact could have led other countries to intervene. Krebs, Japan im Pazifischen Krieg, 
46.
462 Maruyama, “Ideology,” 72.
463 Krebs, “Kaiserliche Militär,” 54-55.
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private sphere as well as all sectors of the economy. Freedom of speech was further 
restricted, strikes were outlawed, and freedom of movement was limited through forced 
labor allocation. The government now enjoyed widespread control over the economy 
and the remaining power of the political parties and the Diet was virtually eradicated.465
8.3 Total War
Until 1937, as Bix notes, the Japanese state's fascization progressed as the Diet's and the 
political parties' power declined. The parties kept the image of pluralism intact as long 
as  possible  while  the  power  centered  among  the  members  of  the  zaibatsu and  the 
Imperial Japanese Army officers of the Control Faction, who were coinstantaneously 
members of the bureaucracy and had access to the emperor.466 The situation after the 
China Incident changed, as demonstrated above, in as far as, the political parties, which 
eventually dissolved themselves. In addition, the Diet increasingly lost power and thus 
influence.
Hane sees the formation of the first Konoe cabinet as forming concurrently with 
the beginning of direct preparations for 'total war' and along with the China Incident, 
providing an additional base for the eradication of the remaining liberal and democratic 
tendencies through the “triumph of militarism and ultranationalism.”467 Tipton, however, 
suggests  that  conservatives  and  party  politicians  were  able  to  initially  fend  off  the 
“reformists'” aims to create a “'national defence state.'” Only after the outbreak of the 
China  Incident  did  newly  erupting  notions  of  patriotism  lead  the  Diet  to  support 
legislation for the restructuring of the state,  for example,  and most  importantly,  the 
creation of the previously discussed National Mobilization Law. However, she argues 
that this legislation was not as far-reaching as the reformists demanded, and the power 
struggles continued. She also states that the military was not in place to solely dominate 
the  state  after  the  February  26  Incident,  and  although  having  significantly  gained 
influence by 1940, was still  not  the sole  political  power during the Tōjō cabinet.468 
Whether  the  military had become the  sole  political  power,  or  not,  following Sims's 
argument,  it  did  have  a  significant  influence.469 Tipton  acknowledges  that  although 
465 Böttcher,  “Faschismus,” 92; Bürkner,  “Probleme,” 90;  Hartmann,  Geschichte, 190;  Krebs, 
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466 Bix, “Rethinking,” 18.
467 Hane, Modern Japan, 288.
468 Tipton, Modern Japan, 129-31.
469 Sims, Political History, 203.
76
establishing the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (大政翼賛会 taisei yokusankai) as 
a “mass organization for political integration” failed, institutions that were attached to it, 
for example the seinendan and the  fujinkai, which as demonstrated in Chapter 6 were 
greatly influenced and increasingly dominated by the Imperial Japanese Army, had great 
influence  on  the  populace  and  involved  it  in  the  war  effort.470 The  first  general 
mobilization plan had been developed under Tanaka Giichi's supervision between 1915 
and 1917.471 There is disagreement about whether or not Japan became dominated by 
the army or at  what point  they became preoccupied by the war effort.  Nonetheless, 
'national mobilization' was maximized and 'total war' reached the Japanese mainland, at 
the latest when Pearl Harbor was attacked, dominating the Japanese populace's lives 
until Japan's defeat in 1945.472
Conclusion
Yamagata  Aritomo's  conviction  that  universal  conscription  would  be  an  important 
educational factor, and that it would aid the unification of the nation and create loyal  
citizens, prompted him to establish the Imperial Japanese Army as an army based on 
conscripts. His emphasis on the necessity of loyalty was reflected in the gunjin chokuyu 
as well as in the kyōiku chokugo. The institutions he aided in establishing, for example, 
the  sanbō  honbu,  and  the  army's  position  in  the  Meiji  Constitution  as  well  as  his 
authority, made the army a powerful and very independent actor, not only in the military 
sphere but in the political sphere as well. Tanaka Giichi, who shared many views with 
his mentor, sought to further the army's ties within the population, on the one hand, 
while simultaneously instilling military values in the entire populace on the other hand. 
He was convinced that future wars would be 'nation total wars.' These wars, as Tanaka 
perceived,  would require more than a strong military:  the mobilization of the entire 
populace. Tanaka established the zaigō gunjinkai and the seinendan on the basis of these 
convictions.  The  indoctrination  that  began  with  compulsory  education  was  thus 
extended through the seinendan. Upon reaching the age to qualify for conscription, the 
470 Tipton, Modern Japan, 131-33. The seinendan and the fujinkai can be termed as being associated with 
the  Imperial  Rule  Assistance  Association since  both  were  technically  supervised  by  the  Home 
Ministry, as was the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.
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majority of Japanese males either joined the military or the zaigō gunjinkai where their 
indoctrination continued.
Yamagata  and  Tanaka  created  more  than  a  populace  consisting  of  'national 
villagers' – loyal subjects to the Emperor. To a large part, Yamagata, within the Meiji-
System,  created  a  powerful  military  institution  –  the  Imperial  Japanese  Army  – 
independent of the government, which after Yamagata's and Tanaka's death proved to be 
more or less uncontrollable. Neither Yamagata nor Tanaka can be attributed with being 
fascist. However, Yamagata was to a high degree involved in establishing a framework 
for militarism to develop in Japan. Tanaka extended the scope of indoctrination, which 
was influenced by the militarist and fascist thought of, for example Kakehi Katsuhiko 
and Uesugi Shinkichi,  to  spread widely into the lives of the Japanese populace and 
therefore exposing the masses to this ideology.
In Japan, militarism and fascism lacked mass base support concentrated in a 
fascist political party. The high ranking officers' toleration of the secret societies and the 
terrorist  attacks,  in  which  so-called  young  officers  and  civilian  extremists  were 
involved,  which  benefited  the  army  during  its  struggle  for  power,  as  well  as  the 
deteriorating  socioeconomic  situation  that  stimulated  the  terrorist  plotters' 
dissatisfaction with the status quo, were a decisive factor, but not the sole basis for the 
spreading of fascism in prewar Japan. Further, the instability that evolved after the Meiji 
oligarchs had died also benefited the extremist forces within Japan because the elite 
competing for power either chose not to intervene in the radicalization or due to their 
lack  of  power  could  not.  However,  the  willing  mass  base  that  cheered  the  fascist 
terrorists,  supported  the  expansionist  policies,  and  carried  the  burden  of  complete 
'national  mobilization'  in  the  'total  war'  effort,  was  created  by  the  pillars  of  the 
indoctrination effort: initially through (1) compulsory education shaped by the  kyōiku  
chokugo, but especially through (2) universal conscription and (3) the  zaigō gunjinkai 
and its subsidiary organizations. The Imperial Japanese Army, therefore, can be seen as 
already having been a decisive factor in spreading militarism and fascism in prewar 
Japan even before actively promoting 'fascism from above' in the third period – the 
wartime period – of Japanese fascism.
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Appendix I: Select Glossary of Japanese Terms
•Chian ijihō 治安維持法 Peace Preservation Law
•Chōheirei 徴兵令 Conscription Ordinance of 1873
•Chokurei 勅令 Imperial command
•Dainippon kokubō fujinkai 大日本国防婦人会 Greater Japan National Defense 
Women’s Association
•Dainippon seinendan 大日本青年団 Greater Japan Youth Association
•Dainippon teikoku kenpō 大日本帝国憲法 Constitution of the Empire of Japan
•Dainippon teikoku rikugun 大日本帝国陸軍 Imperial Japanese Army
•Fujinkai 婦人会 See: Dainippon kokubō fujinkai
•Gakusei 学制 Education Order of 1872
•Genrō 元老 Elder statesman
•Gunbu daijin geneki bukansei 軍部大臣現役武官制 Regulation that the Army Minister 
had to be an officer on active duty
•Gunjin chokuyu 軍人勅諭 Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors
•Gunji kyōiku 軍事教育 Military education
•Gunji kyōren 軍事教練 Military drill
•Gunjin kunkai 軍人訓戒 Admonitions to the Armed Forces
•Gunjin seishin 軍人精神 Soldiers' spirit
•Gunrei 軍令 Military decree
•Gunrei 軍令 Imperial Japanese Army's command 
•Gunsei 軍政 Imperial Japanese Army's
administration
•Guntai naimusho 軍隊内務書 Handbook of Interior Administration
•Han 藩 Feudal domains
•Iaku jōsō 帷幄上奏 Army Minister's direct access to the 
emperor
•Jūgonen sensō 十五年戦争 15 Year War
•Kakushin kanryō 革新官僚 Reform bureaucrats
•Kantōgun 関東軍 Japanese Kwantung Army
•Kiheitai 奇兵隊 Irregular militia
•Kōdōha 皇道派 Imperial Way Faction
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•Kokka sōdōin 国家総動員 National mobilization
•Kokutai 国体 National polity
•Kokutai no hongi 国体の本義 Fundamentals of our National Polity
•Kyōiku chokugo 教育勅語 See: Kyōiku ni kansuru chokugo
•Kyōiku ni kansuru chokugo 教育ニ関スル勅語 Imperial Rescript on Education
•Kunrenjo 訓練所 See: Seinen kunrenjo
•Mantetsu 満鉄 See: Minami manshū tetsudō
•Manshūkoku 満州国 Manchukuo
•Manshū jihen 満州事変 Manchurian Incident
•Meiji kenpō 明治憲法 See: Dainippon teikoku kenpō
•Minami manshū tetsudō 南満州鉄道 South Manchurian Railway
•Monbushō 文部省 Education Ministry
•Naimushō 内務省 Home Ministry
•Ni-niroku jiken 二・二六事件 February 26 Incident
•Rikugunshō 陸軍省 Army Ministry 
•Rikugun yōnen gakkō 陸軍幼年学校 Army preparatory schools
•Rikugun daigakkō 陸軍大学校 Army College
•Rikugun shikan gakkō 陸軍士官学校 Army Academy
•Ryōhei soku ryōmin 良兵即良民 Good soldier = good citizen
•Sanbō honbu 参謀本部 General Staff Office
•Seinendan 青年団 See: Dainippon seinendan
•Seinen kunrenjo 青年訓練所 Youth Training Centers 
•Seinen shōkō 青年将校 Young officers
•Seishin kyōiku 精神教育 Ideological education
•Shina jihen 支那事変 China Incident
•Shinkanryō 新官僚 New bureaucrats
•Shinkō zaibatsu 新興財閥 New zaibatsu
•Shizoku 士族 Former samurai
•Shotai 諸隊 Mixed militia unit
•Shōwa ishin 昭和維新 Shōwa Restoration
•Sōhei 壯兵 Army based on volunteers, primarily 
shizoku
•Taishō demokurashii 大正デモクラシー Taishō Democracy
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•Teikoku kokubō kōshin 帝国国防方針 Imperial National Defense Plan
•Teikoku zaigō gunjinkai 帝国在郷軍人会 Imperial Military Reserve 
Association
•Tōseiha 統制派 Control Faction
•Zaibatsu 財閥 Business conglomerate
•Zaigō gunjinkai 在郷軍人会 See: Teikoku zaigō gunjinkai
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Appendix II: Translation
Kōketsu Atsushi [纐纈厚]. Kindai nihon no seigun kankei: Gunjin seijika Tanaka Giichi  
no kiseki [近代日本の政軍関係―軍人政治家田中義一の軌跡]
Modern Japan's Government-Army Relations: The Locus of the Soldier-Politician 
Tanaka Giichi
Chapter 2: Army Reforms and the Formation of the the Army's Popular Base
Section 2: The Formation of the the Army's Popular Base
1. The Establishment of the Imperial Military Reserve Association
Tanaka,1 at that time commander of the infantry's third regiment, who had partaken in 
the  revision  of  various  command  regulations,  was inaugurated  Section  Chief  of  the 
Military Affairs Bureau in the Army Ministry on 28 June 1909 (Meiji 11). At that time 
Terauchi  Masatake2 was  Army Minister.  The  [position]  of  Military  Affairs  Section 
Chief,  as  a  gateway  to  success  to  future  [posts],  such  as  Military  Affairs  Bureau 
Director, Vice Army Minister, and furthermore Army Minister, was an important post. 
Terauchi  selected  Tanaka  as  Military  Affairs  Section  Chief,  who  following  his 
predecessor Ōi Shigemoto3, was from Yamaguchi, but also achieved outstanding results 
in  practical  business  affairs.  Through  this,  together  with  Military  Affairs  Bureau 
Director  Nagaoka  Gaishi4 also  from  Yamaguchi,  Terauchi  was  about  to  mold  the 
'Terauchi – Nagaoka – Tanaka' line, so to speak, the Chōshū Clique's Army Ministry's 
mainstay  line.  Terauchi  strengthened  the  structure  that  concretely  implemented  the 
“Army Handbook of Interior Administration,”5 which had been revised by this staff.
The establishment of the Imperial Military Reserve Association6 was the greatest 
project that Tanaka conducted during the time of his position as Military Affairs Section 
Chief (January 1909 – February 1910). According to the Biography of Tanaka Giichi, it 
1 田中義一, 1864 – 1929. For details on Tanaka Giichi, see Chapter 5 of this thesis.
2 寺内正毅 , 1852 – 1919. Imperial Japanese Army officer. Army Minister (1902 – 1910), Governor-
General of Korea (1910 – 1916), Prime Minister (1916 – 1918).
3 大井成元, 1863 – 1951. Imperial Japanese Army officer. Section Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau 
(1906 – 1909), President of the the Army College (1912 – 1914).
4 長岡外史 , 1858 – 1933. Imperial Japanese Army officer. Member of the House of Representatives 
(1924 – 1928).
5 軍隊内務書 guntai naimusho.
6 For the Imperial Military Reserve Association (帝国在郷軍人会 teikoku zaigō gunjinkai) see Chapter 6 
of this thesis.
I
is  assumed  that  Tanaka  first  advocated  the  establishment  of  the  Imperial  Military 
Reserve Association in June 1903 (Meiji 36). At that time Tanaka received a command 
for  deployment  to  Russia.  It  is  noted  that  he  made  the  following statement  on  the 
occasion of his farewell party.
In the case that  a country as  small  as  Japan wages  war,  it  will  be from the
situation that the opponent is a large country, as it was with the Sino-Japanese
War, and will be the same hereafter. Because there is also a great difference in
the number of the people, in case the war is long [and] drawn out, it  will be
necessary to draft  the reservists7 and rapidly send the soldiers  of  the second
reserve  to  the  war  front.  Moreover,  the  guidance  of  the  soldiers  after  their
honorable discharge is of utmost importance. Also, it is of utmost importance to
let the result of military education be amply demonstrated in the hometowns and
to become the backbone of the hometown's population. <Annotation 208>
The  mentioned  “reservists”  are  militarist  organizations  and  reservist 
organizations  that  had  already been individually  established  all  over  the  country  in 
various places before the establishment of the Imperial Military Reserve Association. It 
is  noted that the actual  number counted in the phase of 1906 (Meiji  39) was 4,367 
groups,  and  in  1910  (Meiji  43),  at  the  time  when  the  Imperial  Military  Reserve 
Association was established there were already 11,364 groups <Annotation 21>.
Tanaka hypothesized a war against Russia, which, in the inevitable-outbreak-of-
war atmosphere  during that  time,  had become a likelihood,  and considered that  the 
number  of  standing  divisions  (13  divisions  before  the  outbreak  of  war)  was  not 
sufficient to oppose the Russian army that at that time was said to be the strongest. 
Accordingly,  to  prepare  for  the exhaustion of the military power and the numerical 
superiority of the Russian army, he thought of the “reservists” as a source of military 
force that would supplement the standing divisions in time of war. The Russo-Japanese 
War was practically in accordance with what Tanaka expected: the standing divisions 
were all committed to the war front and, moreover, it came as far as the mobilization of 
the second reserve soldiers. Because of that, the Japanese army ended up acquiring the 
bitter experience of being forced to mobilize its military power to the battlefield to the 
very limits of possible mobilization.
7 在郷の兵隊 (zaigō no heitai) literally translates to 'soldier(s) from the rural district(s).'
8 Annotations are not translated.
II
Against this background, on 3 November 1910 (Meiji 43), the existing militarist 
organizations and reservist organizations from various places all over the country were 
consolidated  into  the  Imperial  Military  Reserve  Association  with  Army  Minister 
General Terauchi Masatake as chairman and Imperial Prince Fushiminomiya Sadanaru9 
as president. Through this it was arranged that the reservist association groups that were 
dispersed  nation-wide  and  whose  roles  themselves  varied,  were  incorporated  and 
consolidated into the jurisdiction of the Army Minister. And the unification of every 
organization  and  the  integrity  and  unification  of  the  role  expectations  came  to  be 
demanded. Tanaka was promoted to Major General and transferred from [the post of] 
Military Affairs Section Chief to [the post of] commander of the army first division's 
second brigade in the year following the establishment of the Imperial Military Reserve 
Association. There he held a speech that was entitled “Concerning the Relationship of 
the  Army and  the  Provinces”10 and  stated  the  following  in  regards  to  the  Imperial 
Military Reserve Association role.
In Japan's future wars it will be necessary to power by all means a large army.
Even though [it  is  necessary]  to  mobilize  a  large  army in times  of  war,  the
possession  of  a  large  army  in  peacetime  is  indeed  not  permitted  by  the
circumstances of our country's financial affairs. Accordingly, in the future the
Japanese army will be small in times of peace, but when it comes to times of war 
it has to become large. When one speaks of by what means it will be enlarged in
times of war, that is the enlargement by the means of all reservists. <Annotation
22>
In  order  to  implement  the  post  Russo-Japanese  War  principle  of  twofold 
mobilization in times of war, the estimate of the enlargement of the mobilization of 
military  force  in  future  wars,  which  was  based  on the  experience  from the  Russo-
Japanese War, into reality, to guarantee the potential source of military force, already in 
peacetime,  became  an  indispensable  requirement.  The  Imperial  Military  Reserve 
Association was established as the organization that secured this  source of potential 
military force in peacetime.
Furthermore, Tanaka, in the same speech, stated “not of the ones on active duty, 
but of the reservists, one must think of as leaders of Japan's fighting strength in the 
future” <Annotation 23>. In future wars, the reservists were the very thing that was 
9 伏見宮貞愛 , 1858 – 1923. Imperial Japanese Army officer. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal (1912 – 
1915).
10 地方ト軍隊トノ関係ニ就テ chihō to guntai no kankei ni tsuite.
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located  as  the  core  of  the  source  of  mobilization  of  military  force  during wartime. 
Although this locating did not necessarily match the army's mobilization plan of that 
time, which to the end considered the active duty soldiers of the standing divisions as 
the core of the wartime mobilization.  Hereafter, especially the General Staff Office,11 
the body in charge of [military] strategy and operations, consequently came to demand 
the expansion of the standing army's divisions and at least did not possess the attitude of 
agreeing to Tanaka's plan.
But,  as  a  result  of  the  reduction  of  military  strength  that  was  enforced 
secondarily by the so called Yamanashi Disarmament12 in the years of 1922 (Taishō 11) 
and 1923 (Taishō 12), and enforced even more by the Ugaki Disarmament13 in the year 
1925  (Taishō  14),  in  the  sense  of  making  up  for  the  reduction  of  the  scope  of 
mobilization  of  military  force  during  wartime,  the  quasi  military  utilization  of  the 
Imperial  Military  Reserve  Association organization  was  considered. However,  the 
heightening of the role expectations in both of the reservist association's fields, the quasi 
military and the non-military (national defense propaganda etc.), had to wait until the 
necessity of the establishment of the national mobilization system14 was pointed out in 
the all-out war phase and became the military's largest challenge <Annotation 24>.
At any rate, in regards to Tanaka, he was certain that the establishment of the 
Imperial  Military Reserve Association was the great aim in the establishment  of the 
system of large quantity military-force-mobilization, from peacetime to wartime. This 
can be understood by the following statement, which is also from the aforementioned 
speech.
The Japanese population is numerous but because the finances are not opulent, 
the  support  of  a  large  army in  peacetime  is  not  permitted  by the  country's  
capacity. We perform to the utmost effort; however, there are limits to things. It 
is nearly impossible to perceive one human being as being equivalent to 20 other 
persons. Therefore in the meanwhile, because there are limits, I think that in  
wars  from  now  on,  it  will  become  the  Japanese  army's  most  important  
requirement to accelerate the replenishment; that is: the quick replacement [of 
exhausted troops] with fresh troops. <Annotation 25>
11 参謀本部 sanbō honbu.
12 山梨軍縮 yamanashi gunshuku.
13 宇垣軍縮 ugaki gunshuku.
14 国家総動員体制 kokka sōdōin taisei.
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And,  moreover,  Tanaka,  through  the  linkage  and  combination  of  national 
education and military education, as stated in the preceding paragraph, expected from 
the Imperial Military Reserve Association the promotion of the integration of the people 
as  well  as  the  formation  of  the  army's  popular  base.  In  the  same  “Concerning  the 
Relationship of the Army and the Provinces” Tanaka stated as follows.
You have to be the ones who set an example of this thrift and exertion in your
hometown.  Also,  when  you  return  to  your  hometown  you must  receive  the
respect of the people because you are trained on the basis of the doctrine of
being  very  sincere  towards  people,  very  diligent  in  business  affairs,  and
industrious in your own occupation. Your behavior as reservists will generate
respect in and create trust from the people in villages or towns. Because of you,
order  in  the villages  or  towns will  be properly maintained and manners  will
improve.  Because you  are diligent  in  an honest  business,  the productivity  of
towns and villages will improve. <Annotation 26>
In  other  words,  he  [Tanaka]  expected  the  reservists  to  behave  as  models  of 
exemplary  citizens  in  the  regional  communities.  Thereby,  by  being  the  people's 
backbone  that  contributed  to  the  establishment  of  provincial  order,  hindering  the 
disorder of morals and manners that arose among the people was expected. Moreover, 
by the dedication towards everyday production projects, the performance of the role of 
vanguard of the regional communities' material development was expected. Actually, 
the reservists thereafter gradually came to be expected to be a provincial organization 
for the unification of the people and came to accomplish the important role of spreading 
militarism within the military order of provincial society.
This  plan  of  Tanaka  is  concisely  summarized  in  the  following  concluding 
section. This  is  the  following  passage:  “I  think  that  national  education  must  inject 
military ideology.  Accordingly,  it  is necessary to consistently glue the army and the 
provincial supporters together, to inject military ideology into all provincial youths and 
also,  as much as possible,  to choose the process of allowing military education and 
national education to coincide.” <Annotation 27> Here, the necessity of the Imperial 
Military Reserve Association, which in one of Tanaka's plans was the physical means of 
combining and linking military education and national education, to become a medium, 
was precisely located <Annotation 28>.
Also,  in June 1911 (Meiji  44),  during his time as commander  of the second 
brigade,  in  a  lecture  entitled  “The People and the Reservists”  that  Tanaka held,  he 
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insisted  on  the  necessity  of  letting  the  Imperial  Military  Reserve  Association  as  a 
people's group become established within society. He stated, namely,  “I believe that, 
when speaking of  this  subject  matter,  this  association  is  truly a  people's  group,  the 
soldiers become the backbone of it, the people in general will become supporters and 
will become advocates of it, and all together will jointly cooperate, and face this large 
primary  goal  and  advance  courageously”  <Annotation  29>.  By  name,  it  was  the 
Imperial  Military  Reserve  Association  but  in  reality,  he  located  it  as  the  “people's 
group.” Furthermore, “the time in which one thought in terms of an army society as 
another  society,  which is  independent  of  the people,  is  already a thing  of  the past. 
Today's army endeavors [to do this], based on the belief that it can only completely 
reach the goal for the first time when it has the sympathy and support of the people 
<Annotation 30>.
Here the role that Tanaka expected of the Imperial Military Reserve Association 
is  summarized.  The  realization  of  the  slogans  “militarization  of  the  people”15 or 
“nationalization of the army”16 that are summarized here, and use the Imperial Military 
Reserve Association as a medium, became much more urgent subjects for the army in 
the decade of the 1920's, when the Taishō Democracy Movement, socialism, and the 
labor  movement  were  promoted.  Even  though  the  Imperial  Military  Reserve 
Association, in correspondence to these new tendencies, was forced to reorganize and 
reinforce [itself], it came to the result of generally being pushed forward as a breakwater 
to maintain rule and order.
For  example,  corresponding to  the  large  strike  at  Hachiman  Ironworks  on 5 
February 1920 (Taishō 9), and Japan's first May Day meeting on 2 May of the same 
year,  which symbolized the increase in activity of the labor movement,  the Imperial 
Military Reserve Association bulletin “Comrades in Arms17” in four consecutive issues, 
from June to September of the same year, published an article entitled “Pros and Cons 
of the Ideology Question”18 and indicated a sensitive reaction to those tendencies. This 
turns  out  to be the writing  of  “Comrades  in  Arms” chief  editor  Lieutenant  General 
Yamanashi Hanzō.19 [He] conducted an appeal to the reservists to use plenty of caution 
15 国民の軍隊化 kokumin no guntaika.
16 軍隊の国民化 guntai no kokuminka.
17 戦友 senyū.
18 思想問題是非 shisō mondai zehi.
19 山梨半造 , 1864 – 1944. Imperial Japanese Army officer. Army Minister (1921 – 1923), Governor-
General of Korea (1927 – 1929).
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in regards to those ideologies, and stated that these ideologies, radicals (communism),20 
democracy (democracy),21 individualism (liberalism)22 were entirely incompatible with 
the soldiers'  spirit,23 and concerning military education as well as national  education 
these ideologies were dangerous <Annotation 31>.
In this manner the Imperial Military Reserve Association, being a trump card for 
maintaining and restoring order in the disorder of public order, which occurred in the 
time  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War  and  even  more  in  the  time  after  World  War  I, 
became an organization that developed a positive activity.  Therefore, in making “the 
army and the people unite”24 and forcing the “people's militarization” in the following 
speech that Tanaka held in a later year “if the reservists are united and given mental 
training and discipline is increased, it will not stop with increasing the value of only 
soldiers, but it will earn the respect and sympathy of the people. Due to this thorough 
understanding,  the army and the people will  unite,  and it  will  naturally  become an 
excellent linkage,” <Annotation 32> one can read between these lines the attempt to 
obstruct  the  tide  of  democracy.  This  plan  of  Tanaka  was  also  adopted  in  the 
reorganization  of  the  Youth  Association25 organization  four  years  after  the 
establishment of the Imperial Military Reserve Association.
2. The Reorganization of the Youth Association Organization
After  the  successive  posts  of  Military  Affairs  Bureau  Director  (September  1911  – 
December  1912)  and  commander  of  the  second  brigade  (December  1912 –  August 
1914), Tanaka was assigned to the General Staff Office and from February to August 
1914 (Taishō 3), roughly the period of half a year, conducted an inspection of Europe 
and America. The factual investigation of the juvenile male education of the various 
European and American countries was the focus of this inspection. In May of the year 
following his  homecoming,  Tanaka summarized  these results  in  a  pamphlet  entitled 
“Social National Education.”26
In this  Pamphlet Tanaka showed great interest  in each nation's juvenile male 
education  and addressed  this  as  follows:  “Obviously,  the  foremost  component  of  a 
20 過激派 kagekiha (共産主義 kyōsan shugi).
21 デモクラシー demokurashii (民主主義 minshu shugi).
22 個人主義 kojin shugi (自由主義 jiyū shugi).
23 軍人精神 gunjin seishin.
24 軍隊と国民とを結合 guntai to kokumin to wo ketsugō.
25 For details concerning the [大日本]青年団 [dainippon] seinendan.([Greater Japan] Youth Association) 
see Chapter 6 of this thesis.
26 社会的国民教育 shakaiteki kokumin kyōiku.
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nation's prosperity are the people. For those who consider the long term plan for the 
state, the concentration of one's effort towards the education of the youth who will have 
to shoulder the burden of the destiny of the nation's future, has to be a matter of course 
from the beginning on” <Annotation 33>. From here on Tanaka began paying attention 
to  the  Youth  Association  organization  as  an  aim  of  youth  education.  The  Youth 
Association  organization  that  Tanaka  planned,  was  a  Youth  Association  whose 
character was that of a self improvement organization and guidance organization, whose 
members'  ages  ranged  from  after  graduation  from  compulsory  education  to  the 
conscription examination, at the maximum 20 years of age. Thus the Youth Association 
was directly connected to the Imperial Military Reserve Association, and the consistent 
course  of  compulsory  education  completion  →  Youth  Association  enrollment  → 
military service duty fulfillment →  Imperial  Military Reserve Association  admission 
was  established  and  the  Youth  Association  was  located  within  it  as  one  part 
<Annotation 34>.
The Young Person's Association27 that can be called the ancestor of the Youth 
Association,  until  then  had  steadily  advanced  the  military  structuring,  from  the 
viewpoint  of  military usefulness,  through for  example,  countering draft  evasion and 
supporting military affairs, particularly in the sequential line of military expansion after 
the Russo-Japanese War. This was not promoted through the army's leadership alone. 
Both  the  Education  Ministry28 and  the  Home  Ministry29 respectively,  inserted 
expectations and the organization was promoted. Especially in October 1908 (Meiji 41), 
through  the  leadership  encouragement  of  the  Education  Ministry  and  the  Home 
Ministry, this organization was rapidly promoted by the local administrations.
In  April  1910  (Meiji  43),  a  country-wide  youth  convention  took  place  in 
Nagoya.  “12 Guidelines  of  the  Youth  Association”30 and  “13 Articles  of  Important 
Activities”31 were presented. Against this background, the army nationalized the Home 
Ministry's  and  Education  Ministry's  Youth  Association  and  made  it  into  an 
administration agency. In regards to the characterization of a 'project for the common 
good organization'32 = 'education organization,'33 it inserted a new character and a new 
27 青年会 seinenkai.
28 文部省 monbushō.
29 内務省 naimushō.
30 青年団規十二則 seinen danki jūnisoku.
31 実行要目十三箇条 jikkō yōmoku jūsan kajō.
32 公益事業団体 kōeki jigyō dantai.
33 教化団体としての性格 kyōka dantai toshite no seikaku.
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organization policy <Annotation 35>. It is assumed that the first time the army showed 
interest  in  the military reorganization  of the Youth Association  organization  was in 
1912, when Nogi Maresuke34 showed Tanaka, who at that time was Military Affairs 
Bureau  Chief,  materials  concerning  the  youth  scouts  (Boy Scouts),35 which  he  had 
brought from England, and ordered [Tanaka] to engage in research on youth education 
on the basis of this material <Annotation 36>.
The concrete development of the Youth Association restructuring began on 15 
September  1915,  with  the  nation-wide  local  government  secretary  directive 
“Notification Concerning the Leadership Development of the Youth Association”36 with 
the joint signature of Home Minister Ichiki Kitokurō37 and Education Minister Takata 
Sanae38 of the second Ōkuma Shigenobu39 cabinet. And in January 1916 (Taishō 5), the 
central  unification  mechanism  of  the  nation-wide  Youth  Association,  the  Central 
Gratitude  Organization  Youth  Bureau40 was  established  and  the  bulletin  “Imperial 
Youth”41 was launched at the same time. Tanaka, as a member of the executive board of 
directors, came to acquire the right to have a large say within the Youth Bureau. The 
nation-wide directive addressed to local government secretaries “Case Concerning the 
Leadership Development of the Youth Association”42 appeared to have been issued by 
the Home and Education Ministries. However, the content actually came to completely 
include the ideas of the military authorities, who had Tanaka at their center.
In  other  words,  in  a  letter  to  Army  Minister  Terauchi  Masatake,  dated  1 
September 1915, Tanaka touched upon this directive. He wrote that the directive was 
established through the interim of the Home Ministry and the Education Ministry with 
Tanaka  as  mediator.  As  a  result  of  the  continuous  repetition  of  the  negotiations 
regarding the content of the Youth Association organization, the content ultimately “in 
general, following my humble (annotation, Tanaka) proposal, with the joint signature of 
both ministers, the directive, and the secondary organizational proposal will be decided, 
and within two or three days it will be published.” <Annotation 37>
34 乃木希典, 1849 – 1912. Imperial Japanese Army officer.
35 少年斥候隊 shōnen sekkōtai (ボーイスカウト bōisukauto).
36 青年団体ノ指導発達ニ関スル通牒 seinen dantai no shidō hattatsu ni kansuru tsūchō.
37 一木喜徳郎, 1867 – 1944. Education Minister (1914 – 1915), Home Minister (1915 – 1916).
38 高田早苗, 1860 – 1938. Education Minister (1915 – 1916).
39 大隈重信, 1838 – 1923. Prime Minister (1898, 1914 – 1916).
40 中央報徳会青年部 chūō hōtokukai seinenbu.
41 帝国青年 teikoku seinen.
42 青年団体ノ指導発達ニ関スル件 seinen dantai no shidō hattatsu ni kansuru ken.
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The aim of the reorganization of the Youth Association that Tanaka planned, 
was the creation of an organization with the purpose of militarily controlling the before-
conscription  stratum  of  youth,  in  other  words,  the  young  males  who  had  reached 
adulthood.  Therefore,  it  is  obvious  that  the idea  of  the combination  and linkage of 
national education and soldiers' education, identical with the details of the establishment 
of the Imperial Military Reserve Association,  was at its foundation. However, in the 
Youth Association organization,  there existed the participation of the Education and 
Home Ministries and there was also the connection with the Imperial Military Reserve 
Association. In the beginning, in the practical managing aspect, the taking of a unified 
route was impossible. In short, this was because the Education and the Home Ministries 
had the idea that the Youth Association was an enterprise-organization for the stratum 
of  youths  that  had  finished  compulsory  education,  and  that  it  was  an  independent 
organization that played the main role in genuine youth voluntary service. However, for 
the army, the Youth Association to the bitter end was an organization connected to the 
Imperial Military Reserve Association, and because it naturally treated the introduction 
of the military components as indispensable, the antagonism of the Home and Education 
Ministries toward the Army Ministry existed forthwith.
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